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Abstract
In public–key cryptography each entity generates a public and secret key. The public key
is published alongside the user’s identity, whereas the secret key is kept private. Signature
schemes allow a signer with their secret key to “sign” a message producing a digital
signature. This signature can be publicly verified and ensures that the message originated
from the signer associated with the public key. Group signatures allow users to sign on
behalf of a group of users. Essentially, this ensures that the message originates from any
member of the group. However their identity within this group is not revealed, except
to a trusted opener who holds the opening secret key. In this thesis we introduce several
variants of group signature schemes for two applications.
The first application is reputation systems, which assign a user or item a reputation
value that can be used to evaluate trustworthiness. Examples of this include Amazon,
which rates sellers out of 5, and AirBnb which rates properties and users out of 5. In
a reputation system a user often has multiple items associated with them; for example,
on Amazon a user may sell several products. We introduce a new cryptographic model,
whereby reputation values are given to users, as opposed to existing cryptographic models
where reputation values are given to items. To allow for user privacy, a user’s items cannot
be linked. We prove this model can be achieved using two variations of a group signatures
scheme, with low additional efficiency cost given the extra functionality.
The collection of user data, such as health care records or other personal data, for pro-
cessing is our second application. Group signatures allow user data to be collected while
preserving the user’s privacy but still ensuring it originates from a group member. How-
ever, the correlation of data by user is useful for processing data. Therefore, the linkability,
i.e. whether signatures can be linked by user, must balance utility and privacy. We intro-
duce a new variant of group signature scheme that provides a more flexible and privacy-
friendly form of linkability. When created, all signatures are fully unlinkable, but can be
made linkable via a centrally trusted entity known as the converter. We formally define
the requirements for this new type of group signature scheme and provide an efficient
instantiation that provably satisfies these requirements.
The previous model captures a setting where the entity collecting and processing data is
the same. Therefore the data collector can be assumed to only submit honest input to the
converter. The outputs of the converter do not provide any assurance that data originated
from a group member. We extend the previous model to remove this assumption and allow
authentication to be preserved after data is converted. In order to provide a provably
secure construction we introduce: commuting group signatures. These signatures lift the
idea from the existing work of commuting signatures to the setting of group signatures.
We formally introduce these signatures and show how they can be realised.
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This chapter provides the motivation for the work in this thesis and an overview of the
structure.
1.1 Motivation
Group signature schemes [49] allow group members to sign on behalf of a group, without
revealing their identity within this group. A group signature ensures that a message
originates from a member of the group. To ensure accountability, a trusted opener has
the power to de-anonymise signatures with the opening secret key. In this thesis we will
introduce variants of group signature schemes for two different applications.
Our first application is centralised reputation systems [7, 18, 58, 70, 106, 112, 128], where
a user or item is allocated a reputation value representing trustworthiness or merit. Cen-
tralised schemes are managed by a trusted entity who forms reputation values. However
forming reputation values is often at odds with privacy. If reputation values are formed
from feedback given by other users, then the privacy of this feedback should be ensured,
whilst also ensuring that feedback is not given in an unfair way. For example a user
could unfairly influence another’s reputation by giving a large amount of positive or neg-
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ative feedback on the same subject. Also to form a reputation value on a user’s entire
behaviour, their activities must be linked together. This linkability could potentially be
used to de-anonymise users.
In order to address this, cryptographic models have been proposed to capture the key
security and privacy properties that a reputation system should satisfy [7, 18, 58]. Differ-
ent cryptographic techniques have been used to provide instantiations that achieve these
models. Group signature schemes have been used to allow feedback to be provided while
avoiding multiple feedback on the same item [18, 58]. They have also been used to enable
the formation of reputation values whilst ensuring the privacy of users’ behaviour [70, 106].
Contribution. In this thesis we establish a cryptographic model for a centralised rep-
utation system in a setting where user behaviour is unlinkable and reputation is given
to users instead of items. This ensures that users are accountable for all their behaviour
within the system. For example, in the context of a car pooling app, we ensure that a
user’s journeys (or items) cannot be linked together. However, we still allow for a user’s
reputation to be based on all of their activities on the app, so that it accurately reflects
their overall behaviour. We show that this model can be achieved by using two variants
of group signature schemes. The first variant allows reputation to be bound to group
signatures, so that reputation can be proved alongside group membership. The second
variant is based on an existing primitive, direct anonymous attestation [29].
Our second application is the collection and processing of data for privacy enhancing ap-
plications. Group signatures enable data to be stored authenticated, whilst also preserving
a user’s privacy. However there should be a balance between privacy and utility: the cor-
relation of data by user is often necessary for data processing. For example, several high
value measurements of blood pressure over many users may have very different implica-
tions than if they were all associated with a single user. Often the exact reason for data
processing is not clear when data is collected. Data collectors gather large amounts of data
but will only use small subsets when necessary for particular applications. For example,
public Wi-Fi data was accidentally captured by Google Street View cars but later used to
improve Google’s location services.
The opener, a trusted entity with the opening secret key, could de-anonymise signatures to
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allow for processing. However, this is potentially privacy intrusive, as the opener has the
power to de-anonymise all signatures. Alternative variants of group signatures have been
proposed which, instead of the opening functionality, allow signatures to be linked. This
means that signatures do not have to be fully de-anonymised, yet the correlation of data
by user can still be determined. Controlled linkability [79, 80, 120] allows for the linking
of signatures by a trusted entity with a linking secret key. However, this is still privacy
invasive since the linking entity can obtain information about the linking of signatures.
Also it does not scale well, as each pair of signatures must be linked. This means linking
a set of n signatures would require
(
n
2
)
operations. User controlled linkability [29] allows a
user to choose a basename, as well as a message to sign. Signatures on the same basename
can be publicly linked. However the linking can be determined by all, not just a trusted
entity. Also the signatures that need to be linked must be determined at the point of data
collection, which is not flexible enough. This is because, the purpose of the data may not
be known until later.
Contribution. In this thesis we firstly introduce a new variant of group signatures:
group signatures with selective linkability. Data is stored authenticated and unlinkable
by the data collector. We refer to the part of a signature that provides linkability as
a pseudonym. When a subset of pseudonyms, are processed, they can be linked in a
controlled way by a trusted central entity known as the converter. Specifically, this linking
should be performed blindly, so that the messages/ pseudonyms that are being linked, and
their linkage is not revealed to the converter. This linking is non-transitive, meaning
pseudonyms can only be linked within the same query to the converter. This ensures that
a list of linked pseudonyms cannot be gradually built up by the data collector. We assume
both the data collector, and converter are honest–but–curious, i.e. we assume they follow
the protocol honestly, but will attempt to learn all possible information. Therefore, only
correctly formed messages and pseudonyms are input to the converter.
Secondly, we introduce an extended model, for a setting where the data collector is split
into a data lake and data processor. A data lake is an entity that has collected a large
amount of user data, which they could then sell or pass on to data processors if a use for
this data is found. For example, groups of hospitals could collect anonymised healthcare
records of patients stored in a data lake. Researchers could then request relevant data
for analysis. The data processor can no longer trust that correctly formed pseudonyms
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were input to the converter. Therefore signatures as well as pseudonyms must be input
to the converter. To ensure that authentication is preserved, the converter must also
output signatures. Finally, in order to achieve this model, we introduce commuting group
signatures as a building block. These allow both messages and signatures to be blinded,
whilst still allowing for public verifiability, similarly to commuting signatures [66]. Blinded
signatures can still be opened to reveal a blinded identity. Therefore, blinded group
signatures can now be input to the converter who can verify and blindly open them.
1.2 Chapter Overviews
Chapter 2 presents preliminaries used throughout this thesis. This includes an introduction
to the notation used and core definitions.
In Chapter 3 we focus on the first application of reputation systems. We provide a cryp-
tographic security model for a centralised reputation system where reputation values are
given to users instead of items. We then present two building blocks and show how they
can be used to build a construction for such a reputation system. These are a direct
anonymous attestation scheme [29], and a modification to an existing group signature
scheme that allows reputation to be proved alongside group membership. We then prove
the security of this construction in our model, and evaluate how susceptible it is to conven-
tional attacks against reputation systems outside the scope of our cryptographic model.
We provide a concrete instantiation of our construction and analyse the efficiency of this
in comparison to other relevant reputation systems.
In Chapter 4 we consider our second application of data collection/ processing. We provide
a security model for our group signatures with selective linkability, defining the security
and privacy properties required. We then present a construction and prove the security
of this in the model. This construction makes use of ElGamal encryption [59], BBS+
signatures [9] and signature proofs of knowledge [46]. We then provide a concrete instan-
tiation for these building blocks and evaluate the efficiency of this in terms of the sizes of
pseudonyms/ signatures, and the number of operations required.
In Chapter 5 we introduce commuting group signatures, which will be used as a building
block to achieve the extended model for group signatures with selective linkability defined
17
1.3 Publications
in Chapter 6. We first present a formal security model for this new primitive, including
syntax and the necessary security and privacy properties. The standard security require-
ments for group signatures should apply, but now must hold for both standard and blinded
signatures. We also must ensure the security of the blinding of messages and signatures.
We then provide a construction, making use of malleable proof systems [45], automorphic
signatures [65], and ElGamal encryption. We prove our construction is secure, and then
provide a concrete instantiation of these building blocks. We compute the sizes of these
signatures in terms of the number of group elements.
In Chapter 6 we provide an extended security model for group signatures with selective
linkability, which takes into account the split data lake/ data processor. We provide
updated syntax to take into account that signatures are now input to the blind and
convert algorithms. We extend our security requirements to so that we no longer assume
that all inputs to convert from the data lake are correctly formed. We also ensure that the
unforgeability properties now hold for blinded and converted signatures. We then present
a construction making use of a commuting group signature scheme, as given in Chapter 5,
as a building block. The construction also makes use of a signature proof of knowledge and
a standard signature scheme. We then prove this construction secure under the extended
security model. We show that the concrete instantiation of commuting group signatures
given in Chapter 5 is compatible with our construction, and also provide an instantiation
of the other building blocks used. We analyse the efficiency of this in comparison to the
instantiation given in Chapter 4.
1.3 Publications
Chapter 3 is based on the paper “A New Approach to Modelling Centralised Reputa-
tion Systems”, which was joint work with Elizabeth A. Quaglia. This was presented at
AFRICACRYPT 2019 [71]. Preliminary work on this topic was included in the paper
“Reputation Schemes for Pervasive Social Networks with Anonymity”, which was joint
work with Keith Martin and Siaw–Lynn Ng. This was presented at PST 2017 [70].
Chapter 4 is based on the paper “Group Signatures with Selective Linkability”, which was
joint work with Anja Lehmann. This was presented at PKC 2019 [69].
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Chapters 5 and 6 are based on the paper “Convertible Group Signatures – Stronger Se-
curity and Preserved Verifiability”, which was joint work with Anja Lehmann. This is
currently under submission.
19
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Contents
2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Provable Security of Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 The Discrete Logarithm problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Random Oracle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Basic Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Zero–Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.7 Group Signature Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8 Direct Anonymous Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
This chapter introduces the standard notation, key building blocks, and definitions that
will be used throughout this thesis. For a comprehensive background on these notions,
see [82].
2.1 Notation
We first provide some basic notation and group theory that will be used throughout the
thesis.
We denote the set of integers as Z, the set of natural number as N and the set of real
numbers as R. A positive integer is a prime if it only has two divisors: 1 and itself. Let Z∗p
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denote the set {1, .., p− 1}. We denote the set of consecutive integers {i, ..., j} for integers
i ≤ j, as [i, j], and [n] denotes the set {1, ..., n} for n > 1. We denote the empty set as ∅.
A function, f : N→ R , is negligible on its input, if for every positive polynomial p, there
exists an N such that for all integers n > N , f(n) < 1p(n) . Throughout this thesis, we
shall denote an arbitrary negligible function by negl().
We denote assigning the value x to the variable y as y ← x, and y←$S denotes choosing
an element from a finite set S uniformly at random and assigning it to the variable y. If
A is a deterministic function, y ← A(x1, ...xn) denotes assigning the result of running A
on the inputs x1 to xn to an output y. If A is instead a probabilistic algorithm, y←$A()
denotes assigning the output of A to the variable y. We let ⊥ denote a failure symbol,
and PPT denote probabilistic polynomial–time.
2.2 Provable Security of Cryptography
In cryptography it is vital to precisely define security for cryptographic primitives, because
otherwise it is not possible to precisely evaluate the security of the construction.
One way of defining security is using security games, which will be the method we use
throughout this thesis. The games are designed to model real life security, incorporating
the threat model by the input given to the adversary, and the security goals by the
conditions the adversary must satisfy to win. In a security game a challenger interacts
with a probabilistic polynomial–time adversary A. The challenger provides the adversaries
inputs and receives outputs in return. In some cases the adversary may keep track of a
state throughout, so can “remember” past inputs and computations. At the end of the
game the challenger decides if the adversary has won or lost based on what they have
output. We say that if any adversary can only “win” with negligible probability then the
cryptographic primitive is secure. The adversaries are often given access to oracles for
particular functions. These allow the adversary to submit queries to the challenger who
performs some function on this input, alongside some other private input, and returns the
output of this function to the adversary.
Security can also be defined using simulation based security definitions. In this case, an
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ideal functionality is given for the cryptographic primitive and we say a construction is
secure if it is indistinguishable to an adversary from the ideal functionality.
In order to ensure that a construction satisfies the security requirements for a crypto-
graphic primitive, proofs of security must be provided that this is the case given a set of
assumptions. These proofs of security often take the form of reductions from the security
of the scheme to a cryptographic hardness assumption.
2.3 The Discrete Logarithm problem
We let G denote a group generation algorithm that on input a security parameter 1τ
outputs a description of a cyclic group along with its prime order p and a generator g ∈ G.
The size of the group output will depend on the security parameter τ input. We require
that the group operation can be computed efficiently. For each h ∈ G there is a unique x
in Zp, such that h = gx. We call this x the discrete logarithm of h with respect to g. The
discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group G is, for a uniformally chosen h, to compute
the discrete logarithm of h with respect to g. We say the discrete logarithm problem is
hard with respect to G, if for all PPT algorithms A, the probability that they solve the
discrete logarithm problem for the group output by G with input 1τ , is negligible in τ .
The discrete logarithm assumption is the assumption that there exists G for which the
discrete logarithm problem is hard.
2.3.1 The Diffie–Hellman problems
The Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption, which we will refer to as the CDH as-
sumption, and the Decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption, which we will refer to as the
DDH assumption, are two assumptions that are related (but not equivalent) to the Discrete
Logarithm assumption.
The Computational Diffie–Hellman problem is given a prime p order group G, a generator
g and uniformally chosen group elements h1, h2 ∈ G, compute gx1x2 where x1, x2 are the
discrete logarithms of h1, h2 with respect to g .
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The Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem is given a prime p order group G, a generator g
and uniformally chosen group elements h1, h2 ∈ G, to distinguish between gx1x2 where x1,
x2 are the discrete logarithms of h1, h2 with respect to g and a uniform group element.
The random self–reduction for DDH [105, 122] randomises a DDH problem instance so
that if the input is a random DDH 3–tuple then the output is a random DDH 3–tuple,
and otherwise the output is a random 3–tuple. In [127] an expanded self–reduction is given
that will be used in this thesis. If the input is a random DDH 3–tuple (x, y, z) then the
output is two random DDH 3–tuples (x′, y′, z′) and (x′′, y′, z′′) with y′ in common, and
otherwise (x′, x′′, y′, z′, z′′) is a random 5–tuple. This can be generalised so that the output
is either k random DDH tuples with y′ in common, or a random 2k + 1–tuple.
2.3.2 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2, GT be cyclic groups of prime order p. A bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT must
satisfy the following conditions: bilinearity, i.e., e(gx1 , g
y
2) = e(g1, g2)
xy; non-degeneracy,
i.e., for all generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, e(g1, g2) generatesGT ; and efficiency, i.e., there
exists an efficient algorithm G(1τ ) that outputs a bilinear group (p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2),
and an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for all a ∈ G1, b ∈ G2. Bilinear maps are
also referred to as pairings.
In [67] pairings are classified into three different types. For type–1 pairings, G1 = G2.
For type–2 pairings, G1 6= G2, but there is an efficiently computable homomorphism
ψ : G2 → G1. For type–3 pairings, G1 6= G2 and there is no efficiently computable
homomorphisms between G1 and G2.
We use type–3 pairings [67] in this work; i.e., we do not assume G1 = G2 or the existence of
an homomorphism between both groups in our scheme and security proofs. The advantage
of type–3 pairings is that they enjoy the most efficient curves, when balancing the cost of
pairings and group operations, the size of the representation of an element of G2 and the
flexibility of parameter choice [47, 67].
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2.3.3 q-Strong Diffie–Hellman Assumption
The q-Strong Diffie–Hellman assumption which we will refer to as the q-SDH assumption
is another hardness assumption related to the discrete logarithm assumption.
There are two versions of the q-Strong Diffie–Hellman assumption. The first version, given
by Boneh and Boyen in [19], is defined in a type–1 or type–2 pairing setting. We will refer
to this version as the Eurocrypt version. It is stated as follows:
Definition 2.1 (q–SDH assumption (Eurocrypt Version)). In (G1,G2), with an homomor-
phism ψ : G2 → G1: given (S1, S2, Sχ2 , S(χ)
2
2 , ..., S
(χ)q
2 ) such that S1 ∈ G1, S2 ∈ G2, S1 =
ψ(S2), output (S
1
χ+x
1 , x) ∈ G1 × Zp\{−χ}.
We use the second version of that definition that supports type–3 pairings and was stated
in the journal version of their paper [20]. We will refer to this version as the JoC version.
It is stated as follows:
Definition 2.2 (q-SDH assumption (JoC version)). Given (g1, g
χ
1 , g
(χ)2
1 , ..., g
(χ)q
1 , g2, g
χ
2 )
such that g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, output (g
1
χ+x
1 , x) ∈ G1 × Zp\{−χ}.
2.3.4 LRSW Assumption
Another hardness assumption related to the discrete logarithm problem we will use in this
thesis is the LRSW assumption [97].
Definition 2.3 (LRSW assumption). Let an adversary be given (G1,G2), with generators
G1, G2 of G1, G2 respectively, X = Gx2 , Y = G
y
2 for some x, y ∈ Z∗p and access to an oracle
that when f is input, outputs (A,Aβ, AαAfαβ) where A = Gr2 for uniform r ∈ Z∗p. It is
hard for the adversary to output (f,A,B,C) such that A ∈ G1, B = Aβ, C = AαAfαβ ,
and f has not been queried to the oracle.
2.4 Random Oracle Model
In this thesis we will make use of the random oracle model [13] as an assumption. The
random oracle model is a powerful tool that allows many practical schemes to be proven
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secure.
The random oracle model firstly assumes that a hash function can be modelled in security
proofs by a black box that on receiving an input x outputs y. If x has been input previously,
then the same y should be output. If x has not been input previously, then y should
be chosen uniformally at random, and (x, y) should be stored for future queries. If an
adversary queries x to H then the reduction in the proof of security can see the query
and learn x, which is referred to as extractability. The reduction can also set the value of
H(x) to a value of its choice, provided it is correctly distributed, which is referred to as
programmability.
The value of proofs based on the random oracle model is still under debate within the
cryptographic community. Examples of cryptographic schemes that can be proved secure
under the random oracle, but where any practical instantiation can be shown to be insecure
were found in [42]. However these schemes were contrived, and so far there have been no
successful “real world” attacks on schemes proved secure under the random oracle model.
When instantiated properly with a suitable hash function, proofs under the random oracle
are still seen as strong evidence that a cryptographic construction will resist attacks in
practise [31].
2.5 Basic Cryptographic Primitives
2.5.1 Encryption Schemes
A public–key encryption scheme consists of the following probabilistic polynomial–time
algorithms:
• EncKGen(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter 1τ and outputs the public key
pk and secret key sk.
• Enc(pk,m): takes as input the public key pk and a message m from the message
space, and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk, c): takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message
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m or a decryption failure ⊥.
Correctness. We say the encryption scheme is correct if for all messages m in the
message space, the probability that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) 6= m is negligible in τ . We say
an encryption scheme is perfectly correct if, for all messages m in the message space, the
probability that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) 6= m is 0.
2.5.1.1 Security Against Chosen–Plaintext Attacks
Security against chosen–plaintext attacks captures that an adversary should not be able
to distinguish between encryptions of two messages chosen by the adversary.
We now present the security game corresponding to the indistinguishable encryptions under
a chosen–plaintext attack (ind-cpa) requirement.
Experiment: Expind−cpa−bA,Π (τ)
(pk, sk)←$EncKGen(1τ ), (m0,m1, st)←$A(choose, pk)
c←$Enc(pk,mb), b∗←$A(st, guess, c)
return b∗
Definition 2.4. A public–key encryption scheme Π has indistinguishable encryptions
under a chosen–plaintext attack if, for all probabilistic polynomial–time adversaries A, the
following advantage is negligible in τ : |Pr[Expind−cpa−0A,Π (τ) = 1]−Pr[Expind−cpa−1A,Π (τ) = 1]|.
2.5.1.2 Security Against Chosen–Ciphertext Attacks
Security against chosen–ciphertext attacks captures that an adversary should not be able
to distinguish between encryptions of two messages, even when the adversary is able to
obtain decryptions of arbitrary ciphertexts. This ensures that the encryption scheme is
non–malleable [11]. This means that, given an encryption c of a message m, an adversary
cannot transform this into a new ciphertext, which is an encryption of a known function
of the original message.
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We now present the security game corresponding to the indistinguishable encryptions under
a chosen–ciphertext attack requirement.
DEC(c′)
if c′ = c return ⊥ else return m′ ← Dec(sk, c′)
Experiment: Expind−cca2−bA,Π (τ)
(pk, sk)←$EncKGen(1τ ), (m0,m1, st)←$ADEC(choose, pk)
c←$Enc(pk,mb), b∗←$ADEC(st, guess, c)
return b∗
Definition 2.5. A public–key encryption scheme Π has indistinguishable encryptions un-
der a chosen–ciphertext attack if, for all probabilistic polynomial–time adversaries A, the
following advantage is negligible in τ : |Pr[Expind−cca2−0A,Π (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expind−cca2−1A,Π (τ) =
1]|.
2.5.2 ElGamal Encryption
We will use the ElGamal encryption scheme [59] in this thesis. This encryption scheme
has public parameters (G, g, p). We now present algorithms ElgGen, ElgEnc, ElgDec.
ElgGen(1τ )
sk←$Z∗p, pk ← gsk
return (pk, sk)
ElgEnc(pk,m)
r←$Z∗p return c← (gr, pkrm)
ElgDec(sk, (c1, c2))
return m← c2c−sk1
Assuming the DDH assumption holds in G, ElGamal encryption is chosen–plaintext se-
cure [59].
Later in this thesis, we will use the homomorphic property of ElGamal; i.e., if C1 ∈
ElgEnc(pk,m1) and C2 ∈ ElgEnc(pk,m2), then C1  C2 ∈ ElgEnc(pk,m1 ·m2).
We further use that ElGamal ciphertexts c = ElgEnc(pk,m) are publicly re-randomisable;
i.e., the re-randomised version c′ of c looks indistinguishable from a fresh encryption of
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the underlying plaintext m. The following procedure clearly satisfies this:
Re-randomisation: On input (pk, (c1, c2)), r
′←$Z∗p and output (c1gr
′
, c2pk
r′).
2.5.3 Signature Schemes
A signature scheme consists of the following probabilistic polynomial–time algorithms.
• SigKGen(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter 1τ and outputs the public veri-
fication key vk and secret signing key sk.
• Sign(sk,m): takes as input the signing key sk and a message m, and outputs a
signature σ.
• Verify(vk,m, σ): takes as input the verification key vk, a message m, and signature
σ, and outputs 1 if σ is valid with respect to vk,m, and 0 otherwise.
Correctness. We say a signature scheme is correct if for all messages m in the message
space, the probability that Verify(vk,m,Sign(sk,m)) 6= 1 is negligible in τ . We say a
signature scheme is perfectly correct if for all messages m in the message space, the
probability that Verify(vk,m,Sign(sk,m)) 6= 1 is 0.
2.5.3.1 Defining the Security of Signature Schemes
The security requirements capture that an adversary cannot produce a signature on a
message of their choice without knowledge of the secret key, even when it can see signatures
of other messages.
We now present the security game corresponding to the existential unforgeability under
an adaptive chosen–message attack (EUF-cma) requirement. The adversary is given the
verification key vk and a signing oracle for secret key sk. The signing oracle is input a
message m′, and keeps track of inputs in the list M . The adversary must output a valid
signature for a message m not stored in M .
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SIGN(m′)
M ←M ∪ {m′} return σ←$Sign(sk,m′)
Experiment: Expsig−forgeA,Π (τ)
(vk, sk)←$SigKGen(1τ ),M ← ∅, (m,σ)←$ASIGN(vk)
if m ∈M or Verify(vk,m, σ) 6= 1 return 0 else return 1
Definition 2.6. A signature scheme Π is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive
chosen–message attack if, for all probabilistic polynomial–time adversaries A, there is a
negligible function negl such that Pr[Expsig−forgeA,Π (τ) = 1] ≤ negl(τ).
There is also a strengthened version of this security notion: strong existential unforgeability
under an adaptive chosen–message attack. We now present the security game for this
requirement.
SIGN(m′)
σ←$Sign(sk,m′),M ←M ∪ {m′, σ} return σ
Experiment: Expsig−strongforgeA,Π (τ)
(vk, sk)←$SigKGen(1τ ),M ← ∅, (m,σ)←$ASIGN(vk)
if (m,σ) ∈M or Verify(vk,m, σ) 6= 1 return 0 else return 1
Definition 2.7. A signature scheme Π is strongly existentially unforgeable under an
adaptive chosen–message attack if, for all probabilistic polynomial–time adversaries A,
there is a negligible function negl such that Pr[Expsig−strongforgeA,Π (τ) = 1] ≤ negl(τ).
2.5.4 Structure Preserving Signatures Schemes
A structure preserving signature scheme [5] over a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
is an EUF–cma secure signature scheme such that the verification keys, messages and
signatures are elements of G1 and G2, and the verification predicate is a conjunction of
pairing-product equations over the verification key, the message and the signature.
29
2.5 Basic Cryptographic Primitives
2.5.5 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures
We will use the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [39] in Chapter 3. The
public parameters of the signature scheme are the bilinear group: paramCL = (p,G1,G2,GT ,
e, g1, g2). We now present the algorithms CLKGen, CLSign, CLVerify.
CLKGen(paramCL)
x←$Z∗p, y←$Z∗p, sk ← (x, y), X ← Gx2 , Y ← Gy2, vk ← (X,Y ) return (vk, sk)
CLSign((x, y),m)
A←$G1, return σ ← (A,Ay, AxAmxy)
CLVerify((X,Y ),m, (A,B,C))
if e(A, Y ) = e(B,G2) and e(AB
m, X) = e(C,G2) return 1 else return 0
The CL signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen–message attack under
the LRSW assumption [39].
2.5.6 BBS+ Signatures
We will use the BBS+ signature scheme in Chapter 4. This signature scheme was given
by Au et al. [9], and inspired by the BBS group signature scheme introduced in [21]. The
public parameters of the signature scheme are the bilinear group: (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2).
We now present the algorithms BBSGen+, BBSSign+, BBSVerify+.
BBSGen+(1τ )
h1←$G1, h2←$G1, x←$Z∗p, w ← Gx2 , sk ← x, pk ← (w, h1, h2) return (pk, sk)
BBSSign+(x,m)
s1←$Zp, s2←$Zp, A← (G1hs21 hm2 )
1
s1+x return (A, s1, s2)
BBSVerify+((w, h1, h2),m, (A, s1, s2))
if A ∈ G1 and e(A,wGs12 ) = e(G1hs21 hm2 , G2) return 1 else return 0
Originally, Au et al. [9] proved the BBS+ signature scheme existentially unforgeable under
chosen–message attacks under the Eurocrypt version of the q-SDH assumption, making
use of the homomorphism between the groups in the security proof. However, in our
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security proofs, we will make use of techniques from [32] which prove the unforgeability of
BBS+ signatures in the type–3 setting.
2.6 Zero–Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
Intuitively, zero–knowledge proofs allow a prover to interact with a verifier demonstrating
that a proposition holds, without revealing any extra information. In fact, if the proposi-
tion is true, the verifier might as well have simulated the interaction on their own. A proof
of knowledge proves not only that a proposition holds but also that the prover knows a
valid witness of this.
We define a zero–knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) for a language L, which consists
of a set of instances for which there exist a valid witness, defined by the relation R. More
formally L = {x : ∃w s.t (x,w) ∈ R}.
Definition 2.8 (Zero–Knowledge Proof of Knowledge). An interactive zero–knowledge
proof of knowledge for a language L defined by relation R consists of two interactive PPT
algorithms P and V such that the following conditions hold:
1. Completeness For all (x,w) ∈ R, Pr[〈P(x,w),V(x)〉 = 1] = 1.
2. Soundness For all x /∈ L, for all adversaries A, the probability Pr[〈A(x),V(x)〉 = 1]
is negligible. Perfect soundness is achieved if this probability is 0.
3. Zero–Knowledge For all PPT adversaries A, there exists a probabilistic PPT
algorithm S such that for all (x,w) ∈ R, then the distributions of 〈P(x,w),A(x)〉
and S(x) are computationally indistinguishable. Perfect zero–knowledge is satisfied
if the two distributions are identically distributed.
4. Knowledge Soundness with error κ There exists a PPT E such that for every
adversary A that outputs x such that Pr[〈A,V(x)〉 = 1] = (|x|) > κ(|x|), then
EA()(x) outputs w such that (x,w) ∈ R with probability (|x|)− κ(|x|).
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2.6.1 Non–Interactive Zero–Knowledge Proofs
In a non–interactive zero–knowledge proof, the prover does not interact with the verifier.
Instead, all parties have access to a trusted common reference string (CRS).
Definition 2.9 (Non–Interactive Proof Systems). A set of algorithms (CRSSetup,P,V)
constitute a non-interactive (NI) proof system for an efficient relation R with associ-
ated language LR if completeness and soundness are satisfied. A NI proof system is
extractable if, in addition, the extractability property is satisfied. An NI proof system is
zero–knowledge (NIZK) if the zero–knowledge property is satisfied. A NIZK proof system
that is also extractable constitutes a non-interactive zero–knowledge proof of knowledge
(NIZKPoK). An NI proof system is witness–indistinguishable (NIWI) if the witness–
indistinguishability property is satisfied. A NIWI proof system that is also extractable
constitutes a non-interactive zero–knowledge proof of knowledge (NIWIPoK).
1. Completeness. For all σcrs←$CRSSetup(1τ ) and (x,w) ∈ R, V(σcrs, x, pi) = 1 for
all proofs pi←$P(σcrs, x, w).
2. Soundness. For all PPT adversaries A, and for σcrs←$CRSSetup(1τ ), the proba-
bility that A(σcrs) outputs (x, pi) such that x /∈ L but V(σcrs, x, pi) = 1 is negligible.
Perfect soundness is achieved when this probability is 0.
3. Extractability. There exists polynomial–time extractor algorithms E = (E1, E2),
with E1(1
τ ) outputting (σext, τe), and E2(σext, τe, x, pi) outputting w, such that:
(a) E1(1
τ ) outputs σext that is indistinguishable from σcrs output by CRSSetup(1
τ ).
(b) for all PPT adversaries A, the probability that A(σext, τe) (where (σext, τe)←$
E1(1
τ )) outputs (x, pi) such that V(σcrs, x, pi) = 1 and (x,E2(σext, τe, x, pi) /∈ R,
is negligible.
Perfect extractability is achieved if this probability is 0, and σext is distributed iden-
tically to σcrs.
4. Zero–Knowledge. There exists a polynomial–time simulator algorithm S = (S1, S2),
with S1(1
τ ) outputting (σsim, τs), and S2(σsim, τs, x) outputting pis, such that for all
(x,w) ∈ R and PPT adversaries A, the following two interactions are indistinguish-
able:
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• We give the adversary A the CRS σcrs←$CRSSetup(1τ ) and oracle access to
P(σcrs, ·, ·) (where P will output ⊥ on input (x,w) such that (x,w) /∈ R).
• We compute (σsim, τs)←$S1(1τ ) and give the adversary A the simulated CRS
σsim and oracle access to S2(σsim, τs, ·, ·), where, on input (x,w), S outputs
S2(σsim, τs, x) if (x,w) ∈ R and ⊥ otherwise.
Perfect zero–knowledge is achieved if for all (x,w) ∈ R, these interactions are dis-
tributed identically.
5. Witness–Indistinguishability. For all (x,w1, w2) such that (x,w1), (x,w2) ∈ R,
the tuple (σcrs, pi1) is indistinguishable from (σcrs, pi2) where σcrs←$CRSSetup(1τ ),
and for i ∈ {1, 2}, pii←$P(σcrs, x, wi). Perfect witness indistinguishability is achieved
when these two distributions are identical.
Simulation Sound Extractability The simulation soundness requirement [52, 116] en-
sures that soundness holds, even when the adversary is able to see simulated proofs as in
the zero–knowledge property. This was strengthened in [75] to ensure that extractability
holds, even when the adversary is able to see simulated proofs. All proofs that were not
simulated should be extractable.
Definition 2.10 (Simulation Sound Extractability). Let (CRSSetup,P,V) be a NIZKPoK
system for an efficient relation R, with a simulator (S1, S2) and an extractor (E1, E2).
Let SE1 be an algorithm that, on input 1
τ , outputs (σext, τs, τe) such that (σext, τs) is
distributed identically to the output of S1. Consider the following game with the adversary
A:
• (σcrs, τs, τe)←$SE1(1τ )
• (x, pi)←$AS2(σcrs,τs,·)(σcrs, τe)
• w ← E2(σcrs, τe, x, pi).
The proof system satisfies simulation-sound extractability if for all PPT algorithms A
there exists a negligible function negl such that the probability that V(σcrs, x, pi) = 1 and
(x, pi) /∈ Q (where Q is the set of queried statements and their responses) but either
(x,w) /∈ R or w =⊥ is at most negl(τ).
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2.6.2 Fiat–Shamir Transform
The Fiat–Shamir transform [63] allows for interactive proofs to be transformed into non-
interactive ones in the random oracle model.
The honest–verifier zero–knowledge property is a weakening of standard zero–knowledge
such that the verifier now performs their side of the protocol honestly. An interactive,
constant round, honest–verifier zero–knowledge proof of knowledge Π where the verifier
is public coin, i.e. its messages are fresh, random coins, and can be transformed into a
non-interactive proof ΠFS as follows.
• The verifier chooses a hash function.
• The prover executes the protocol, replacing messages with the verifier by the hash
of the transcript so far.
• The verifier checks that the transcript would have been accepted, and is consistent
with the hash function.
If we model the hash function in the random oracle model, then the security of the inter-
active proof system Π implies the security of ΠFS [4, 62, 113]. Proofs can be simulated by
programming the random oracle. Extraction occurs by rewinding and programming the
random oracle model, due to the Forking Lemma [114]. This lemma roughly says that if
an adversary has a non–negligible success probability in proving a statement then, after
rewinding to a crucial random oracle query and changing the response, the adversary will
generate a second successful proof with non-negligible probability.
2.6.3 Proofs of Discrete Logarithms
We follow the notation defined in [35] when referring to zero–knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge of discrete logarithms. For example PK{(a, b, c) : y = gahb ∧ y˜ = g˜ah˜c} denotes a
zero–knowledge proof of knowledge of integers a, b and c such that y = gahb and y˜ = g˜ah˜c
hold. Given a protocol in this notation, it is straightforward to derive an actual protocol
implementing the proof [35]. Indeed, the computational complexities of the proof protocol
can be easily derived from this notation: for each term y = gahb, the prover and the
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verifier have to perform an equivalent computation, and to transmit one group element
and one response value for each exponent.
An SPK denotes a signature proof of knowledge [41, 46] which attests that the signer
of a message had knowledge of a witness to a particular relation. A formal definition
of signature proofs of knowledge is given in [46]. This can be seen as a non-interactive
transformation of a proof PK with respect to a message, e.g., using the Fiat–Shamir
transform [63] in the random oracle model. Using the Fiat–Shamir transform, the witness
can be extracted from these proofs by rewinding the prover and programming the random
oracle. We require the proof system to be simulation-sound and zero–knowledge.
Alternatively, these proofs can be extended to be online-extractable [64, 110]. This ensures
that the witness can be extracted without rewinding, to avoid potential exponential time
blow ups in security reductions. This is achievable by verifiably encrypting the witness
to a public key defined in the common reference string. Clearly this requires a trusted
common reference string. A practical instantiation is given by Camenisch and Shoup [40]
using Paillier encryption, secure under the DCR assumption [109]. We underline the
values that we need to be online-extractable in all proofs throughout this thesis.
2.7 Group Signature Schemes
Group signature schemes allow users to sign messages on behalf of the group in an anony-
mous way. That is, a verifier of a group signature is assured that it was signed by a valid
member of the group, but does not learn anything about the identity of the signer, or even
whether two signatures stem from the same user.
Group signature schemes were first introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [49]. A formal
security model was given for the static setting, when all users join the scheme at the
beginning, in [12]. A security model was given for the dynamic setting, where users can
join the group at any time, in [14]. We will use this dynamic setting predominately in this
thesis, and so we follow this model in this chapter. The dynamic model has three main
differences to the static model. Firstly, there is an interactive join protocol, which ensures
that users can join at any time and the group manager does not discover the user’s secret
key. Secondly, the group manager is split into two entities: a group manager who can join
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users, and an opener who can de-anonymise signatures. Finally, in the dynamic model the
opener produces a proof that it has correctly traced a signature, which can be publicly
verified.
Weakened models for group signature schemes have also been proposed to allow for more
efficient schemes. In [21], CPA anonymity was defined for group signatures. Analogously
to CPA security for encryption schemes, in the CPA anonymity security game there is no
opening oracle. Also, in [23], selfless anonymity was introduced where signatures can be
de-anonymised if the signer’s secret key is leaked. This can be seen as a group signature
scheme without forward anonymity.
In [118], an additional security requirement opening soundness was introduced, which
ensures that corrupted users cannot claim that the signature of an honest user traces back
to them. In [108], randomness exposure resilience of group signatures was defined. It was
shown that it is impossible to achieve full anonymity, whilst also achieving randomness
exposure resilience. However, randomness exposure resilience can be achieved for schemes
with selfless anonymity. In [55, 56], the property of leak-freeness was introduced, which
ensures that a signer is not able to convince others that they were responsible for a
signature. A security model was also given in [24] for the fully dynamic setting, where
users are able to join and leave the group at any time, allowing for revocation.
Group signature schemes that are secure without assuming the random oracle model were
proposed in [8, 12, 25, 76]. Some group signature schemes have been designed to prioritise
very short signatures [17, 21]. Post-quantum secure group signature schemes [87, 88, 89,
92, 93] have also been proposed, with the first scheme from lattice assumptions introduced
in [74].
2.7.1 Security Model for Dynamic Group Signature Schemes
We first introduce the syntax of dynamic group signature schemes and then present the
desirable security and privacy properties for such schemes.
The following entities are involved: an issuer I, a set of users U = {uidi}, and an opener
O. The issuer I is the central entity that allows users to join the group. Once joined, a
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user can then sign on behalf of the group in a pseudonymous way. That is the validity of a
signature with respect to the group’s public key can be publicly verified without revealing
any information about the particular user that created the signature. An opener O can
de-anonymise all signatures, outputting an identifier and a proof of this claim.
A group signature scheme in the dynamic setting consists of the following algorithms:
• GSetup(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter, and outputs the public parame-
ters paramGS.
• GKG(paramGS): takes as input the public parameters paramGS, and outputs the group
public key gpk, the issuing secret key isk, and the opening secret key osk.
• GUKG(1τ ): ran by the user with identifier uid on input the security parameter, and
outputs the user’s public key upk[uid] and private key usk[uid].
• 〈GJoin(gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid]),GIssue(isk, gpk, uid,upk[uid])〉: a user uid joins the
group by engaging in an interactive protocol with the Issuer I. The user uid and
Issuer I perform GJoin and GIssue respectively. These are input a state and an in-
coming message, and output an updated state, an outgoing message, and a decision,
either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to GJoin is the group public key gpk,
and the user uid’s public and private key, whereas the initial input to GIssue is the
issuer secret key isk, and the user uid’s public key. If the issuer accepts, GJoin has
a private output of gsk[uid], and GIssue has output reg[uid].
• GSign(m,gsk[uid], gpk): performed by the user with identifier uid, takes as input a
message m, the user’s secret key gsk[uid], and the group public key gpk, and outputs
a signature Ω.
• GVerify(m,Ω, gpk): outputs 1 if Ω is a valid signature on m under the group public
key gpk, and 0 otherwise.
• GOpen(m,Ω, reg, osk, gpk): takes as input a message m, a signature Ω, the regis-
tration table reg, the opening secret key osk, and a group public key gpk. Outputs
(uid, λ) where if uid 6=⊥ then uid is the author of signature Ω and λ is a proof of
this claim, and otherwise no group member has been found to author Ω.
• GJudge(uid,upk[uid],m,Ω, λ, gpk): takes as input a user identifier uid, the public
key upk[uid] of the user uid, a message m, a valid signature Ω of m, a proof-string
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λ and the group public key gpk. It checks that λ is a valid proof that user uid
produced Ω, and if so outputs 1 but otherwise outputs 0.
In Figure 2.1, we provide the oracles used in the security requirements. We now provide
a high–level description. The joining of users is modelled with the ADDU, SNDU and
SNDI oracles, depending on the corruption setting. When the issuer is corrupted, the
adversary can already create corrupted users, and can create honest users with the SNDU
oracle which runs the join protocol on behalf of this honest user. When the issuer is
honest, the adversary can create honest users with the ADDU oracle which runs both
the user’s and issuer’s sides of the protocol, and corrupted users with the SNDI oracle,
which runs the issue protocol on behalf of the honest issuer. As the issuer outputs the
user’s registration after a successfully completed join protocol, after the SNDI and ADDU
oracles this registration is stored in reg. The oracle WREG allows the adversary to control
reg if the issuer is corrupted, and the RREG oracle allows the adversary to read reg if
the adversary is not corrupted. The USK oracle can be used to reveal the secret key of
an honest user. The join protocol is modelled as follows: CLS.Join and CLS.Issue both
take as input the state stuidJoin or st
uid
Issue, which includes initial inputs and values stored
from the previous stage of the protocol, and an incoming message. They output a new
state, an outgoing message, and decuid which is set to accept, reject or cont and indicates
respectively that the protocol has completed successfully, the protocol has completed in
failure, or the protocol has not yet completed.
ADDU (join of honest user and honest issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and internally runs a join protocol between the honest user and honest issuer. At
the end, the honest user’s secret key gsk[uid] is generated and from then on signing
queries for uid will be allowed.
SNDU (join of honest user and corrupt issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and runs the join protocol on behalf of uid with the corrupt issuer. If the join
session completes, the oracle will store the user’s secret key gsk[uid].
SNDI (join of corrupt user and honest issuer) Runs the join protocol on behalf of
the honest issuer with corrupt users. For joins of honest users, the ADDU oracle
must be used.
USK Allows an adversary to obtain the secret key of an honest user.
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RREG When the issuer is honest, allows an adversary to read reg.
WREG When the issuer is corrupt, allows an adversary to write to reg.
SIGN Returns signatures for honest users that have successfully joined (via ADDU or
SNDU, depending on the corruption setting).
OPEN Allows an adversary to open signatures with GOpen.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state:
HUL List of uids of honest users, initially set to ∅. New honest users can be added by
queries to the ADDU oracle (when the issuer is honest) or SNDU oracle (when the
issuer is corrupt).
CUL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. Initially set to ∅, new
corrupt users can be added through the SNDI oracle if the issuer is honest. If the
issuer is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
The security requirements for group signature schemes in the dynamic setting are correct-
ness, anonymity, traceability and non–frameability.
Correctness. The correctness requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.2. Given
a user is honestly registered to the scheme, and GSign is performed honestly, then the
signature output should verify correctly, and correctly open to reveal the correct author
of the signature, along with a valid proof of this.
A group signature scheme Π satisfies correctness if for all adversaries A, Pr[ExpcorrA,Π(τ) =
1] = 0.
Anonymity. The anonymity requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.2, and ensures
that a user’s signature cannot be de-anonymised or linked by user. In the security game
the adversary has corrupted the issuer but not the opener, as otherwise they could trivially
open signatures. They choose two honest users and a message, and in response are given
a signature authored by one of these authors and must guess which. They can create
honest users using the SNDU oracle and corrupt all honest users, including the two users
challenged by the adversary, with the USK oracle. As they are assumed to have corrupted
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ADDU(uid):
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥
decuid ← cont, (upk[uid],usk[uid])←$GUKG(1τ )
stuidJoin ← (gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid])
stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk, uid,upk[uid])
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$GJoin(stuidJoin,⊥)
while decuid = cont
(stuidIssue,MJoin,dec
uid)←$GIssue(stuidIssue,MIssue)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$GJoin(stuidJoin,MJoin)
if decuid = accept
reg[uid]← stuidIssue,gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return upk[uid]
SNDU(uid,Min):
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}
(upk[uid],usk[uid])←$GUKG(1τ )
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidJoin undefined
stuidJoin ← (gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid])
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$GJoin(stuidJoin,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return (Mout,dec
uid)
SNDI(uid,Min, upk):
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CUL
CUL← CUL ∪ {uid}
decuid ← cont,upk[uid]← upk
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if undefined stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk, uid,upk[uid])
(stuidIssue,Mout,dec
uid)←$GIssue(stuidIssue,Min,decuid)
if decuid = accept reg[uid]← stuidIssue
return (Mout,dec
uid)
USK(uid):
return (gsk[uid],usk[uid])
RREG(uid):
return reg[uid]
WREG(uid, reg):
reg[uid]← reg
SIGN(m,uid):
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
return GSign(m,gsk[uid], gpk)
OPEN(m,Ω):
if (m,Ω) = (m∗,Ω∗) return ⊥
return GOpen(m,Ω, reg, osk, gpk)
Figure 2.1: Oracles used in the dynamic group signature security model
the issuer, they have access to WREG. They have access to the OPEN oracle, however
they cannot query the challenge signature, to avoid trivial wins.
Definition 2.11 (Anonymity). A group signature scheme Π satisfies anonymity if for all
polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage |Pr[Expanon−0A,Π (τ) = 1]−Pr[Expanon−1A,Π (τ) =
1]| is negligible in τ .
Traceability. The traceability requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.2. This
requirement ensures that all valid signatures open to reveal a valid user, along with a
valid proof under GJudge, when the issuer is honest. In the security game the adversary
has corrupted the opener but not the issuer, as otherwise they could simply create users
without updating reg and so produce valid signatures that would not open correctly. They
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are given the SNDI and ADDU oracles to create honest and corrupt users respectively, and
the RREG oracle to read reg. The USK oracle allows them to reveal the private keys of
honest users. The adversary must output a valid signature that does not open to reveal a
user along with a valid proof.
Definition 2.12 (Traceability). A group signature scheme Π satisfies traceability if for
all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,Π (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Non–frameability. The non–frameability requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.2.
This requirement ensures an adversary cannot impersonate an honest user, by forging a
signature that opens to their user identifier. In the security game the adversary has
corrupted the opener and the issuer, but not all users. They have access to the SNDU
oracle, which allows them to create honest users, and the USK oracle, which allows them
to obtain these users’ private keys. As they have corrupted the issuer they have access to
the WREG oracle which allows them to control reg. They can obtain signatures of honest
users with the SIGN oracle. Without using the signing oracle, the adversary must output
a valid signature, the identifier of an honest user that has not been revealed with USK,
and a proof that is valid under GJudge with respect to this signature and user identifier.
Definition 2.13 (Non–frameability). A group signature scheme Π satisfies non–frameability
if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[Expnon−frameA,Π (τ) = 1] is negli-
gible in τ .
2.7.2 XS Group Signatures
We now present the XS group signature scheme which will be used in Chapter 3. The XS
scheme [53] satisfies the security requirements for dynamic group signatures [14], under the
q-SDH [19] assumption, the XDH assumption [10, 21], and in the random oracle model [13].
As the XS scheme is given in the type–2 setting, it relies on the XDH assumption.
Definition 2.14 (XDH Assumption). The DDH assumption holds in G1 even when there
exists a homomorphism ψ : G2 → G1.
We provide the XS scheme in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The public parameters of the XS scheme
are the type–2 bilinear group: (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2,Ψ).
41
2.7 Group Signature Schemes
Experiment: ExpcorrA,Π(τ)
paramGS←$GSetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk, osk)←$GKG(paramGS),CUL,HUL← ∅
(uid,m)←$AADDU,RREG(gpk)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
Ω←$GSign(m,gsk[uid], gpk), if GVerify(m,Ω, gpk) = 0 return 1
(uid′, λ)←$GOpen(m,Ω, reg, osk, gpk), if uid 6= uid′ return 1
if GJudge(uid,upk[uid],m,Ω, λ, gpk) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Experiment: Expanon−bA,Π (τ)
paramGS←$GSetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk, osk)←$GKG(paramGS),CUL,HUL← ∅
(st, uid0, uid1,m
∗)←$AOPEN,SNDU,WREG,USK(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid0, uid1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid0],gsk[uid1] =⊥ return 0
Ω∗←$GSign(m∗,gsk[uidb], gpk), b∗←$AOPEN,SNDU,WREG,USK(guess, st,Ω∗)
return b∗
Experiment: ExptraceA,Π (τ)
paramGS←$GSetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk, osk)←$GKG(paramGS),CUL,HUL← ∅
(m,Ω)←$ASNDI,ADDU,RREG,USK(gpk, osk)
if GVerify(m,Ω, gpk) = 0 return 0
(uid, λ)←$GOpen(m,Ω, reg, osk, gpk)
if uid =⊥ or GJudge(uid,upk[uid],m,Ω, λ, gpk) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Experiment: Expnon−frameA,Π (τ)
paramGS←$GSetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk, osk)←$GKG(paramGS),CUL,HUL← ∅
(m,Ω, uid, λ)←$ASNDU,WREG,SIGN,USK(gpk, isk, osk)
if GVerify(m,Ω, gpk) = 0 return 0
If the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1.uid ∈ HUL and gsk[uid] 6=⊥
2.GJudge(uid,upk[uid],m,Ω, λ, gpk) = 1
3.USK not queried uid and SIGN oracle not queried (m,uid)
Figure 2.2: Experiments capturing the correctness, anonymity, traceability, and non–
frameability security requirements for dynamic group signature schemes
2.7.3 Variants of group signature schemes
Since the introduction of group signatures, several variants have also been proposed for dif-
ferent applications. Many seek to reduce the power of the opener, which can de-anonymise
all signatures and so is potentially a privacy bottleneck. An overview is given in [99].
Ring signatures [115] do not involve openers or issuers. Users generate their own secret and
public keys and can sign on behalf of a ring of users including themselves. The signature
guarantees that the message originates from a member of this ring, without revealing the
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XSKeyGen(param)
ξ1, ξ2←$Zp;K ←$G1 \ {1G1}, H ← Kξ1 , G← Kξ2 , γ←$Zp,W ← Gγ2
return gpk = (G1,K,H,G,G2,W ), isk = γ, osk = (ξ1, ξ2)
XSUKG(1τ )
return (upk, usk)←$ SigKeyGen(1τ )
XSSign(m, (Z, x, y), gpk)
ρ1, ρ2←$Zp, T1 ← Kρ1 , T2 ← ZHρ1 , T3 ← Kρ2 , T4 ← ZGρ2 , z ← xρ1 + y
pi←$SPK{(x, z, ρ1, ρ2) : T1 = Kρ1 ∧ T3 = Kρ2 ∧ T4T−12 = Gρ2H−ρ1∧
e(T2,W )e(T2, G2)
x = e(G1, G2)e(H,W )
ρ1e(H,G2)
z}(m)
return Ω = (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
XSVerify(m,Ω, gpk)
return 1 if pi holds for T1, T2, T3, T4 else return 0
XSOpen(m,Ω, osk, gpk)
if XSVerify(m,Ω, gpk) = 0 return ⊥
Z ← T2T−ξ11 , if ∃uid s.t reg[uid] = (upk, Z, ., S) and Verify(upk, Z, S) = 1 uid∗ ← uid
λ = (Z,SPK{ξ1 : Z = T2T−ξ11 ∧H = Kξ1})
return (uid∗, λ)
XSJudge(uid, upk,m,Ω, λ = (Z, pijg), gpk)
If the following hold return 1 else return 0
1.XSVerify(m,Ω, gpk) = 1
2.pijg is valid in relation to Z,Ω, gpk
3.reg[uid] = (upk, Z, ., S) and Verify(upk, Z, S) = 1
Figure 2.3: The XS group signature scheme
identity of the signer. Linkable ring signatures [94] allow signatures with the same author
to be linked, while signatures still do not reveal the identity of the signer.
Direct anonymous attestation (DAA) schemes [29] also do not have a trusted opener, but
instead have user–controlled linkability. Users now sign basenames as well as messages.
Signatures with the same basename and signer can be publicly linked together, and other-
wise are unlinkable. Therefore, the user re-uses the same basename whenever they wants
to be linkable. In DAA the user is split into two entities: a host, which is assumed to have
greater computational power, and a trusted platform module (TPM). Enhanced privacy
ID (EPID) schemes [28] were introduced to allow for revocation in DAA.
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XSJoin(gpk,upk[uid],usk[uid]) 
 XSIssue(isk, gpk, uid,upk[uid])
y←$Z∗p, C ← Hy,
pijoin←$SPK{y : C = Hy}
-C, pijoin
Verifies C ∈ G1, checks pijoin,
x←$Z∗p, Z ← (G1C)1/(isk+x),
E ← e(G1C,G2)/e(Z,W ),
D ← e(Z,G2)
piiss←$ SPK{x : Dx = E}
ff Z, piiss
E ← e(G1C,G2)/e(Z,W )
D ← e(Z,G2)
Verifies Z ∈ G1, checks piiss
S←$Sign(usk[uid], Z)
-S
Checks Verify(upk[uid], Z, S) = 1
reg[uid]← (upk[uid], Z, x, S)
ff x
Checks e(Z,G2)
xe(Z,W )e(C,G2)
−1 =
e(G1, G2)
gsk[uid]← (Z, x, y)
Figure 2.4: The 〈XSJoin,XSIssue〉 protocol of the XS group signature scheme
Dynamic group signatures with distributed traceability were formalised in [72]. These
allow a set of managers to open signatures in a distributed way, reducing the power of the
opener.
Forward secure group signatures [121, 104] provide security even after a user’s signing key
is leaked, by updating the users’ secret keys every time interval. This goes further than
the forward anonymity mentioned earlier, which only ensures that anonymity is preserved
after a user’s secret key is leaked.
Group signatures with deniability were introduced in [81]. These allow the opener to prove
that a user was not the signer of a signature, without revealing the actual signer.
In group signatures with controlled linkability [79, 80, 120], signatures are unlinkable except
to a dedicated linking authority with a linking secret key. On input two signatures this
linking authority decides whether they stem from the same user or not.
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Another related concept is traceable group signatures [83] where a dedicated entity can
generate a tracing trapdoor for each user which allows this user’s signatures to be traced.
They also allow group members to prove they authored a signature.
Accountable tracing signatures [84] also reduce the power of the opener, by allowing the
opener to choose which users’ signatures they can open and prove they did not have the
ability to open a particular user’s signatures.
In [85], they avoid the need for an opener all together, by allowing users to prove or
deny authorship of a signature, as well as prove that two signatures authored by them
are linked. The opener can also prove that two signatures originate from the same user
without revealing user identities.
In [117], the power of the opener is reduced by introducing another entity, the admitter.
They have the power to specify messages, so that only signatures on those messages should
be able to be opened.
Different approaches have been proposed to allow for revocation in group signatures. One
approach is for users to prove when they sign that they are not included in a revocation
list [26, 34, 38, 57, 90, 91, 103, 107, 124]. Another method is to regularly update the group
public key, and users’ secret keys, so that revoked users are no longer able to sign [21, 121].
In verifier local revocation [23, 27], revocation information is sent to the verifiers who can
then determine whether a revoked user authored a signature. Group signature schemes
with verifier local revocation, such that the revocation is probabilistic have also been
proposed [86]. Another type of group signatures with verifier local revocation is group
signatures with time bound keys [61, 50]. Users’ secret keys are bound to a specific time
interval, and after these keys expire they are immediately revoked. The model for fully
dynamic group signatures given in [24] allows for revocation capturing the first two of
these approaches.
Another variant is group blind signature schemes [96]. Blind signatures [48] allow a mes-
sage to be signed via an interactive protocol between a entity holding the signing secret
key who should not learn the message and an entity holding the message who should not
learn the secret key. Group blind signature schemes similarly allow group signatures to
be signed in this way.
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Democratic group signatures [98] remove the role of the group manager, so that new
members join and leave the group via an interactive protocol with all existing group
members. There is no longer an opener, and instead all group members hold the tracing
trapdoor. Linkable democratic group signatures [100] allow signatures to be linked (but
not traced) by entities outside the group.
Mediated group signature schemes [55, 56] introduce an additional central entity, the
mediator. The signer identifies themself and submits a partial signature to the mediator,
which converts this into a full signature. This means that the mediator can immediately
revoke a group member.
2.8 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct anonymous attestation was introduced in [29]. A security model was given in [15]
for pre–DAA, the case where the TPM and host are merged into one entity. Security
requirements for the full DAA model were given in [33].
2.8.1 Pre–DAA Security Model
As in this thesis we always assume the host and TPM are merged, we now present the
pre–DAA security model [15]. A pre–DAA scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• DAASetup(1τ ): takes as input the security parameter τ and outputs the parameters
for the scheme param.
• DAAKeyGen(param): takes as input the parameters param, and outputs the group
public key gpk, and the issuing secret key isk.
• 〈DAAJoin(gpk),DAAIssue(isk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the group by engaging in an
interactive protocol with the Issuer. The user with identifier uid and Issuer perform
algorithms DAAJoin and DAAIssue respectively. These are input a state and an
incoming message respectively, and output an updated state, an outgoing message,
and a decision, either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to DAAJoin is the
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group public key, whereas the initial input to DAAIssue is the issuer secret key, isk,
and the group public key. If the issuer accepts, DAAJoin has a private output of
gsk[uid], DAAIssue has a private output of reg[uid].
• DAASign(bsn,m,gsk[uid], gpk): takes as input a basename bsn, a message m, a user
secret key gsk[uid], and a group public key gpk, and outputs a signature Ω.
• DAAVerify(bsn,m,Ω, gpk): takes as input a basename bsn, a message m, a signature
Ω, and a group public key gpk, outputs 1 if Ω is valid, and 0 otherwise.
• DAALink((bsn0,m0,Ω0), (bsn1,m1,Ω1), gpk) takes as input two signatures Ω0,Ω1
each on a basename and a message, and a group public key gpk. Outputs 1 if
the two signatures are linked and 0 otherwise.
• DAAIdentifyT (T , gsk) outputs 1 if T corresponds to a valid transcript of a
< DAAJoin,DAAIssue > with output gsk, and otherwise 0.
• DAAIdentifyS(bsn,m,Ω, gsk) outputs 1 if the signature Ω originates from the user
secret key gsk, and 0 otherwise.
In Figure 2.5, we provide the oracles used in the pre–DAA security requirements: ADDU,
SNDU, SNDI, USK, and SIGN. These are similar to those for dynamic group signatures.
As there is no longer an opening functionality, there is no need for the WREG and RREG
oracles. The ADDU, SNDU, and SNDI oracles allow for the joining of honest and corrupted
users, depending on the corruption setting of the issuer as in group signature schemes.
The USK again allows the secret keys of honest users to be revealed, and the SIGN oracle
outputs signatures of honest users. There is no need for a linking oracle, because signatures
are publicly linkable. As in group signatures, DAAJoin and DAAIssue both take as input
the state, and an incoming message. They output a new state, an outgoing message, and
decuid which again is set to accept, reject or cont.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state:
HUL List of uids of honest users, initially set to ∅. New honest users can be added by
queries to the ADDU oracle (when the issuer is honest) or SNDU oracle (when the
issuer is corrupt).
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CUL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. Initially set to ∅, new
corrupt users can be added through the SNDI oracle if the issuer is honest. If the
issuer is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
BUL List of users that have been corrupted with the USK oracle. Initially set to ∅, only
honest users that have joined through the SNDU or ADDU oracles can be corrupted
in this way.
SL List of (uid,m, bsn) tuples input to the SIGN oracle.
ADDU(uid):
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥
decuid ← cont, stuidJoin ← (gpk)
stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk, uid)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$DAAJoin(stuidJoin,⊥)
while decuid = cont
(stuidIssue,MJoin,dec
uid)←$DAAIssue(stuidIssue,MIssue)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$DAAJoin(stuidJoin,MJoin)
if decuid = accept
reg[uid]← stuidIssue,gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return reg[uid]
SNDU(uid,Min):
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidJoin undefined st
uid
Join ← gpk
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$DAAJoin(stuidJoin,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return (Mout,dec
uid)
SNDI(uid,Min):
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CUL
CUL← CUL ∪ {uid},decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if undefined stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk, uid)
(stuidIssue,Mout,dec
uid)←$DAAIssue(stuidIssue,Min)
if decuid = accept reg[uid]← stuidIssue
return (Mout,dec
uid, reg[uid])
else return (Mout,dec
uid)
USK(uid):
if uid /∈ HUL return ⊥
BUL← BUL ∪ {uid} return gsk[uid]
SIGN(bsn,m, uid):
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
SL← SL ∪ {uid,m, bsn}
return DAASign(bsn,m,gsk[uid], gpk)
Figure 2.5: Oracles in the pre-DAA security model
The security requirements for pre–DAA schemes are correctness, anonymity, traceability
and non–frameability.
Correctness. In the game given in Figure 2.6 we provide the correctness requirement.
This ensures that, given a user is honestly joined to the scheme and DAASign is performed
correctly, the signature output will verify correctly. It also ensures that signatures gener-
ated honestly using the same user private key and basename will be linked under DAALink,
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Experiment: ExpcorrA,Π(τ)
param←$DAASetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAAKeyGen(param),HUL,CUL← ∅
(uid,m0,m1, bsn)←$AADDU(gpk), if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
∀b ∈ {0, 1} Ωb←$DAASign(bsn,mb,gsk[uid], gpk)
∀b ∈ {0, 1} if DAAVerify(bsn,mb,Ωb, gpk) = 0 return 1
if bsn 6=⊥ if DAALink((bsn,m0,Ω0), (bsn,m1,Ω1), gpk) = 0 return 1
if DAAIdentifyS(bsn,m0,Ω0,gsk[uid]) = 0 return 1
Let T denote the < DAAJoin,DAAIssue > transcript for user uid
if DAAIdentifyT (T ,gsk[uid]) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Figure 2.6: Experiment capturing the correctness requirement for pre–DAA schemes
and that DAAIdentifyS and DAAIdentifyT correctly identify signatures to the user private
key and the transcript respectively.
A pre–DAA scheme Π satisfies correctness if for all adversaries A: Pr[ExpcorrA,Π(τ) = 1] = 0.
Anonymity. The anonymity requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.7. This ensures
that a user’s signatures cannot be de-anonymised, and signatures with different basenames
cannot be linked by user. In the security game, the adversary has corrupted the issuer,
and chooses two honest users and a message and basename. They are returned with a
challenge signature and they must guess which of the two users is the author. They can
create honest users using the SNDU oracle and corrupt these with the USK oracle. They
can also obtain signatures from honest users with the SIGN oracle. However, they cannot
corrupt either of the challenged honest users with the USK, or query one of these users,
and the challenge basename to SIGN as otherwise the DAALink algorithm could be used
to trivially win.
Definition 2.15 (Anonymity). A pre–DAA scheme Π satisfies anonymity if for all polynomial–
time adversaries A, the advantage |Pr[Expanon−0A,Π (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−1A,Π (τ) = 1]| is neg-
ligible in τ .
Traceability. The traceability requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.7. This
requirement ensures firstly that all signatures identify under DAAIdentifyS to a secret key
obtained through a < DAAJoin,DAAIssue > protocol, and secondly that two signatures on
the same basename that identify to the same secret key under DAAIdentifyS are always
linked. The Traceability experiment is made up of two games, which each capture a
different property. Both properties must be satisfied to ensure Traceability. The adversary
is separated into A1 and A2 to emphasize that these are separate games and there is no
49
2.8 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Experiment: Expanon−bA,Π (τ)
param←$DAASetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAAKeyGen(param),HUL,BUL,SL← ∅
(st, uid0, uid1, bsn,m)←$ASNDU,USK,SIGN(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid0, uid1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid0],gsk[uid1] =⊥ return 0
Ω∗←$DAASign(bsn,m,gsk[uidb], gpk)
b∗←$ASNDU,USK,SIGN(guess, st,Ω∗)
if uid0, uid1 ∈ BUL or (uid0, ·, bsn), (uid1, ·, bsn) ∈ SL return 0
return b∗
Experiment: ExptraceA,Π (τ)
param←$DAASetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAAKeyGen(param),HUL,CUL,BUL← ∅
(Ω,m, bsn, gsk1, · · · , gskl)←$ASNDI1 (gpk)
Let T denote the set of all transcripts accepted from SNDI queries
If the following conditions hold return 1
1. DAAVerify(bsn,m,Ω, gpk) = 1
2. ∀T ∈ T ∃i ∈ [l] such that DAAIdentifyT (T , gski) = 1
3. ∀i ∈ [l] DAAIdentifyS(bsn,m,Ω, gski) = 0
(bsn,m0,m1,Ω0,Ω1, gsk)←$A2(gpk, isk) if bsn =⊥ return 0
If the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1. ∀b ∈ {0, 1} DAAVerify(bsn,mb,Ωb, gpk) = 1
2. ∀b ∈ {0, 1} DAAIdentifyS(bsn,mb,Ωb, gsk) = 1
3. DAALink((bsn,m0,Ω0), (bsn,m1,Ω1), gpk) = 0
Experiment: Expnon−frameA,Π (τ)
param←$DAASetup(1τ ), (gpk, isk)←$DAAKeyGen(param),HUL,BUL,SL← ∅
(bsn,m, uid,Ω)←$ASNDU,USK,SIGN1 (gpk, isk)
If the following conditions hold return 1
1. DAAVerify(bsn,m,Ω, gpk) = 1
2. uid ∈ HUL\BUL and (uid,m, bsn) /∈ SL
3. DAAIdentifyS(bsn,m,Ω,gsk[uid]) = 1.
(bsn0,m0,Ω0, bsn1,m1,Ω1, gsk)←$A2(gpk, isk)
If one of the following conditions hold return 0
1. ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that DAAVerify(bsnb,mb,Ωb, gpk) = 0
2. DAALink((bsn0,m0,Ω0), (bsn1,m1,Ω1), gpk) = 0
If one of the following conditions hold return 1 else return 0
1. DAAIdentifyS(bsn0,m0,Ω0, gsk) = 1 and DAAIdentifyS(bsn1,m1,Ω1, gsk) = 0
2. bsn0 6= bsn1 or bsn0 =⊥ or bsn1 =⊥
Figure 2.7: Experiments capturing the anonymity, traceability and non–frameability se-
curity requirements for pre–DAA schemes
joint state.
The first game captures that all valid signatures should identify to a secret key of a user
that has successfully joined under DAAIdentifyS . The adversary has not corrupted the
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issuer as otherwise they could simply create their own unregistered users. They are given
the SNDI oracle to create corrupt users, and have no need for other oracles as the game
does not distinguish between honest and corrupt users. They then must output a secret
key corresponding to every accepted SNDI query under DAAIdentifyT , and a valid signature
that does not identify to any of these secret keys under DAAIdentifyS .
The second game captures that signatures tracing to the same secret key and with the
same basename should link under DAALink. The adversary has corrupted the issuer, and
has no need for oracles as the game does not distinguish between honest and corrupt
users. They must output a basename, a user secret key, and two valid signatures on this
basename. They win if the two signatures are not linked under DAALink but do identify
to the same secret key.
Definition 2.16 (Traceability). A pre–DAA scheme Π satisfies traceability if for all
polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,Π (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Non–frameability. The non–frameability requirement is given by the game in Figure 2.7.
This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot impersonate an honest user by forg-
ing signatures linking to theirs. This requires firstly that an adversary should not be
able to output a valid signature that identifies to the secret key of an honest user under
DAAIdentifyS , and secondly that they should not be able to output two valid linked sig-
natures, that either have different basenames or identify under DAAIdentifyS to different
secret keys. The non–frameability experiment is also made up of two games, which each
capture a different property. Both properties must be satisfied to ensure Non–frameability.
The adversary is separated into A1 and A2 to emphasize that these are separate games
and there is no joint state.
The first security game captures that an adversary should not be able to output a signature
that traces to the secret key of an honest user. The adversary has corrupted the issuer.
They are given the SNDU, USK, SIGN oracles to create honest users, reveal their private
keys, and obtain signatures from these honest users. They then must output a valid
signature that identifies under DAAIdentifyS to the secret key of an honest user, that was
not revealed under USK, or obtained through the SIGN oracle.
The second game captures that signatures tracing to different secret keys or with different
basenames should not link under DAALink. The adversary has again corrupted the issuer,
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and has no need for oracles as the game does not distinguish between honest and corrupt
users. They must output two valid linked signatures and a user secret key. They win
if either the basenames of the two signatures are different or only one of the signatures
identifies under DAAIdentifyS to the secret key.
Definition 2.17 (Non–frameability). A pre–DAA scheme Π satisfies non–frameability if
for all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[Expnon−frameA,Π (τ) = 1] is negligible
in τ .
2.8.2 CDL Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme
The CDL scheme [33] was proved secure under the state–of–the–art security requirements
for full DAA [33], assuming the LSRW [97], Discrete Logarithm (DL), and DDH assump-
tions. It consists of the algorithms provided in Figure 2.8, and the protocol provided in
Figure 2.9. We merge the TPM and host here, as this is the setting considered through-
out this thesis. The public parameters of a CDL scheme are the type–3 bilinear group:
(p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2) and a hash function H.
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CDLKeyGen(param)
α, β←$Z∗p, X ← G2α, Y ← G2β return gpk = (X,Y ), isk = (α, β)
CDLSign(bsn,m, (f, (A,B,C,D), gpk)
a←$Z∗p, A′ ← Aa, B′ ← Ba, C ← Ca, D′ ← Da
if bsn 6=⊥ J ← H(bsn)f , pi←$SPK{(f) : D′ = B′f ∧ J = H(bsn)f}(bsn,m)
if bsn =⊥ J ←⊥, pi←$SPK{(f) : D′ = B′f}(bsn,m)
return Ω = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
CDLVerify(bsn,m,Ω, gpk)
Parse Ω = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
Verify pi with respect to B′, D′, J,m, bsn
if A′ = 1 or J = 1 return 0
if e(A′, Y ) 6= e(B′, G2) or e(A′D′, X) 6= e(C ′, G2) return 0 else return 1
CDLLink((bsn0,m0,Ω0), (bsn1,m1,Ω1), gpk)
For b ∈ {0, 1} parse Ωb = (A′b, B′b, C ′b, D′b, Jb, pib)
if bsn0 6= bsn1 or bsn0, bsn1 =⊥ return 0
if ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that CDLVerify(bsnb,mb,Ωb, gpk) = 0 return 0
if J0 = J1 return 1 else return 0
CDLIdentifyT (T , (f,A,B,C,D))
Let T = (n, (F, pif ), (cre, picre)), if F = Gf1 and cre = (A,B,C,D) return 1 else return 0
CDLIdentifyS(bsn,m,Ω, (f,A,B,C,D))
Let Ω = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi), if CDLVerify(bsn,m,Ω, gpk) = 0 return 0
if D′ = B′f return 1 else return 0
Figure 2.8: The algorithms of CDL
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CDLJoin(gpk) 
 CDLIssue(isk, gpk, uid)
choose n←$ {0, 1}τ
ff n
f ←$Z∗p, F ← Gf1 ,
piF ←$SPK{(f) : F = Gf1}(n)
-F, piF
Verify piF , F ∈ G1 and F 6= 1
s←$Z∗p, A← G1s, B ← Aβ
C ← AαF sαβ, D ← F sβ
cre← (A,B,C,D), picre←$
SPK{t : B = Gt1 ∧D = F t}
reg[uid]← (F, cre)
ff cre, picre
if A = 1 return ⊥
Verify picre
if e(A, Y ) 6= e(B,G2) or
e(AD,X) 6= e(C,G2)
return ⊥
gsk[uid]← (f, cre)
Figure 2.9: The < CDLJoin,CDLIssue > Protocol
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a new model for centralised reputation systems and a construction
satisfying this model using two variants of a group signature scheme as building blocks.
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3.1.1 Motivation
We first focus on an application of group signature schemes to centralised reputation sys-
tems.
Reputation has always played a fundamental role in how we exchange products and ser-
vices. While traditionally we have been used to trusting the reputation of established
brands or companies, we are now facing a new challenge in the online world: determining
the trustworthiness of a wide variety of possible exchanges. Whether we are selecting a
restaurant, buying a product or getting a taxi, we are increasingly relying on scores and
ratings to make our choice. For example, on Amazon, which in 2015 had over 2 million
third party sellers worldwide [1], each seller is given a rating out of 5. Also Uber, with
over 40 million monthly active users [3], allows drivers and passengers to rate each other.
A reputation system formalises this process of rating a user or service by associating them
with a reputation value representing their trustworthiness. A reputation is then built
as the value gets updated over time, as a consequence of user interactions and service
exchanges.
There are several privacy implications of reputation systems. Obviously, to form a rep-
utation value for a specific user or service, their behaviour across interactions needs to
be linked. However, a user could be deanonymised by linking all their interactions to-
gether in a profiling attack. Also the detection of multiple feedback on the same instance
also involves linking users’ feedback. Given this, a cryptographic treatment of reputation
systems has been considered necessary, and several models have been proposed in the
literature so far [7, 18, 58].
Reputation systems can be generally categorised into distributed or centralised systems.
Distributed systems [101] have no central server and use local reputation values, i.e.,
reputation values created by users on other users. For example, a user may generate a
reputation value based on feedback from querying other users, and their own interactions.
This means a user does not have a unique reputation value, but many other users hold
their own reputation value for them. As users must form reputation values on others,
their interactions cannot be anonymous. Examples of distributed reputation systems are
decentralised reputation systems (DRS) [51], based on querying other nodes, and privacy
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preserving DRS [78, 111], designed to maintain anonymity when answering queries from
other nodes using multi-party computation.
Centralised reputation systems, on the other hand, have a central server that manages
the network, performing tasks such as controlling communication between users, receiving
feedback and evaluating reputation values. We will focus on centralised systems since the
reputation systems used by most service providers such as Airbnb, Uber and Amazon are
of this type. A variety of centralised reputation system models have been proposed in
the literature. While their applications and the used techniques vary greatly, all of the
models have in common that reputations are assigned to each item or service, the object
of the reputation, rather than each user, the provider of the service. To understand the
limitations of this, let us consider the case of online shopping: in such a scenario, existing
reputation systems would typically allocate a reputation to each product sold (item), and
not to each seller (user), based on all their sold products.
In this chapter, we advocate the need for a shift in how reputation systems are modelled,
and we propose a model for reputation systems in which a reputation value is given to
each user, based on all their user behaviour or items. This is crucial in ensuring that a
user’s previous behaviour will contribute to their current reputation, instead of having
separate reputations for each service provided. Clearly, if items belonging to a user could
be linked together, the model which has been used so far could be transformed into our
new one, by collating the reviews for each item belonging to a user to form a reputation
value. However, if the user wishes to make their items unlinkable for privacy reasons,
then this becomes more challenging. We note that users can refer to both consumers and
providers of a service. However, as many applications such as Uber and AirBnb allow
both consumers and providers to be rated, we do not distinguish between the two.
A car pooling app is an example of the reputation systems we are modelling. A user may
not want their trips (or items) to be linked together, as their movements could be tracked.
However, a user’s reputation should be based on their previous trips, so others can judge
their reliability. In this context, reputations based on each journey are not useful, as they
cannot be used for future journeys. This is why it is important to assign reputation values
to users instead of items.
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3.1.2 Existing Work
There exist several security models for centralised reputation systems. Reputation sys-
tems using ecash for reputation points were modelled in [7], where a reputation value
corresponds to the number of a user’s reputation points. However, this model is limited
since it only captures reputation systems where reputations are formed in this way.
The model proposed in [18] is inspired by the security model for dynamic group sig-
natures [14], and the authors provide an extra linkability feature to detect users giving
multiple feedback on the same subject. In [58], the security requirements for this model
are improved by giving more power to the adversary, (for example, in the public linkability
security requirement the key issuer is no longer assumed to be honest), and introducing
the requirement that an adversary cannot forge feedback that will link to another user,
invalidating their feedback. In [58] the model is also made fully dynamic [24], i.e. users
can join or leave the scheme at any time, and a lattice-based instantiation satisfying this
model is provided.
Crucially, in both [18] and [58] reputations are assigned to each item, the subject of
feedback, not each user. In contrast, we propose a new model for reputation systems in
which a reputation value is given to each user, based on all their user behaviour or items.
This ensures a user’s reputation reflects their entire past behaviour and so ensures they
are accountable for their previous actions, modelling more accurately how such systems
truly operate.
3.1.3 Our Contribution
Our contribution is to propose a new model for reputation systems so that reputation
values are given to users instead of items, whilst guaranteeing that the user’s behaviour is
unlinkable, and that the central server does not have to be involved during every transac-
tion. This means that users can have multiple unlinkable items, whilst a reputation value
still reflects their entire behaviour. Therefore users can have the benefits of privacy, whilst
still being held accountable.
The first challenge when developing such reputation systems, is to provide a mechanism for
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generating reputation values, whilst ensuring items cannot be linked by user. We model
this with a ReceiveFB algorithm run by the central server (CS), which takes feedback, and
links it to other feedback on items with the same author, updating their reputation. We
define the security requirement, unlinkability of user behaviour, which defines the unlink-
ability of items by the same user achievable while reputations can still be updated using
ReceiveFB. Our approach as described so far gives rise to a possible attack in which a user
produces a valid item which will not contribute to this user’s reputation, or will even un-
fairly affect another user in ReceiveFB. We introduce the traceability security requirement
to mitigate against this attack. These security requirements are reminiscent of those for
group signature schemes in [12].
The second challenge is to determine the reputation of a specific user, whose items are
unlinkable. A naive solution could be for the user to simply attach their reputation to
an item, but the user could lie about their reputation. To avoid this, we introduce the
PostItem algorithm, with which the user posts their item, and proves they were given a
reputation at a particular time, using a token generated by the CS. We further introduce
the security requirement of unforgeability of reputation to ensure the user cannot lie about
their reputation.
Finally, the standard security requirements of a centralised reputation system [18, 58],
namely anonymity of feedback, soundness of reputation and non–frameability, still need to
hold, and we adapt these naturally to our new model.
We then show how such a reputation system satisfying our security requirements is achiev-
able using two variants of group signature schemes: a group signature scheme that has been
bound to reputation for sending items, and a DAA scheme [29] for sending feedback. We
present a concrete construction which ensures the unlinkability of user behaviour, trace-
ability and unforgeability of reputation requirements. Our modification to [53], similarly
to in [106], allows users to prove their reputation at a particular time. Our construction
also makes use of the DAA scheme given in [33], which ensures anonymity of feedback,
whilst multiple feedback on the same item can be detected, ensuring soundness of repu-
tation. This is due to the user controlled linkability property of the DAA scheme, where
only signatures with the same basenames can be linked. We set the basename to be the
item feedback is given on.
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To reduce complexity, our model is in the static setting, however it could simply be
converted to the dynamic case using [14]. Our construction uses building blocks designed
in the dynamic case and so could also be easily converted.
Although our scheme aims to provide reputation values for users, it would be straightfor-
ward to provide reputation values for items as well. The Central Server could simply keep
track of all feedback given on an item and publish the item alongside its reputation based
on just this feedback. In many applications, such as AirBnb, reputations are provided for
both users and items.
3.2 Chapter Preliminaries
3.2.1 Existing Work on Centralised Reputation Systems
We now provide an overview of several centralised reputation systems that have been pro-
posed for different applications that are not proven secure under a particular cryptographic
model for a reputation system.
The reputation system PerChatRep [126] was developed for pervasive social chatting;
users chat with each other and provide feedback on this. This scheme is a hybrid between
a distributed and centralised system. Local reputations are used, as well as a global
reputation calculated by the central server. The scheme manages privacy by changing the
pseudonyms used by nodes, at regular intervals. Therefore it does not achieve unlinkability
of all of a user’s behaviour to other users. This is also true for sending feedback.
AdContRep [125] is a reputation system that works in a similar way to PerChatRep but is
specifically for MANET content services, which help nodes to decide which service provider
to use for different applications. In this scheme reputations for different content as well
as users are tracked. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are networks of mobile devices
that communicate wirelessly, in a decentralised manner. However, nodes do communicate
with a central server periodically in AdContRep.
The reputation system AnonRep was devised in [128] for use in internet message boards
with anonymity. In order to form reputation values, messages must be opened to reveal
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the author. Anonrep uses multi–party computation to restrict this opening power, so that
reputation values are formed by a group of servers, instead of one trusted party. Users’
messages can only be de-anonymised if all servers collude.
In the context of vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), networks of vehicles that allow
communication, an example is the reputation system in [106], where vehicles communi-
cate directly, and messages and feedback are anonymous and unlinkable. This reputation
system uses a modification of the BBS group signature scheme [21], which we will call
BBS*, that allows users to prove their reputation. Finally, [70] fixes a bug in the BBS*
scheme, and uses BBS* and a modified direct anonymous attestation (DAA) scheme to
build a reputation system for pervasive social networks with stronger anonymity for feed-
back than [106].
In [112], a reputation system is proposed that ensures feedback remains anonymous, while
ensuring feedback can only be given after the entity that is being rated confirms a trans-
action happens with the rater. This ensures reliability of reputation values by ensuring
that users cannot collude to repeatedly unfairly rate another user.
In [16], signatures of reputation are proposed, which allow users to sign demonstrating
they have a particular reputation, provided the measure of reputation is monotonic. This
means that extra feedback only increases the reputation score. A cryptographic security
model is given for this primitive, but not the wider reputation system.
3.2.2 Conventional attacks on Reputation Systems
We now detail several attacks on reputation systems outside the scope of a cryptographic
model. These attacks can be mitigated in other ways when a reputation system is imple-
mented by making careful design choices. We will evaluate how susceptible our construc-
tion is to these attacks at the end of this chapter.
• The On–Off attack: In this attack [95] adversaries behave honestly for some time,
building up a good reputation. They can then start behaving dishonestly. Their
high reputation enables them to do this effectively and for a long period of time,
before their reputation drops. This is particularly effective for an adversary with
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one specific target in mind. For example in eBay, a user could build up a good
reputation score for small orders in order to later defraud users during a big order.
This is also referred to as the traitors attack [102]. This attack can be mitigated by
adjusting the weighting of the final reputation formation, so that bad behaviour will
cause the reputation to deteriorate quickly. This ensures that more recent feedback
will have more value.
• Unfair Rating attack: A malicious node repeatedly provides dishonest feedback
(without collaboration) [54]. This unfairly affects the other user’s reputation. This
attack can be partly mitigated by ensuring each user can only provide feedback once
for each instance.
• The Collaborative Unfair Rating attack: This attack, described in [95] as the
collaborative bad mouthing attack, involves many malicious users colluding together
in the unfair rating attack. They all collude to submit dishonest feedback on a user.
This is also referred to as a colluders attack [102]. A form of this attack is the front
peers attack [102], when malicious users collude to increase each other’s reputations.
For example, they might post a public message, and inform all other users to submit
positive feedback on this message. In sybil attacks these colluding users are fake
identities.
This attack can be mitigated by ensuring only one feedback can be given per instance,
and also by making joining the scheme expensive in some way. New users to the
scheme could be verified. Another way is through incentivising honest feedback,
which was shown game theoretically to ensure players rate accurately [123].
• The Whitewashers attack: Whitewashers are malicious users that leave and then
rejoin the reputation scheme in order to lose their bad reputation [102]. After a user
has behaved maliciously they leave the system and then rejoin under a new identity
with a new reputation score. A way to mitigate this attack is to assign new users a
low reputation so that they must prove themselves in the network, as well as making
joining the scheme expensive in some way.
• The Self–Rating attack: Adversaries positively rate a large number of their own
items. This is particularly effective if they can create a large number of fake items
to positively rate. Ideally this attack should be avoided by preventing the user from
self rating. The central server can also punish authors of items that do not represent
a valid transaction.
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3.3 Defining a Reputation System
We first introduce the syntax and generic functionality of a centralised reputation system
RS with unlinkable user behaviour, and a reputation value assigned to users.
We define a reputation system, RS, as consisting of the following probabilistic polynomial–
time algorithms: Setup, AllocateReputation, PostItem, CheckItem, SendFB, VerifyFB, LinkFB,
ReceiveFB. We illustrate our model in Figure 3.1.
CS(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,F,L, ID)
2. For current time t perform (ω, r, ID)←$
AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r[uid], ID)
6. (r,L,F) ←
ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)
User uid(gpk,usk[uid])
1. Request reputation at
current time, with req
3. When posting an
item I perform Ω←$
PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)
User uid′(gpk,usk[uid′])
4. Check
CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,Ω) = 1
5. When giving feedback fb
on item I, perform Φ←$
SendFB(gpk,usk[uid′], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
1.
re
q
2.
(ω
, r
, t
)
3. (I, r, t,Ω)
5.
((I, r, t,Ω
), fb,Φ
)
Figure 3.1: How entities interact in our model of a centralised reputation system
SendFB, VerifyFB, and LinkFB are equivalent to the Sign, Verify, Link algorithms in [18]
and [58]. The additional algorithms, represent the key features of our new approach.
We will refer to our model for a centralised reputation system as the RS model. The
entities involved are a set of users U = {uidi} and a central server (CS). The CS has two
secret keys, isk and osk. The issuing secret key, isk, is necessary for allowing users to
join the system and allocating them tokens to prove their reputation, whereas the opening
secret key, osk, is necessary for forming reputations from feedback. For simplicity we
provide the CS with both secret keys, but to reduce the power of one entity the role of
the CS could be distributed.
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The CS begins by running Setup. Users post items1, which are the subject of feedback,
while proving their reputation at a certain time using PostItem. After a request from a
user, the CS runs AllocateReputation, which outputs tokens to allow a user to prove their
current reputation at a specific time in PostItem. Other users verify that an item is a
valid output of PostItem by running CheckItem. This ensures the item was authored by
an enrolled user, the reputation alongside the item is correct for the given time, and the
CS can use feedback on the item to form reputations. SendFB is run by a user when
giving feedback on an item, and its output is sent to the CS. ReceiveFB is run by the CS
when receiving the output of SendFB from a user. The CS updates their stored feedback
and reputations, based on this. VerifyFB and LinkFB are used by ReceiveFB to check the
feedback is valid and that there is no feedback by the same user on this item, otherwise
ReceiveFB will abort.
We note that in our model, any user can give feedback on an item. This is useful for
applications where items are publicly posted and rated, such as a message boards. How-
ever, for applications where only a user who has consumed a service corresponding to a
particular item should be able to rate this item, care must be taken when sharing items.
Only the users who are allowed to rate an item should be given the item.
In the car pooling example, whenever a driver wishes to update their reputation, they
request the CS run AllocateReputation to obtain a token for their reputation. They are
incentivised to do this by the fact the reputation is displayed alongside the time it was
allocated. When they wish to offer a ride, they use their most recent token to share an
item with these passengers through PostItem, which can be verified by passengers with
CheckItem. The passenger can then pay using some anonymous payment system. After
the ride, their passenger can then provide feedback on this item to the CS using SendFB.
The CS uses ReceiveFB to update their lists of feedback and reputations for each user, if
the feedback is valid.
Before describing in detail our new model, we provide an overview of our notation in
Table 3.1.
We keep R, Aggr, rˆ generic to ensure a flexible model that applies to different applications.
We now state some examples.
1A simple example of an item could be a product being sold.
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R The set of all possible reputation values.
rˆ The initial reputation of every user at the system’s setup.
U The set of all users in the scheme.
Aggr A function that takes as input the new feedback fb, the user whose reputation
is being updated uid, the list of feedback already received F , and the most
recent reputation r, and outputs the new reputation r′.
r For the user uid ∈ U , r[uid] is the user uid’s reputation held by the CS.
L A list of feedback that will contain entries in the form of a 6-tuple ((I, r, t,Ω),
fb,Φ), where (fb,Φ) is feedback/ proof pair, given on item I with reputation r
and time t, with the proof Ω. L is used by the CS to keep track of all feedback
given, so that multiple feedback on the same item can be detected in
ReceiveFB.
F A list of feedback that will contain entries of the form (uid, fb) where fb is
feedback given to user uid. F is used by the CS to keep track of all feedback
given on user uid to form reputations in ReceiveFB.
ID A list of identities for all users, this list will allow the CS to store information
on users whilst running AllocateReputation for use in ReceiveFB.
Table 3.1: An overview of the notation used in our RS model
In an application that values anonymity over a fine grained reputation, the set R could
consist of reputation values {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. In an application where fine grained reputation
is valued over large anonymity sets, the set R could consist of reputation values {n/10 :
n ∈ [0, 500]}.
The initial reputation rˆ could be set to 0 or to an average value. The choice of 0 could
potentially penalise new users, but the choice of an average value could allow users to
increase their reputation by rejoining the scheme.
If feedback is in the same set as R, then an example of Aggr that would fit with the
previous examples is:
Aggr(fb, uid,F , r) = fb+ kr
1 + k
, such that k = |{(uid, fb′) ∈ F})|.
For this example, reputation values are the average of all feedback received. Alternatively,
this average could be weighted so that more recent feedback counts for more than more
distant feedback.
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3.3.1 Syntax of RS
We now present the syntax for our RS model of a centralised reputation system. We note
that VerifyFB and LinkFB are never used explicitly, but only used internally by ReceiveFB.
However, as in existing work [18, 58], we include these algorithms separately to allow for
notational simplicity when defining security.
Definition 3.1 (RS). A centralised reputation system RS consists of the following algo-
rithms:
Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)→ (gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID): takes as input security param-
eter τ , a set R of reputation values, rˆ ∈ R, the initial reputation, a set of users U ,
and the aggregation algorithm Aggr. The CS computes a public key gpk, the issuing
secret key isk, which is used to issue new user secret keys and in AllocateRepu-
tation, and the opening secret key osk, which is used in ReceiveFB to trace the
author of an item to form reputations. The CS computes a secret key for each user,
usk = {usk[uid] : uid ∈ U}, and r, the reputation for all users held by the CS,
where ∀uid ∈ U , r[uid] = rˆ. The CS creates empty lists L,F , ID.
AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r[uid], ID)→ (ω, r[uid], ID): takes as input
the public key gpk, the issuing secret key isk, user uid’s secret key usk[uid], the
current time t, the current reputation of user uid held by the CS r[uid], and the list
of identities for users ID. It updates the list of identities ID, and generates ω which
allows user uid to prove they have reputation r[uid].
PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)→ Ω: takes as input the public key gpk, an item I, user
uid’s secret key usk[uid], the last reputation r, time t and token ω received from
the CS (r is not necessarily the reputation r[uid] held by the CS). It outputs Ω,
which proves the author is enrolled and has reputation r at time t, and is used in
ReceiveFB to form a reputation for user uid.
CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,Ω)→ {0, 1}: takes as input the public key gpk, an item I, a rep-
utation r, a time t and Ω. It outputs 1 if Ω is a valid output of PostItem, given
(I, r, t), and 0 otherwise.
SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)→ Φ: takes as input the public key gpk, user uid’s
secret key usk[uid], the subject of their feedback, (I, r, t,Ω), and the feedback fb.
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It outputs Φ which is sent to the CS, to prove the author of Φ is enrolled, and also
for the detection of multiple feedback.
VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)→ {0, 1}: takes as input the public key gpk, an item (I, r,
t,Ω), and feedback/ proof pair on this item (fb,Φ). It outputs 1 if Φ is a valid
output of SendFB, and 0 otherwise.
LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb0,Φ0, fb1,Φ1)→ {0, 1}: takes as input the public key gpk, an
item (I, r, t,Ω), and two feedback/ proof pairs on this item, (fb0,Φ0), (fb1,Φ1). It
outputs 1 if Φ0 and Φ1 were generated by the same user with the same input of
(I, r, t,Ω), and 0 otherwise.
ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)→ (r,L,F): takes as input the public
key gpk, the opening secret key osk, a feedback/ proof pair (fb,Φ) on item (I, r, t,Ω),
the current reputations r held by the CS, the lists of feedback so far L and F , and
the list of user identities ID. If Φ is not valid, or the LinkFB algorithm finds multiple
feedbacks in L then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it uses the aggregation algorithm Aggr,
and the list F , to update r, L and F to take into account the new feedback.
3.4 Security Properties
We now present the desirable security and privacy properties for our RS model.
As discussed earlier, we consider reputation systems satisfying the following properties:
correctness, unforgeability of reputation, traceability, unlinkability of user behaviour,
soundness of reputation, anonymity of feedback, and non–frameability.
We introduce unforgeability of reputation, a requirement that ensures a user cannot prove
that they have a reputation for a certain time, which differs from the one they were
allocated by the CS in AllocateReputation. This is necessary because when an item is
unlinkable, the author’s reputation cannot be determined. Therefore the reputation must
be included alongside the item. This property ensures that the sender has not lied about
their reputation.
We also introduce unlinkability of user behaviour, which formalises our definition of unlink-
able user behaviour, given that ReceiveFB can still form reputations, as well as traceability,
67
3.4 Security Properties
which ensures that all items generated by an adversary can be traced back to them when
computing their reputation. This is necessary because, due to the unlinkability of user
behaviour property, an attacker could attempt to subvert ReceiveFB. These properties
are reminiscent of the full-anonymity and full-traceability properties [12] for static group
signature schemes, and have been adapted for reputation systems. Traceability and Un-
forgeability of Reputation are separate requirements because they seek to ensure different
properties: that user cannot lie about their reputation and that a user cannot avoid their
behaviour being traced back to them in ReceiveFB.
Soundness of reputation ensures an adversary cannot submit multiple feedback on the
same item, undermining the integrity of reputation values. Anonymity of feedback en-
sures that feedback cannot be traced to the user’s identity and is unlinkable. We have
adapted these two properties from [18] to fit our notation2. Non–frameability ensures
that an adversary cannot produce a feedback that links to another user’s feedback under
LinkFB, and so unfairly stop this feedback being counted. We have adapted this property
from [58]. Non–Frameability and Soundness of Reputation are separate requirements,
because non–frameability captures that feedback should not be unfairly linked together,
whereas Soundness of Reputation captures that feedback should not be unfairly unlinkable.
We highlight that the issuing secret key is used by the CS for joining users to the scheme,
and therefore for the traceability and soundness of reputation property the adversary
cannot corrupt the isk as otherwise they could cheat by creating unregistered users. The
opening secret key is used by the CS to trace items, so that reputations can be updated
with new feedback. Therefore in the unlinkability of user behaviour property the adversary
cannot corrupt the osk as otherwise they could trace signatures. This means the CS could
be split into two separate entities with different secret keys.
We trust that the CS updates users’ reputations correctly with ReceiveFB, meaning the CS
could potentially unfairly tamper with a user’s reputation. This assumption is necessary
because to publicly scrutinise the CS, the de-anonymisation of items input to the CS
would have to be made public. We justify this honest–but–curious trust assumption by
remarking that the manager of a reputation system will have a vested interest in ensuring
the fairness of the system to avoid disgruntled paying customers from moving elsewhere.
2Soundness of reputation is comparable to public linkability and anonymity of feedback is comparable
to anonymity.
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Oracles and State. The security notions that we will formalise use a number of oracles
which keep joint state, e.g., by keeping track of queries and the set of corrupted parties.
We present the detailed description of all oracles in Figure 3.2 and an overview of them
and their maintained records.
USK (corrupts users) Corrupts user uid, and outputs their secret key usk[uid]. Cor-
rupted users are stored in C.
POST (create items) This oracle returns valid items of a user uid.
SENDFB (create feedback) This oracle returns valid feedbacks of a user uid, storing
outputs in the sets Guid, for use in the non–frameability property.
RECEIVEFB (perform ReceiveFB) This oracle returns outputs of the ReceiveFB algo-
rithm.
ALLREP(perform AllocateReputation) This oracle returns outputs of the
AllocateReputation algorithm.
USK(uid):
C ← C ∪ {uid}; return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω):
return PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)
SENDFB(uid, fb, (I, r, t,Ω)):
Φ←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb),Guid ← Guid ∪ {((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)} return Φ
RECEIVEFB((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, ID):
return (r,L,F)← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)
ALLREP(uid, t, r):
return AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r, ID)
Figure 3.2: Oracles in our RS security model
3.4.1 Correctness
The reputation system RS should function correctly. We formulate correctness via five
conditions.
1. Items computed honestly via AllocateReputation and PostItem will verify correctly
under CheckItem.
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2. Feedbacks computed honestly via SendFB will verify correctly under VerifyFB.
3. On input outputs of SendFB on the same item of (I, r, t,Ω), using the same user
secret key, the LinkFB algorithm will output 1.
4. If an item and feedback were generated honestly via PostItem and SendFB, then
ReceiveFB updates r,L,F correctly.
5. If ReceiveFB is input feedback that is not valid under VerifyFB, or links to other
feedback in L under LinkFB, then it will output ⊥.
Definition 3.2 (Correctness). A reputation system RS satisfies correctness if conditions
1–5 are satisfied.
Condition 1 is satisfied if for all τ ∈ N, all polynomially bounded R,U , rˆ ∈ R, all aggrega-
tion algorithms Aggr, (gpk, isk,usk, ID)←$ Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr), all uid ∈ U , any time
t ∈ {0, 1}∗, any r ∈ R|U|, (ω, r, ID)←$AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r[uid], ID),
any I ∈ {0, 1}∗, then
CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)) = 1.
Condition 2 is satisfied if for all τ ∈ N, all polynomially bounded R,U , all rˆ ∈ R, all
aggregation algorithms Aggr, (gpk,usk)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr), all uid ∈ U , all I ∈
{0, 1}∗, all r ∈ R, all t ∈ {0, 1}∗, all Ω ∈ {0, 1}∗, all fb ∈ {0, 1}∗, then
VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb, SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)) = 1.
Condition 3 is satisfied if for all τ ∈ N, all polynomially bounded R,U , all rˆ ∈ R, all
aggregation algorithms Aggr, (gpk,usk)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr), all uid ∈ U , all I ∈
{0, 1}∗, all r ∈ R, all t ∈ {0, 1}∗, all Ω ∈ {0, 1}∗, all fb0, fb1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Φb←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fbb), then
LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb0,Φ0, fb1,Φ1) = 1.
70
3.4 Security Properties
Condition 4 is satisfied if for all τ ∈ N, all polynomially bounded R,U , all rˆ ∈ R, all aggre-
gation algorithms Aggr, (gpk, isk, osk,usk, ID)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U , Aggr), all uid, uid′ ∈
U , r ∈ R|U|, all t ∈ {0, 1}∗, (ω, r, ID)←$AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r[uid],
ID), all I ∈ {0, 1}∗, Ω←$PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω), all fb ∈ {0, 1}∗, Φ←$SendFB
(gpk,usk[uid′], (I, r, t,Ω), fb), all F , all L such that:
∀((I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ L: LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 0,
(r∗, L∗,F∗)← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID), then
(r∗,L∗,F∗) 6=⊥,L∗ = ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) ∪ L,F∗ = F ∪ (uid, fb),
r∗[uid] = Aggr(fb, uid,F , r[uid]), and ∀uˆid 6= uid ∈ U , r∗[uˆid] = r[uˆid].
Condition 5 is satisfied if for all τ ∈ N, all polynomially bounded R,U , all rˆ ∈ R, all
aggregation algorithms Aggr, (gpk, osk,usk, ID)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr), all r, all F ,
(L, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) with VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) = 0 or ∃((I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ L
such that LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 1 then
⊥← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID).
We now present our new security properties, which are necessary as reputation values are
assigned to users instead of their individual unlinkable items.
3.4.2 Unforgeability of Reputation
A user can only prove that they have reputation r at time t, if this was allocated to them
by the CS in AllocateReputation. In the context of car pooling, this security property
ensures a driver cannot lie about their reputation when requesting a passenger.
In our security game in Figure 3.3, the adversary is given the opening secret key osk, the
list of user identities ID, the USK, POST, ALLREP oracles, but not isk, as they could run
AllocateReputation. The adversary wins if they output a valid item, for reputation r, time
t, tracing to a corrupted user uid in ReceiveFB, without querying (uid, r, t) to the ALLREP
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Experiment: Expanon−ub−bA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(st, uid0, uid1, I, r, t, ID)←$ARECEIVEFB(choose, gpk, isk,usk, r,L,F , ID)
∀b˜ ∈ {0, 1} (ωb˜, ID)←$AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uidb˜], t, r, ID)
Ω←$PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uidb], r, t, ωb)
b∗←$ARECEIVEFB(guess, st,Ω, ID)
if ((I, r, t,Ω), ·) queried to the RECEIVEFB oracle return 0
return b∗
Experiment: ExptraceA,RS(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, ID)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr);C ← ∅
(I, r, t,Ω, fb,Φ, r,L,F)←$AUSK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP(gpk, osk, ID)
if CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,Ω) = 0 or VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) = 0 return 0
if ∃((I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ L with LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 1 return 0
∀uid ∈ U , ID ←$AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r, ID)
if ⊥← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID) return 1
else (r∗,L∗,F∗)← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)
if L∗ 6= ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) ∪ L return 1
if F∗ = (uid′, fb) ∪ F for some uid′ ∈ U uid∗ ← uid′ else return 1
if r∗[uid∗] 6= Aggr(fb, uid∗,F , r[uid∗]), or ∃uˆid ∈ U\{uid∗} such that r∗[uˆid] 6= r[uˆid] return 1
if uid∗ /∈ C and (I, uid∗, r, t, ·) was not queried to the POST oracle return 1
else return 0
Experiment: Expunforge−repA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)←$ Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(I, r, t,Ω)←$AUSK,POST,ALLREP(gpk, osk, ID)
if Ω returned by POST or if CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,Ω) = 0 return 0
uid′←$U , fb← 0,Φ←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uid′], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
(r∗,L∗,F∗)← ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)
if F∗\F = {uid, fb} for some uid ∈ U uid∗ ← uid else return 1
if A queried (uid∗, t, r) to ALLREP oracle and uid∗ ∈ C return 0 else return 1
Figure 3.3: Experiments capturing our unlinkability of user behaviour, traceability and
unforgeability of reputation security properties
oracle, or it does not trace to any user.
Definition 3.3 (Unforgeability of Reputation). A reputation system RS satisfies unforge-
ability of reputation if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U such that
|R| and |U| are polynomially bounded in τ , all rˆ ∈ R, all Aggr functions, the advantage
Pr[Expunforge−repA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1] is negligible in τ .
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3.4.3 Traceability of users
This security property ensures that any valid item an adversary produces will contribute
towards their own reputation in ReceiveFB. This also guarantees unforgeability. In the
context of car pooling, this security property means that feedback on a driver’s rides will
always affect their own reputation and not another’s.
In our security game in Figure 3.3, the adversary is given the opening secret key osk,
the list of user identities ID, the USK oracle to corrupt users, and the POST, SENDFB,
ALLREP oracles for uncorrupted user, but not isk, because they could cheat by generating
the secret key of a new user. They must output a valid item and feedback, and r,L,F ,
such that the feedback does not link to any in L. If ReceiveFB fails, does not correctly
update r,L,F , or updates the reputation of an uncorrupted user, then the adversary wins.
Definition 3.4 (Traceability). A reputation system RS satisfies traceability if for all
polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U such that |R| and |U| are polynomially
bounded in τ , all rˆ ∈ R, all Aggr functions, the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,RS(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]
is negligible in τ .
3.4.4 Unlinkability of User Behaviour
This property ensures other users cannot link together items by author, while the CS can
still link items to form reputation values based on a user’s entire behaviour. In the context
of car pooling, this security property means that all rides a driver/ user undertakes are
unlinkable, so their movements cannot be tracked.
In our security game in Figure 3.3, the adversary is given all user secret keys, the issuing
secret key isk, r, L, F , and ID, but not the opening secret key osk, because otherwise
they could run ReceiveFB, and then check which user’s reputation changes. They are given
the RECEIVEFB oracle, but its use is restricted so that the challenge signature cannot be
queried, to avoid this attack. This attack would not be practical in the real world, as
reputations will be updated at intervals so that multiple users’ reputations will change at
once. Future work could consider specific Aggr algorithms that would allow this security
property to be strengthened. In our work, to ensure our model is generic, we define security
for all possible Aggr functions.
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The adversary chooses an item I, a reputation r and a time t, an updated list of identities
ID, and two users uid0, uid1, they then must decide whether an item Ω was authored by
uid0 or uid1.
Definition 3.5 (Unlinkability of User Behaviour). A reputation system RS satisfies un-
linkability of user behaviour if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U
such that |R| and |U| are polynomially bounded in τ , all rˆ ∈ R, and all Aggr functions,
the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−ub−0A,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−ub−1A,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expsound−repA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr))
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)←$Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr); C ← ∅
((I, r, t,Ω), {fbj ,Φj}|C|+1j=1 )←$AUSK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP(gpk, osk)
if ∃j ∈ [1, |C|+ 1] such that VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fbj ,Φj) = 0 return 0
if ∃j1, j2 ∈ [1, |C|+ 1] with j1 6= j2 s.t. LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fbj1 ,Φj1 , fbj2 ,Φj2) = 1
return 0
if ∃j ∈ [1, |C|+ 1] s.t. (uid, fbj , (I, r, t, ω)) with uid /∈ C was queried to the SENDFB oracle
and Φj was returned return 0 else return 1
Experiment: Expanon−fb−bA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)←$ Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
(st, uid0, uid1, fb, (I, r, t,Ω))←$AUSK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP(choose, gpk, isk, osk)
Φ←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uidb], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
b∗←$AUSK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP(guess, st,Φ)
if uid0 or uid1 queried to the USK oracle return 0
if (uid0, ·, (I, r, t,Ω)) or (uid1, ·, (I, r, t,Ω)) queried to the SENDFB oracle return 0
return b∗
Experiment: Expnon−frameA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr))
(gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)←$ Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr); C ← ∅; ∀uid ∈ U Guid ← ∅
((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)←$AUSK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP(gpk, isk, osk)
if VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) = 0 return 0
if ∃uid ∈ U\C such that the following hold return 1 else return 0
((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) /∈ Guid and
∃((I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ Guid with LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 1
Figure 3.4: Experiments capturing our soundness of reputation, anonymity of feedback
and non–frameability security properties
We now provide an overview of the existing security properties.
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3.4.5 Soundness of Reputation Values
Users who are not enrolled should not be able to submit feedback. Reputation values
should be based on only one piece of feedback per item per user. In the context of car
pooling, this security property would mitigate against an attack where a passenger repeat-
edly gives feedback on one ride, unfairly negatively influencing the driver’s reputation.
In the security game, adapted from [18], given in Figure 3.4, the adversary is able to
corrupt users with the USK oracle, and is given the opening secret key osk, but not the
issuing key isk, as they could use this to cheat by generating a secret key for a new
user. They can use the SENDFB, ALLREP and POST oracles for uncorrupted users. The
adversary outputs a list of feedback on the same item. They win if they can output more
valid unlinkable feedback than the number of corrupted users, without using the SENDFB
oracle.
Definition 3.6 (Soundness of Reputation). A reputation system RS satisfies soundness
of reputation if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U such that |R|
and |U| are polynomially bounded in τ , all rˆ ∈ R, all Aggr functions, the advantage
Pr[Expsound−repA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1] is negligible in τ .
3.4.6 Anonymity of Feedback
Anonymity of feedback captures the anonymity of those providing feedback against the
CS, and up to all but two colluding users. Unfortunately it is not possible for a reputation
system to have anonymity against all colluding users, whilst still satisfying soundness of
reputation. This is because an adversary could discover whether a user uid authored some
feedback ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) by running Φ′←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb′), then
running LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′). If this outputs 1, then ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)
must be authored by uid. In the context of car pooling, this security property means that
provided passengers never submit multiple feedback on the same ride, their feedback will
be unlinkable.
In the security game, adapted from [18], and given in Figure 3.4, the adversary is given
isk, osk, and must choose two users uid0 and uid1, an item (I, r, t,Ω), and feedback fb.
They then must decide which of these users authored the Φ returned to them. The adver-
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sary can corrupt users with USK, and use SENDFB, POST and ALLREP for uncorrupted
users. We do not allow the adversary to query uid0 or uid1 to the USK oracle, or to query
SENDFB with either uid0 or uid1 and (I, r, t,Ω), so that they cannot perform the attack
described.
Definition 3.7 (Anonymity of Feedback). A reputation system RS satisfies anonymity of
feedback if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U such that |R| and |U|
are polynomially bounded in τ , and all rˆ ∈ R, all Aggr functions, the following advantage
is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−fb−0A,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−fb−1A,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]∣∣∣ .
3.4.7 Non–frameability
This property, adapted from [58], ensures that an adversary, who has corrupted the central
server and all users, cannot forge feedback that links to feedback of another user, meaning
ReceiveFB detects multiple feedback by this user, and unfairly outputs ⊥. In the context
of car pooling, this security property means that a passenger cannot feedback on their
own ride, linking to the driver involved, invalidating any feedback they submit.
In the security game, given in Figure 3.4, the adversary is given isk, osk and can corrupt
users using the USK oracle, and use the POST, SENDFB, ALLREP oracles for uncorrupted
users. To win, they must output valid feedback not output by the SENDFB oracle, which
links to feedback output by the SENDFB oracle, authored by an uncorrupted user.
Definition 3.8 (Non–frameability). A reputation system RS satisfies non–frameability
if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, all sets R and U such that |R| and |U| are
polynomially bounded in τ , all rˆ ∈ R, all Aggr functions, the advantage
Pr[Expnon−frameA,RS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1] is negligible in τ .
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3.5 A Centralised Reputation System with Unlinkable User
Behaviour
We now present our construction that securely realises our RS model for reputation sys-
tems. Our construction makes use of two primitives: a modification of the XS group
signature scheme XS*, and the CDL DAA scheme [33].
More specifically, we modify the XS group signature scheme [53], detailed in Section 2.7.2,
similarly to the modification of the BBS group signature scheme [21] in [70, 106]. We use
XS* for posting items in PostItem, CheckItem, and AllocateReputation. The XS scheme
satisfies unlinkability of user behaviour, whilst still allowing reputations to be formed in
ReceiveFB, using the opening key. Furthermore our modification allows a user to prove
they were allocated a reputation at a certain time by AllocateReputation.
We then adopt the CDL [33] DAA scheme, detailed in Section 2.8.2, for the feedback
component of the reputation system in SendFB, VerifyFB, LinkFB. This perfectly fits our
requirements, because of the user controlled linkability of the DAA scheme. Signatures are
signed with respect to a basename, and are linkable only when they have the same author
and basename. Therefore in the context of reputation systems, by setting the basename
to be the subject of the feedback, multiple feedback on the same item can be detected,
whilst still ensuring anonymity of feedback.
3.5.1 Binding Reputation to the XS Group Signature Scheme
As discussed in the preliminaries, security requirements for group signatures were de-
fined for static groups [12], dynamic groups [14], and fully dynamic groups [24]. The
XS scheme [53] satisfies the security requirements for dynamic groups [14], of anonymity,
traceability and non–frameability, under the q-SDH [19] assumption and in the random
oracle model [13].
We present XS*, a modification of the XS scheme [53], to allow users to prove their repu-
tation in PostItem. In this modification, we introduce an additional algorithm XSUpdate*,
used in AllocateReputation, which outputs a token allowing a user to update their secret
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XSKeyGen*(gpp1)
ξ1, ξ2←$Zp;K ←$G1 \ {1G1}, H ← Kξ1 , G← Kξ2 , γ←$Zp,W ← Gγ2
return gpk1 = (G1,K,H,G,G2,W ), isk1 = γ, osk = (ξ1, ξ2)
XSJoin*(isk1, uid, gpk1)
x, y←$Zp; Z ← (G1Hy) 1γ+x
return usk1[uid] = (Z, x, y)
XSUpdate*(t, r, isk1, (Z, x, y), gpk1)
Q← H(r, t)
return (ω ← Q 1γ+x , Z · ω)
XSSign*(I, (Z˜, x, y), gpk1, r, t)
ρ1, ρ2←$Zp, T1 ← Kρ1 , T2 ← Z˜Hρ1 , T3 ← Kρ2 , T4 ← Z˜Gρ2 , z ← xρ1 + y
pi←$SPK{(x, z, ρ1, ρ2) : T1 = Kρ1 ∧ T3 = Kρ2 ∧ T4T−12 = Gρ2H−ρ1∧
e(T2,W )e(T2, G2)
x = e(G1 · H(r, t), G2)e(H,W )ρ1e(H,G2)z}
return Ω = (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
XSVerify*(I, r, t,Ω, gpk1)
Parse Ω = (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi), G˜1 = G1 · H(r, t)
return 1 if pi holds for T1, T2, T3, T4, G˜1 else return 0
XSOpen*(I, r, t,Ω, osk, gpk1)
if XSVerify*(I, r, t,Ω, gpk1) = 0 return ⊥ return Z˜ ← T2T−ξ11
Figure 3.5: The algorithms of XS*, our modification to the XS group signature scheme
key, depending on their reputation r at time t. PostItem uses XSSign* to sign as in the
original group signature scheme, but with this updated secret key as input. CheckItem
uses XSVerify*, which now also takes (r, t) as input, and only outputs 1 if the secret key
used to generate this signature has been updated correctly with (r, t).
We also modify the XS scheme by converting it to the static setting, to fit with our
reputation system model. We also move to the type–3 pairing setting, as defined in
Section 2.3.2, where there is no homomorphism between groups. This means we use the
(JoC) q-SDH assumption defined for the type–3 setting.
The XS* signature scheme consists of the algorithms given in Figure 3.5, and the group
public parameters gpp1: the type–3 bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2) and hash func-
tion H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 that we assume is in the random oracle model. A signature proof
of knowledge SPK, as defined in Section 2.6.3, is used as a building block.
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CDLKeyGen(gpp2)
α, β←$Z∗p, X ← G2α, Y ← G2β
return gpk2 = (X,Y ), isk2 = (α, β)
CDLJoin(uid, isk2, gpk2)
f ←$Zp;F ← G1f , r←$Zp
A← G1r, B ← Aβ ;C ← (AαF rαβ), D ← (F )rβ
cre← (A,B,C,D) return usk2[uid]← (f, cre)
CDLSign(msg, fb, (f, (A,B,C,D)), gpk2)
a←$Zp, A′ ← Aa, B′ ← Ba, C ′ ← Ca, D′ ← Da
J ← H(msg)f , pi←$SPK{(f) : D′ = B′f ∧ J = H(msg)f}(msg, fb)
return Φ = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
CDLVerify(msg, fb,Φ, gpk2)
Parse Φ = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
Verify pi with respect to B′, D′, J, fb,msg
if A′ = 1 or J = 1 return 0
if e(A′, Y ) 6= e(B′, G2) or e(A′D′, X) 6= e(C ′, G2) return 0 else return 1
CDLLink(msg, (fb0,Φ0), (fb1,Φ1), gpk2)
For b ∈ {0, 1} parse Φb = (A′b, B′b, C ′b, D′b, Jb, pib)
if ∃b ∈ {0, 1} such that CDLVerify(msg, fbb,Φb, gpk2) = 0 return 0
if J0 = J1 return 1 else return 0
Figure 3.6: The algorithms of CDL in the static setting
3.5.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation
The CDL scheme [33], with a merged TPM and host is given in Section 2.8.2. It was
proved secure in the full DAA setting, assuming the LSRW [97], Discrete Logarithm (DL),
and DDH assumptions, under the state–of–the–art definitions given in [30]. We use the
CDL construction in particular because, as shown in Table 1 of [32], it has the lowest
estimated running time for signing out of the schemes proved secure under the more
recent models. We prioritise efficiency of signing over verification because in reputation
systems verification is performed by a server with more computational power.
We provide the CDL scheme in the form used in our reputation system construction in
Figure 3.6. The main difference from Section 2.8.2 is that it is in the static setting. The
group public parameters gpp2 are the type–3 bilinear group: (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2) and
a hash function H, that we assume is in the random oracle model. Again, a signature
proof of knowledge SPK, as defined in Section 2.6.3, is used as a building block.
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3.5.3 Our RS-GS Construction
In Figure 3.7 we present our RS-GS construction for a reputation system RS, as defined
in Section 3.3, derived from the XS* scheme and the CDL scheme.
3.6 Evaluation of our Construction
We first analyse the security of our construction against the conventional attacks against
reputation systems, discussed in Section 3.2.2, as well as in the RS model. We then
evaluate the efficiency of this construction.
3.6.1 Resilience against Conventional Attacks
The unfair rating attack is mitigated by the soundness of reputation requirement. The on-
off attack and whitewashing attack, and collaborative unfair rating attack can be mitigated
by design choices detailed in Section 3.2.2. Self–rating attacks could be mitigated by
making all users submit the feedback “*” on their own items that could be used to link
to self ratings, or be punished by the CS. The central server can also punish authors of
items that do not represent a valid transaction.
3.6.2 Security of our Construction
We now show that our construction is a secure RS reputation system as defined in Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4.
The proofs of traceability and unlinkability of user behaviour are similar to the proofs of
traceability/ non-frameability and anonymity for the XS scheme [53]. We have adapted
these proofs due to the modification in XS*, and as our model is static (users do not join
or leave after the scheme begins).
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Setup(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
Generate (gpp1, gpp2) as in XS, CDL
(gpk1, isk1, osk)←$XSKeyGen*(gpp1), (gpk2, isk2)←$CDLKeyGen(gpp2)
gpk ← (gpk1, gpk2), isk ← (isk1, isk2)
∀uid ∈ U usk1[uid]←$XSJoin*(isk1, uid, gpk1),usk2[uid]←$CDLJoin(uid, isk2, gpk2)
usk[uid]← (usk1[uid],usk2[uid])
L ← ∅,F ← ∅, ID ← ∅,∀uid ∈ U , r[uid]← rˆ return (gpk, isk, osk,usk, r,L,F , ID)
AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid,usk[uid], t, r[uid], ID)
(ω, Z˜)←$XSUpdate*(t, r[uid],usk1[uid], isk1, gpk1)
ID ← ID ∪ (uid, r[uid], t, Z˜) return (ω, r[uid], ID)
PostItem(gpk, I, (Z, x, y), r, t, ω)
if e(ω,WGx2) 6= e(H(r, t), G2) return ⊥
Z˜ ← Z · ω, ˜usk ← (Z˜, x, y) return Ω←$XSSign*(I, ˜usk, gpk1, r, t)
CheckItem(gpk, I, r, t,Ω)
return XSVerify*(I, r, t,Ω, gpk1)
SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
return Φ←$CDLSign((I, r, t,Ω), fb,usk2[uid], gpk2)
VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)
return CDLVerify((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, gpk2)
LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb0,Φ0, fb1,Φ1)
return CDLLink((I, r, t,Ω), (fb0,Φ0), (fb1,Φ1), gpk2)
ReceiveFB(gpk, osk, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ), r,L,F , ID)
if VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) = 0 return ⊥
if ∃(I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ L s.t. LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 1 return ⊥
Z˜ ← XSOpen*(I, r, t,Ω, osk, gpk1),Find (uid, r, t, Z˜) ∈ ID, otherwise return ⊥
r[uid]← Aggr(fb, uid,F , r[uid]),L ← ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) ∪ L,F ← (uid, fb) ∪ F return (r,L)
Figure 3.7: Our RS-GS reputation system
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3.6.2.1 Correctness
We show our RS-GS construction satisfies correctness. Condition 1 is satisfied because the
original XS scheme is correct, and the modification simply replaces G1 with G1H(r, t),
in both XSSign* and XSVerify*. Conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied due to the correctness
of CDL. Condition 4 is satisfied because the XS scheme is correct, and the modification
only replaces Z with Z(H(r, t)1/(γ+x)), as the output of XSOpen*. This is stored alongside
the user’s identity in ID. Condition 5 is satisfied, because ReceiveFB outputs ⊥ if the
feedback input is not valid, or links to other feedback in L.
3.6.2.2 Unforgeability of Reputation
Lemma 3.1 (Unforgeability of Reputation). Assuming the random oracle model, the
SPK is zero–knowledge and simulation sound extractable, and the q-SDH assumption, our
RS-GS construction satisfies unforgeability of reputation as defined in Section 3.4.
Proof. We show that if an adversaryA′ exists, such that Pr[Expunforge−repA′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr)
= 1] = , for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R| polynomial in τ , n = |U| polynomial in τ ,
there are l different values of (r, t) queried to the H oracle, or the ALLREP oracle, and
 is non–negligible in τ , then we can can build an adversary A, that solves the q-SDH
problem, where q = n, in polynomial–time. We describe A in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. We
then describe why the simulation given in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 and the unforgeability of
reputation experiment are indistinguishable to A, and how A′ works.
We first show that all inputs that A provides to A′ are distributed identically to the
unforgeability of reputation experiment. As H is in the random oracle model, we include
a H oracle. We keep track of the inputs and outputs to this oracle in HL
Simulating (gpk, osk, ID). W = T γ2 = Gγ2 . G1 is chosen randomly due to µ being
chosen randomly and independently. As ν1 is chosen randomly and independently, H is
independent of G1. (ξ1, ξ2,K,G, ID) are chosen as in Setup.
We will use the fact that Γ = Gγ1 and Buid = G
1/(γ+xuid)
1 later. This is because G1 =
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USK(uid)
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗ A aborts else C ← C ∪ {uid} return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω)
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗
if e(ω,WGxuid∗2 ) 6= e(H(r, t), G2) return ⊥
ρ1, ρ2←$Zp, T1 ← Kρ1 , T2 ← Zuid∗ωHρ1 , T3 ← Kρ2 , T4 ← Zuid∗ωGρ2
G˜1 ← H(r, t) ·G1, Simulate pi with T1, T2, T3, T4, G˜1
return Ω← (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
else return PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)
ALLREP(uid, t, r)
if (uid, t, r, out) ∈ AR return (out, r, ID)
else out′ ← H(r, t), let ((r, t), out′, χ,m′) ∈ HL
if m′ = m∗ and b′ = 0 and uid = uid′ A aborts
if m′ = m∗ and b′ = 0 and uid 6= uid′, out′′ ←
n′−2∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χηuid,j
else out′′ ←
n−1∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χκuid,j
AR← AR ∪ (uid, t, r, out′′), ID ← ID ∪ (uid, r, t, Zuidout′′),
return (out′′, r, ID)
H(in)
if ∃(in, out, ·, ·) ∈ HL return out else m← m+ 1, χ←$Z∗p
if m = m∗ and b′ = 0, out←
n′−1∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χζj
else out←
n∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χλj
HL← (in, out, χ,m) ∪HL
return out
Figure 3.8: Simulated answers to oracle queries in our unforgeability of reputation proof
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A(T1, T γ1 , T γ
2
1 , ..., T
γq
1 , T2, T
γ
2 )
Create Empty List HL,AR, m← 0,m∗←$ [l], uid′←$U , b←$ {0, 1}, b′←$ {0, 1}
if b = 0 V ← U , n′ ← n
if b = 1 uid∗ ← U\{uid′},V ← U\{uid∗}, n′ ← n− 1, xuid∗ ←$Z∗p, Zuid∗ ←$G1
∀uid ∈ V\uid′, xuid, yuid←$Z∗p
µ←$Z∗p, let f(X) =
∏
j∈V\{uid′}
(X + xuid) =
n′−1∑
i=1
ζiX
i;G1 ←
n′−1∏
i=0
(T γ
i
1 )
µζi ,Γ←
n′−1∏
i=0
(T γ
(i+1)
1 )
µζi
G2 ← T2,W ← T γ2 , x, ν1, ν2←$Z∗p, H ← ((ΓGx1)ν1G−11 )1/ν2
ξ1←$Z∗p,K ← H1/ξ1 , ξ2←$Z∗p, G← Kξ2 , osk ← (ξ1, ξ2), gpk1 ← (G1,K,H,G,G2,W )
∀uid ∈ V\{uid′} let fuid(X) =
∏
uˆid∈V\{uid′,uid}
(X + xuˆid) =
n′−2∑
j=0
ηuid,jX
j ;Buid ←
n′−2∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
µηuid,j
Zuid ← Buid(B((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2uid Gν1/ν21 )yuid ,usk1[uid]← (Zuid, xuid, yuid)
yuid′ ← ν2, xuid′ ← x, Zuid′ ← Gν11 ,usk1[uid′]← (Zuid′ , xuid′ , yuid′)
Let g(X) =
∏
uid∈U
(X + xuid) =
n∑
j=0
λjX
j
∀uid ∈ U , set guid(X) = g(X)/(X + xuid) =
n−1∑
j=0
κuid,jX
j
Finish computing (usk2[uid], gpk2, ID), as in Setup
(I, r, t,Ω, fb,Φ)←$A′USK,POST,ALLREP,H(gpk, osk, ID)
Let Ω = (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
if @out such that ((r, t), out, χ,m∗) ∈ HL return ⊥
Extract x?, ρ?1, z
? from pi, y? ← z? − x?ρ?1, Q? ← T2T−ξ11
if x? = xuid with uid ∈ U
if uid ∈ C if x? 6= xuid′ or b = 1 return ⊥
if y? = yuid′ , if b
′ = 1 return ⊥ else return ((Q?Z−1uid′)µ/χ, x?)
if y? 6= yuid′ , if b′ = 0 return ⊥ else ω←$ALLREP(uid′, t, r)
return (Q?ω−1G−ν1y
?/ν2
1 )
ν2
(ν2−y?) , x?)
if uid /∈ C if x? 6= xuid∗ or b = 0, or b′ = 0 return ⊥
ω←$ALLREP(uid∗, t, r), Q? ← Q?ω−1
return (Q?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x) , x?)
else if b = 1 or b′ = 0 return ⊥ else return (Q?G−ν1y?/ν21 G−χ/µ1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x) , x?)
Figure 3.9: A which solves the q-SDH problem, using A′ which breaks unforgeability of
reputation for the RS-GS construction
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∏n′−1
i=0 (T
γi
1 )
µζi = T
µf(γ)
1 , and so Γ =
∏n′−1
i=0 (T
γ(i+1)
1 )
µζi
=
∏n′−1
i=0 (T
γi
1 )
µζiγ
= Gγ1 , and Buid =
∏n′−2
j=0 (T
γj
1 )
µηuid,j = T
µfuid(γ)
1 = G
1/(γ+xuid)
1 . This is because ηuid,j for
j ∈ [0, n′ − 2] are defined to be the coefficients of fuid in Figure 3.9.
Simulating the USK oracle. The USK oracle is distributed identically to the unforge-
ability of reputation experiment because, provided the oracle does not abort, if uid 6= uid′,
Zuid = Buid(B
((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2
uid G
ν1/ν2
1 )
yuid = Buid(B
((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2
uid B
ν1(γ+xuid)/ν2
uid )
yuid
= BuidB
yuid(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
uid = (G1G
yuid(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+xuid) = (G1H
yuid)1/(γ+xuid),
and Zuid′ = G
ν1
1 = (G1G
ν1(γ+x)−1
1 )
1/(γ+x) = (G1H
yuid′ )1/(γ+xuid′ ).
Simulating the POST oracle. If b = 1, and uid = uid∗ is input to the POST oracle,
because Zuid∗ was chosen randomly and independently, it is distributed identically to the
unforgeability of reputation experiment. The SPK can then be simulated due to the zero–
knowledge property. The signature output is then distributed identically to in PostItem.
If b = 0 or uid 6= uid∗, our oracle works in exactly the same way as in the unforgeability
of reputation experiment.
Simulating the other oracles. The ALLREP oracle is distributed identically to the un-
forgeability of reputation experiment, provided the oracle does not abort. This is because
with input (uid, t, r), when m′ = m∗, uid 6= uid′, and b′ = 0,
n′−2∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χηuid,j = T
χfuid(γ)
1 = T
χf(γ)/(γ+xuid)
1 = H(r, t)1/(γ+xuid),
else
∏n−1
j=0 (T
γj
1 )
χκuid,j = T
χguid(γ)
1 = T
χg(γ)/(γ+xuid)
1 = H(r, t)1/(γ+xuid). The hash oracle
is distributed identically to the random oracle model, because χ is chosen randomly and
independently each time.
Reduction to q-SDH. If A′ is successful and outputs (I, r, t,Ω) then there exists
out such that ((r, t), out,m) ∈ HL, because for A′ to have output a valid signature for
(r, t), this must have been queried to the H oracle. Assume m = m∗, with probability
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1/l, then A does not abort at this stage. As (I, r, t,Ω) was not output by POST, we can
extract (Q?, x?, y?) such that Q? = (G1, H
y?out)
1/(x?+γ)
, because Ω is a valid signature.
We now consider all possible cases for a successful A′, and provide reductions to the q-SDH
problem for each case. The three cases are as follows: firstly x? corresponds to the key
of a corrupted user, ie x? = xuid for uid ∈ C; secondly x? corresponds to the key of an
uncorrupted user, ie x? = xuid for uid ∈ U \ C; and finally x? does not correspond to the
key of any user, ie x? 6= xuid for all uid ∈ U . The first cases is split into two sub cases:
firstly y? = yuid where x
? = xuid and secondly y
? 6= yuid where x? = xuid.
When x? corresponds to the key of a corrupted user. When x? = xuid for uid ∈ C,
we assume b = 0 and uid = uid′, which occurs with probability 1/2n. As b = 0, USK will
not abort.
We first note that as A′ is successful, if x? = xuid′ and y? = yuid′ , then as ReceiveFB would
successfully trace user uid′ then (uid′, r, t) has not been queried to ALLREP. Therefore
ALLREP will not abort.
We assume b′ = 0, which occurs with probability 1/2 and therefore, out =
∏n′−1
j=0 (T
γj
1 )
χζj =
G
χ/µ
1 .
Then Q?Z−1uid′ = out
1/(xuid′+γ). Therefore (out1/(γ+xuid′ ))µ/χ = G
1/(γ+xuid′ )
1 . Given this, A
can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20] . Therefore, in this case, assuming A′
was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/4ln
If y? 6= yuid′ , we assume b′ = 1 therefore A will not abort during ALLREP, and we can
query ALLREP(uid′, t, r). As ν2 = yuid′ 6= y?, then (ν2 − y?) 6= 0. Note that x = x?.
Because Q?ω−1 = (G1Hy
?
)1/(x
?+γ), then
(Q?ω−1G−ν1y
?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y? = (G1H
y?)
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?
1
= (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?
1 = G
y?ν1(γ+x)−y?+ν2−y?ν1(γ+x?)
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)
1 = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20]. Therefore, in this case,
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assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/4ln.
When x? corresponds to the key of an uncorrupted user. We now consider the
case that uid /∈ C. In this case, we assume x? = xuid∗ , b = 1, and b′ = 1, which occurs with
probability 1/4n. Then as b′ = 1, A will not abort during ALLREP, and as uid∗ is not
corrupted, A will not abort during USK. If ν2− y?− ν1y?(x?−x) = 0, then ν1 = ν2−y?y?(x?−x) .
If y? = 0 then ν2 = 0, which is not possible. Therefore the adversary can obtain ν1 and
so break the discrete logarithm problem, which is implied by the q-SDH problem.
Because Q?ω−1 = (G1Hy
?
)1/(x
?+γ), then
(Q?ω−1G−ν1y
?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x) = (G1H
y?)
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x)
1
= (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x)
1
= G
y?ν1(γ+x)−y?+ν2−y?ν1(γ+x?)
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))
1 = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20]. Therefore, in this case,
assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/(4ln).
When x? does not correspond to a user’s key. If x? /∈ {xuid : uid ∈ U}, we assume
b′ = 1 and b = 0, which occurs with probability 1/4, and therefore A will not abort. If
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x) = 0, then χ = µ(ν2−y
?−ν1y?(x?−x))
ν2(x?−x) . Therefore the adversary
can obtain χ and so break the discrete logarithm problem, which is implied by the q-SDH
problem.
Due to the fact that ,
out1/(γ+x
?) =
n∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χλj
1/(γ+x?)
= T
χg(γ)/(γ+x?)
1 = G
χ(γ+x)
µ(γ+x?)
1
= Γχ/µ(γ+x
?)G
χx/µ(γ+x?)
1 = (Γ
χ/µG
χx?/µ
1 )
1/(γ+x?))G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 = G
χ/µ
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 ,
and Q? = (G1H
y?out)1/(γ+x
?),
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and
(G1H
y?)1/(γ+x
?) = (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+x?)
= G
y?ν1x
?
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
y?ν1γ
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 (G1G
y?(ν1(x−x?)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+x?) = G
y?ν1/ν2
1 G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 ,
we have that
(Q?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 G
−χ/µ
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x)
= (G
y?ν1/ν2
1 G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 G
χ/µ
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 G
−χ/µ
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x)
= (G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x) = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20] . Therefore, in this case,
assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/4l.
Therefore A solves the q-SDH problem with probability at least 4ln .
3.6.2.3 Traceability
Lemma 3.2 (Traceability). Assuming the random oracle model, the SPK is zero–
knowledge and simulation sound extractable, and the q-SDH assumption, our RS-GS con-
struction satisfies traceability as defined in Section 3.4.
Our proof of traceability is very similar to our proof of unforgeability of reputation. We
therefore present this proof in Appendix A.
3.6.2.4 Unlinkability of User Behaviour
Lemma 3.3 (Unlinkability of User Behaviour). Assuming the DDH assumption and
the SPK is zero–knowledge, our RS-GS construction satisfies unlinkability of user behaviour
as defined in Section 3.4.
Proof. We show that if an adversaryA′ exists, such that |Pr[Expanon−ub−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr)
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RECEIVEFB((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, ID)
if VerifyFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) = 0 return ⊥
if ∃(I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) ∈ L such that LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) = 1
return ⊥
if d = 0 Z˜ ← T2T−ξ11 , if d = 1 Z˜ ← T4T−ξ23
Find (uid, r, t, Z˜) ∈ ID, otherwise return ⊥
r[uid]← Aggr(fb, uid,F , r[uid]),L ← ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ) ∪ L,F ← (uid, fb) ∪ F
return (r,L,F)
A(K,T, U, V )
b, d, d′←$ {0, 1}
if d = 0 ξ1←$Z∗p, H ← Kξ1 , G← T, if d = 1 ξ2←$Z∗p, H ← T,G← Kξ2
Other than (K,H,G) generate (gpk, isk,usk, r,L,F , ID) as in Setup
(st, uid0, uid1, I, r, t, ID)←$A′RECEIVEFB(choose, gpk, isk,usk, r,L,F , ID)
out← H(r, t), G˜1 ← G1out, ω0 ← out1/(γ+xuid0 ), ω1 ← out1/(γ+xuid1 )
ID ← ID ∪ {(uid0, r, t, Zuid0ω0), (uid1, r, t, Zuid1ω1)}
if d = 0 ρ1←$Zp, T1 ← Kρ1 , T2 ← Zuidd′ωd′Hρ1 , T3 ← U, T4 ← ZuidbωbV
if d = 1 ρ2←$Zp, T1 ← U, T2 ← ZuidbωbV, T3 ← Kρ2 , T4 ← Zuidd′ωd′Gρ2
Simulate pi with T1, T2, T3, T4, G˜1, Ω← (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
b′←$A′RECEIVEFB(guess, st,Ω, ID)
if ((I, r, t,Ω), ·) queried to the RECEIVEFB oracle b′ ← 0
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0
Figure 3.10: A which distinguishes between DDH tuples in G1, using A′ which breaks
unlinkability of user behaviour for our RS-GS construction
= 1] − Pr[Expanon−ub−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr) = 1]| = , for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R|
polynomial in τ , n = |U| polynomial in τ , and  is non–negligible in τ , then we can can
build an adversary A that breaks the DDH assumption with non-negligible probability.
We describe A in Figure 3.10. We then describe why the simulation given in Figure 3.10
and the unlinkability of user behaviour experiment are indistinguishable to A if a DDH
tuple is input, and A chooses d′ = b. We then show that, otherwise, A guesses correctly
with probability 1/2, and therefore A successfully distinguishes DDH tuples.
Simulating the inputs to A′. Assuming A was input a DDH tuple and chooses d′ = b,
all inputs to A′ are distributed identically to the unlinkability of user behaviour experi-
ment. In the choosing phase, the only difference to the experiment is in choosing (K,H,G),
which are still distributed identically. In the guessing phase, as d′ = b and (K,T, U, V )
is a DDH tuple,the input Ω to A′ is also distributed identically to the unlinkability of
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user behaviour Experiment, and ID is modified in the same way as the experiment. The
cca-anonymity property of the XS group signature scheme [53] is used to simulate answers
to the RECEIVEFB oracle. Since T4T
ξ2
3 = T2T
−ξ1
1 for a valid signature, to open signatures
it is only necessary to know ξ1 or ξ2.
Reduction to the DDH problem. Assuming A was input a DDH tuple, and chooses
d′ 6= b, both Zuid0ω0 and Zuid1ω1 are encrypted. If the adversary A′ has queried the
RECEIVEFB oracle with (I, r, t,Ω), then A outputs 1 with probability 1/2. Otherwise,
the adversary A′ has not queried the RECEIVEFB oracle with (I, r, t,Ω) to obtain d′, and
therefore A′ has no advantage in guessing b. Therefore A outputs 1 with probability 1/2.
On input a DDH tuple, the probability that A outputs 1 is:
1/4(Pr[Expanon−ub−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 0] + Pr[Expanon−ub−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]) + 1/4
= 1/4(1 + Pr[Expanon−ub−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1]−Pr[Expanon−ub−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1])
+1/4 = 1/4+ 1/2.
If the input to A is not a DDH tuple, then Ω is independent of b, therefore A′ has no
advantage in guessing b. Therefore A outputs 1 with probability 1/2.
Therefore A has an /4 advantage in distinguishing DDH tuples.
3.6.2.5 Soundness of Reputation, Anonymity of Feedback and Non-frameability
Lemma 3.4 (Soundness of Reputation). Assuming that CL signatures are existentially
unforgeable under the chosen–message attack, the SPK is zero–knowledge and simulation
sound extractable, and the random oracle model, our RS-GS construction satisfies sound-
ness of reputation as defined in Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.5 (Anonymity of Feedback). Assuming the DDH assumption in G1, the
SPK is zero–knowledge, and the random oracle model, our RS-GS construction satisfies
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anonymity of feedback as defined in Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.6 (Non–frameability). Assuming the DL assumption in G1, the SPK is zero–
knowledge and simulation sound extractable, and the random oracle model, our RS-GS
construction satisfies non–frameability as defined in Section 3.4.
The proofs of Lemmas 4, 5, 6 are similar to the simulation based proof of security of
CDL [33]. It is clear, due to the similarity of the security requirements for DAA schemes [33]
and the security requirements of soundness of reputation, anonymity of feedback and
non-frameability, that a reputation system that uses the CDL scheme will satisfy these
requirements. We present the proofs in Appendix A for completeness.
Soundness of reputation ensures that an adversary cannot submit multiple feedback on
the same item. This corresponds to the property for DAA that a user should not be
able to produce two signatures with the same basename that do not link. Anonymity of
feedback ensures that, provided a user has not cheated by giving multiple feedback on the
same item, all feedback is unlinkable. This corresponds to the user-controlled linkability
property for DAA schemes that signatures with different basenames should be unlinkable.
Non–frameability ensures that an adversary cannot produce feedback that links to another
user’s feedback, without corrupting this user. This corresponds to the property for DAA
that an adversary should not be able to forge a signature that links to a user’s signature,
without corrupting this user.
3.7 Instantiation of SPK and Efficiency
3.7.1 Instantiation of SPKs
We have two non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge in our scheme, in XSSign*
and CDLSign. Given a proof of discrete logarithms in this notation, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6.3, it is straightforward to derive an actual protocol implementing the proof [35].
For transforming interactive into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs we rely on the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic that ensures security in the random oracle model.
Due to this, we can now state Corollary 3.1.
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Corollary 3.1. The construction presented in Section 3.5.3, with the SPK instantiated
as described, is a secure RS as defined in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 under the DDH, q-SDH, and
LRSW assumptions in the random oracle model.
3.7.2 Computational Cost
We focus on PostItem, CheckItem, and SendFB, because these are performed by users with
less computational power. We note that ReceiveFeedback only needs to check all feedback
for the same item to ensure soundness of reputation, not all feedback. SendFB requires 7
exponentiations in G1, and 2 hash computations, which is a low computational cost.
There is an extra cost, compared to the existing work [18, 58], required to achieve un-
linkability of user behaviour in the PostItem and CheckItem algorithms. We note that
in [18, 58], whenever a user posts an item they must receive a new secret key from the
managing authority, which is not required by our reputation system. When joining, the
user pre–computes e(H,W ) and e(H,G2). When a user receives a token ω, for reputation
r and time t, they must pre–compute e(ω,WGx2), e(H(r, t), G2), and e(ωZ,G2). Assuming
the pre–computation, PostItem requires 8 exponentiations in G1, 3 exponentiations in G3,
and a hash computation. CheckItem requires 2 computations of e, 10 exponentiations in
G1, 2 exponentiations in G2, 2 exponentiations in G3, and 2 hash computations.
3.7.3 Communication Overhead
Using updated parameters for curves that provide 128–bit security [119] and point com-
pression, the XS* signature Ω has length 432 bytes and the CDL signature Φ has length
336 bytes. Therefore the communication overhead when sending feedback with our con-
struction is 768 bytes, compared to 624 bytes in [18] using the same curves. This is a
relatively small increase given the additional security of unlinkability for user behaviour
achieved. Our communication overhead compares well to [58] where signatures have length
O(τ log(n)), as shown in [93], compared to our signatures of length O(τ).
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3.8 Summary
We have introduced and formally defined a new security model for centralised reputation
systems, where user behaviour is unlinkable. This represents a shift from previous models
which aims at more accurately capturing the real-world requirements of reputation systems
used by many on a daily basis.
We have provided a concrete construction which satisfies the new security requirements
with a low additional efficiency cost.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces group signatures with selective linkability, which allow signatures
to be linked in a controlled and flexible way. Signatures are unlinkable by default, but
can be obliviously and non–transitively linked by the converter, a trusted entity. We first
introduce a formal security model for this primitive and then provide a construction that
provably satisfies this model.
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4.1.1 Motivation and Background
Group signatures are highly suited whenever data is collected that needs to be authen-
ticated while, at the same time, the privacy of the data sources must be respected and
preserved. In particular when data is collected from users, the protection of their privacy
is of crucial importance and has seen increased attention due to the recently introduced
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2], Europe’s new privacy regulation. In
fact, the GDPR creates strong incentives for data collectors to thoroughly protect users’
data and implement the principle of data minimization, as data breaches are fined with
up to 4% of an enterprise’s annual turnover.
When aiming to implement such techniques for privacy and data protection, one needs to
find a good balance with utility though since data gets collected in order to be analysed and
to generate new insights. For these processes it is usually necessary to know the correlation
among different data events, as they reveal a crucial part of the information. For instance,
when a group of users measure and upload their blood pressure via wearable activity
trackers, several high value measurements are not critical when they are distributed over
many participants, but might be alarming when originating from a single user.
Often the exact purpose of the data might not be clear at the point of data collection.
In fact, given the rapid advancements in machine learning and ubiquitously available and
cheap storage, data collectors tend to gather large amounts of data at first, and will
only use small subsets for particular applications as they arise. A well known example
is the Google Street View cars that inadvertently recorded public Wi-Fi data like SSID
information, which later was used to improve Google’s location services.
Ideally, the data should be collected and stored in authenticated and unlinkable form.
Only the particular subsets that are later needed should be correlated in a controlled and
flexible manner.
4.1.2 Linkability in Group Signatures
As discussed in Section 2.7.3, to address the tension between privacy and utility, group
signatures often have built-in measures that control linkability of otherwise anonymously
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authenticated information. Interestingly, despite the long line of work on this subject, none
of the solutions provides the functionality to cater for the flexibility needed in practice.
They either recover linkability in a privacy-invasive way or offer control only in a static
manner.
Group Signatures with Opening. Standard group signatures allow an entity with an
opening secret key to recover the signer’s identity. Originally, the opening was intended
to prevent abuse of anonymity, and only meant to be used in extreme situations. Clearly,
the opening capability can also be leveraged to determine the linkability of various data
events, but at a high cost for privacy: every request for linkability will recover the full
identity of the signer, and the central group manager learns the (signed) data of the data
collectors and their correlation.
Group Signatures with Controlled Linkability. A more suitable solution are group
signatures with controlled linkability [79, 80, 120]. This is much better than revealing the
identity of the user, but still relies on a fully trusted entity that will learn the collectors’
signed data. Further, this approach does not scale well for applications where a data
collector is interested in the correlations within a large data set. To link a data set of n
signed entries, each pair of signatures would have to be compared, which would require
n(n− 1)/2 requests to the linking authority. Another related concept are traceable group
signatures [83] where a dedicated entity can generate a tracing trapdoor for each user
which allows for the tracing of this user’s signatures. This approach is not suitable for our
use case of controlled data linkage either, as it requires knowledge of the users’ identities
behind the anonymous group signatures or trapdoors for all users, and also needs every
signature to be tested for every trapdoor.
Group Signatures with User-Controlled Linkability. Finally, schemes with user-
controlled linkability exist, such as in direct anonymous attestation (DAA) [29], described
in Chapter 2. In contrast to solutions with opening or linking authorities, the linkability
here can be publicly verified: a signature in such schemes contains a pseudonym that is
deterministically derived from the user’s secret key and the basename. Thus, the user
re-uses the same pseudonym whenever they want to be linkable. On the downside, this
linkage is immediate and static. That is, the users have to choose at the beginning whether
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they want to disclose their data in a fully unlinkable manner, or linked with respect to a
context-specific pseudonym. There is no option to selectively correlate the data after it
has been disclosed. Therefore, users or rather the data collectors allowing the use of such
protocols, will hesitate to choose the option of unlinkability, as they fear losing too much
information by the irreversible decorrelation.
4.1.3 Our Contribution
In this chapter we overcome the aforementioned limitations by introducing a new type of
group signature scheme that allows for flexible and selective linkability. We achieve that
functionality by combining ideas from the different approaches discussed previously. Group
signatures are associated with pseudonyms, but pseudonyms are unlinkable by default.
Only when needed, a set of signatures – or rather the pseudonyms – can be linked in an
efficient manner through a central entity, the converter. The converter receives a batch
of pseudonymous data and transforms this into a consistent representation, meaning that
all pseudonyms stemming from the same user will be converted into the same value. To
preserve the privacy of the users and their data, the converter correlates the data in a fully
blind way, i.e., they do not learn anything about the pseudonyms they transform. We call
this new type of group signature scheme convertibly linkable (group) signatures, i.e. CLS.
Security and Privacy for CLS. A crucial property that we want from pseudonym
conversions is that they establish linkability only strictly within the queried data, i.e.,
linked pseudonyms from different queries should not be transitive. Otherwise, different re-
linked data sets with overlapping input data could be pieced together, thereby gradually
eroding the user’s privacy. Aiming for such non-transitivity has an immediate impact
on the overall setting: we need to channel both, the pseudonyms and messages, blindly
through the converter, as transforming pseudonyms without the messages would require
linkability between the in- and outputs of the conversion query, which in turn allows
outputs from different queries to be linked.
We formally define the security of CLS through a number of security games, strongly
inspired by the existing work on group signatures and DAA [12, 14, 33]. That is, we want
signatures to be fully anonymous and unlinkable bearing in mind the information that is
revealed through the selective linkability. We discuss that the classic anonymity notion
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adapted to our setting will not suffice, as it cannot guarantee the desired non-transitivity.
In fact, capturing the achievable privacy and non-transitivity property in the presence of
adaptive conversion queries was one of the core challenges in this chapter, and we formalise
this property through a simulation-based definition. If the converter is corrupt, then
unlinkability of signatures no longer holds, but the adversary should neither be able to trace
signatures to a particular user, nor harm the obliviousness of queries, which is captured
in the conversion blindness and join anonymity properties. The guarantees in terms of
unforgeability are captured through the non-frameability and traceability requirements.
The former says that corrupt users should not be able to impersonate honest users, and
the latter guarantees that the power of an adversary should be bounded by the number
of corrupt users they control.
From a corruption point of view, we assume the data collector to be at most honest–
but–curious towards the converter, i.e., even a corrupt data collector will only query
pseudonym-message pairs that it has received along with a valid signature. We consider
this a reasonable assumption, as data collectors that will use such a CLS scheme do so
in order to implement the principle of data minimization on their own premises, and do
not have an incentive to cheat themselves. We will relax this assumption in Chapter 6,
although this will come with an efficiency cost.
Efficient Instantiation. We propose an efficient construction of such CLS schemes,
following the classical sign-and-encrypt paradigm that underlies most group signatures.
Roughly, we use BBS+ signatures [9] for attesting group membership, i.e., a user will
blindly receive a BBS+ signature from the group issuer on a secret key y chosen afresh
by the user. To sign a message m on behalf of the group, the user computes a signature-
proof-of-knowledge (SPK) for m where they prove knowledge of such an issuer’s signature
on its secret key and also encrypts its user key (or rather its “public key” version hy, where
h is a public parameter of the scheme), under the converter’s public key. The ciphertext
that encrypts hy serves as the pseudonym µ.
When the converter is asked to recover the correlations for a set of k pseudonym-message
pairs (µ1,m1), . . . (µk,mk), it blindly decrypts each pseudonym and raises the result to
the power of r, which is chosen fresh for every conversion query but used consistently
within. That is, all pseudonyms belonging to the same user will be mapped to the same
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query-specific DDH tuple hyr which allows for linkage of data within the query, but guar-
antees that converted pseudonyms remain unlinkable across queries. To achieve obliv-
iousness and non-transitivity of conversions, we encrypt all pseudonyms and messages
with a re-randomisable (homomorphic) encryption scheme under the blinding key of the
data collector. The re-randomisation is applied by the converter before they return the
transformed values, which ensures that the data collector cannot link the original and the
converted pseudonyms by any cryptographic value. Clearly, if the associated messages are
unique, then the data collector can link in- and outputs anyway, but our scheme should
not introduce any additional linkage. Given that the pseudonyms are encryptions under
the converter’s public key, we need to add the second layer of encryption in a way that
it does not interfere with the capabilities of the inner ciphertext. Using a nested form of
ElGamal encryption [60] gives us these properties as well as the needed re-randomisability.
Finally, we prove that our instantiation satisfies the desired security and privacy require-
ments under the DDH, q-SDH and DCR assumptions in the random oracle model. Our
construction relies on type–3 pairings and performs most of the work in G1 which comes
with significant efficiency benefits. In fact, we show that our construction is reasonably
efficient considering the increased flexibility when establishing the linkability in such a
selective and controlled manner.
4.1.4 Other Related Work
A number of results exist that establish convertible pseudonyms in the setting of dis-
tributed databases and have inspired our work. The data is created and maintained in a
distributed manner. For privacy, related data is stored under different, database-specific
pseudonyms that are seemingly unlinkable and can only be correlated by a central entity
that controls the data flow. While the initial approach by Galindo and Verheul [68] re-
quired the converter to be a trusted third party, Camenisch and Lehmann [36, 37] later
showed how the converter can operate in an oblivious manner. However, none of these
solutions supports authenticated data collection and [68] and [36] even let the (trusted)
converter establish all pseudonyms. The pseudonym system in [37] bootstraps pseudonyms
in a blind way from a user secret, but for every new pseudonym that requires the user,
converter and targeted data base to engage in an interactive protocol. Clearly, this is not
practical for a setting where users frequently want to upload data. Further, all schemes
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re-use the same pseudonym for a user within a database, whereas our solution creates
fresh and unlinkable pseudonyms for every new data item.
4.2 Definition and Security Model for CLS
In this section we first introduce the syntax and generic functionality of CLS and then
present the desirable security and privacy properties for such schemes.
The following entities are involved in a CLS scheme: an issuer I, a set of users U = {uidi},
a verifier V and a converter C. The issuer I is the central entity that allows users to join
the group. Once joined, a user can then sign on behalf of the group in a pseudonymous
way. That is, a verifier V can test the validity of a signature with respect to the group’s
public key but does not learn any information about the particular user that created the
signature. Most importantly, we want the pseudonymously signed data to be linkable
in a controlled yet blind manner. Such selected linkability can be requested through the
converter C that can blindly transform tuples of pseudonym-message pairs into a consistent
representation.
4.2.1 Syntax of CLS
Our notation closely follows the definitional framework for dynamic group signatures given
in [14], although there are some differences due to the different setting. Instead of an
opener, we have a converter who outputs a linked representation of the signatures input.
This means we no longer have need of a registration table for joined users. As we assume
the converter is honest–but-curious, we no longer need the equivalent of a judge algorithm.
We also weaken the anonymity requirement so that forward anonymity is no longer pro-
vided. It seems difficult to achieve this whilst also ensuring the non–transitivity of con-
versions. Now if the adversary is allowed to query the USK oracle, the adversary could
have instead created that user with the issuer secret key. Therefore there is no longer any
need for the USK oracle.
We stress that our algorithms (and security notions) are flexible enough to cover settings
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where multiple verifiers and converters exist. For the sake of simplicity, however, we focus
on the setting where there is only one entity each.
Definition 4.1 (CLS). A convertibly linkable group signature CLS scheme consists of the
following algorithms:
Setup and Key Generation. We model key generation individually per party, and
refer to (param, ipk, cpk) as the group public key gpk.
CLS.Setup(1τ )→ param: on input the security parameter 1τ , outputs param, the public
parameters for the scheme.
CLS.IKGen(param)→ (ipk, isk): performed by the issuer I; outputs the issuer secret key
isk, and the issuing public key ipk.
CLS.CKGen(param)→ (cpk, csk): performed by the converter C; outputs the converter
secret key csk, and the converter public key cpk.
CLS.BKGen(param)→ (bpk, bsk): performed by the verifier V1; outputs a blinding secret
key bsk, and blinding public key bpk. As the key is only used for blinding purposes,
(bpk, bsk) can be ephemeral. We write BK as the public key space induced by
CLS.BKGen.
Join, Sign and Verify. As in standard dynamic group signatures, we have a dedicated
join procedure that a user has to complete with the issuer. All users that have successfully
joined the group can then create pseudonymous signatures on behalf of the group, i.e.,
that verify with respect to the group public key gpk. For ease of expression we treat the
pseudonym µ as a dedicated part of the signature.
〈CLS.Join(gpk),CLS.Issue(isk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the group by engaging in an in-
teractive protocol with the issuer I. The user uid and issuer I perform algorithms
CLS.Join and CLS.Issue respectively. These are input a state and an incoming mes-
sage respectively, and output an updated state, an outgoing message, and a decision,
1For the sake of simplicity we state the algorithms for the setting where the requester and receiver of
conversions is the same party, namely the verifier. However, our algorithms work in a public key setting
to facilitate more general settings as well.
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either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to CLS.Join is the group public key,
gpk, whereas the initial input to CLS.Issue is the issuer secret key isk, and the group
public key gpk. If the user uid accepts, CLS.Join has a private output of gsk[uid].
CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid],m)→ (µ, σ): performed by the user with identifier uid, with in-
put the group public key gpk, the user’s secret key gsk[uid], and a message m;
outputs a pseudonym µ and signature σ.
CLS.Verify(gpk,m, µ, σ)→ {0, 1}: performed by the verifier V; outputs 1 if σ is a valid
signature on m for pseudonym µ under the group public key gpk, and 0 otherwise.
Blind Conversion. Finally, we want our pseudonymous group signatures to be blindly
convertible. Thus, we introduce a dedicated CLS.Blind and CLS.Unblind procedure for
the verifier and a CLS.Convert algorithm that requires the converter’s secret key. The
latter transforms the unlinkable pseudonyms in a consistent manner, i.e., outputting con-
verted pseudonyms that are consistent whenever the input pseudonyms belong to the same
user. The final pseudonyms after unblinding will be identical if and only if they stem
from the same user and are obtained from the same CLS.Convert query. For example, if
(m1, µ1), (m2, µ2) stem from user A and (m3, µ3), (m4, µ4), (m5, µ5) stem from user B, then
after blinding, conversion and unblinding a random shuffle of (m1, µ1), (m2, µ1), (m3, µ2),
(m4, µ2), (m5, µ2) will be output.
CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µ,m))→ (cµ, c): performed by the verifier V, on input a pseudonym-
message pair (µ,m), blinding public key bpk and group public key gpk; outputs a
blinded pseudonym and message.
CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, {(cµi, ci)}k)→ {(cµi, ci)}k: performed by the converter C, on
input k blinded pseudonym-message tuples {(cµi, ci)}k = ((cµ1, c1), ..., (cµk, ck)),
and the public blinding key bpk used; outputs converted pseudonyms {(cµi, ci)}k =
((cµ1, c1), ..., (cµk, ck)).
CLS.Unblind(bsk, (cµ, c))→ (µ,m): performed by the verifier V, on input a converted
pseudonym-message tuple and the blinding secret key bsk; outputs an unblinded
converted pseudonym-message tuple (µ,m).
We sometimes make the randomness r used in these algorithms explicit and, for example,
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write CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µ,m); r).
4.2.2 Security Properties
We want CLS schemes to enjoy roughly the same security and privacy properties as group
signatures when taking the added linkability into account. Defining these properties when
pseudonyms can be selectively and adaptively converted is challenging, as it requires care
to avoid trivial wins while keeping the adversary as powerful as possible.
In a nutshell, we require the following guarantees from convertibly linkable group signa-
tures, where (join) anonymity and non–transitivity capture the privacy-related properties
and non–frameability and traceability formalise the desired unforgeability.
(Join) Anonymity: Pseudonymous signatures should be unlinkable and untraceable (to
a join session) even when the issuer and verifier are corrupt. When the converter
is honest, unlinkability holds for all signatures for which the associated pseudonyms
have not been explicitly linked through a conversion request. If the converter is
corrupt and also controlled by the adversary, unlinkability is no longer possible, yet
the anonymity of joins must remain.
Non–transitivity: Converted pseudonyms should be non-transitive, i.e., the verifier should
not be able to link the outputs of different convert queries. Otherwise, a corrupt
verifier would be able to gradually link together all pseudonyms that have ever been
queried to the converter.
Conversion Blindness: The converter learns nothing about the pseudonyms (and mes-
sages) it receives and the transformed pseudonyms it computes.
Non–frameability: An adversary controlling the issuer and some corrupt users, should
not be able to impersonate other honest users, i.e., create pseudonymous signatures
that would be linked to a pseudonym of an honest user.
Traceability: An adversary should not be able to create more signatures that remain
unlinkable in a conversion than they control corrupt users.
Clearly, any re-linked subset of the originally anonymous data increases the risk of re-
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identification. Thus, the converter could enforce some form of access control to the re-
linked data; e.g., only converting a certain amount of pseudonyms at once. The non-
transitivity requirement then ensures that a corrupt verifier cannot further aggregate the
individually learned data. We stress that these security properties only formalise the
achievable privacy for the pseudonyms and signatures. They do not and cannot capture
information leakage through the messages that the users sign. This is the case for all group
signatures, and not special to our setting.
Oracles and State. The security notions we formalise in the following make use of
a number of oracles which keep joint state, e.g., keeping track of queries and the set of
corrupted parties. We present the detailed description of all oracles in Figure 4.1 and now
provide an overview of them and their maintained records.
ADDU (join of honest user and honest issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and internally runs a join protocol between the honest user and honest issuer. At
the end, the honest user’s secret key gsk[uid] is generated and from then on signing
queries for uid will be allowed.
SNDU (join of honest user and corrupt issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and runs the join protocol on behalf of uid with the corrupt issuer. If the join
session completes, the oracle will store the user’s secret key gsk[uid].
SNDI (join of corrupt user and honest issuer) Runs the join protocol on behalf of
the honest issuer with corrupt users. For joins of honest users, the ADDU oracle
must be used.
SIGN This oracle returns signatures for honest users that have successfully joined (via
ADDU or SNDU, depending on the corruption setting).
CONVERT This oracle returns a set of converted pseudonyms along with their messages.
To model that conversion is triggered by an at most honest-but-curious verifier, we
request V to provide the unblinded set of pseudonyms along with signatures. The
conversion will only be done when all signatures are valid. The oracle then internally
blinds the pseudonym-message pairs and returns the blinded input, the randomness
used for the blinding along with the converted output. When this oracle is used in
the anonymity game, it further checks that the input does not allow the adversary
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to trivially win by converting the challenge pseudonym together with pseudonyms
from either of the challenge users.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state:
HUL List of uids of honest users, initially set to ∅. New honest users can be added by
queries to the ADDU oracle (when the issuer is honest) or SNDU oracle (when the
issuer is corrupt).
CUL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. Initially set to ∅, new
corrupt users can be added through the SNDI oracle if the issuer is honest. If the
issuer is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
SL List of (uid,m, µ, σ) tuples requested from the SIGN oracle.
Helper Algorithms. We introduce two additional algorithms for notational simplicity
in our security games: Identify and UnLink. Roughly, Identify allows one to test whether a
pseudonym belongs to a certain uid by exploiting the convertibility of pseudonyms. That
is, we create a second signature for gsk[uid] and use the converter’s secret key to test
whether both are linked. If so, Identify returns 1. This algorithm uses our second helper
algorithm UnLink internally, which takes a list of pseudonym-message pairs and returns 1
if they are all unlinkable and 0 otherwise.
Identify(gpk, csk, uid,m, µ)
(µ′, σ′)←$CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid], 0)
if UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ,m), (µ′, 0))) = 0 return 1
else return 0
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ADDU(uid)
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥
decuid ← cont, stuidJoin ← gpk
stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CLS.Join(stuidJoin,⊥)
while decuid = cont
(stuidIssue,MJoin,dec
uid)←$CLS.Issue(stuidIssue,MIssue)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CLS.Join(stuidJoin,MJoin)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return accept
SIGN(uid,m)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥
return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid],m)
SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, µ, σ)}
return (σ, µ)
SNDI(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CUL
CUL← CUL ∪ {uid}
decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if undefined stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk)
(stuidIssue,Mout,dec
uid)←$CLS.Issue(stuidIssue,Min)
return (Mout,dec
uid)
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidJoin undefined st
uid
Join ← gpk
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$CLS.Join(stuidJoin,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return (Mout,dec
uid)
CONVERT((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
if bpk /∈ BK return ⊥
if ∃i s.t. µi = µ∗ and ∃j 6= i s.t. Identify(uid∗d, µj) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); ri) for i = 1, . . . , k
and {(cµi, ci)}k←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, {(cµi, ci)}k)
return ({(cµi, ci)}k, {(cµi, ci)}k, r1, . . . , rk)
Figure 4.1: Oracles used in our CLS model
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UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ1,m1), ..., (µk,mk)))
(bpk, bsk)←$CLS.BKGen(param)
∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi))
{(cµi, ci)}k←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, {(cµi, ci)}k)
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi,mi)← CLS.Unblind(bsk, (cµi, ci))
if ∃(i, j) with i 6= j s.t. µi = µj return 0
else return 1
For even more simplicity we often omit the keys for the algorithms (as they are clear from
the context). That is, we write Identify(uid, µ) which will indicate whether the pseudonym
µ belongs to the user with identity uid or not. Likewise, we write UnLink(µ1, . . . , µk) to
test whether all pseudonyms are uncorrelated or not.
Correctness. CLS signatures, generated by honest parties, should be correct and consis-
tent. More precisely, we formulate correctness via three requirements. Correctness of sign
guarantees that signatures formed using the CLS.Sign algorithm with a user secret key
generated honestly will verify correctly. Correctness of conversion guarantees that after
blinding, converting and then unblinding correctly, the output will be correctly linked mes-
sages/ pseudonyms. The messages output after unblinding should be the original messages
shuffled with a permutation Π (the permutation is necessary for non–transitivity to hold).
The unblinded converted pseudonyms should be shuffled with the same permutation and
are identical if and only if they stem from the same user. Consistency is a stronger vari-
ant of conversion-correctness and requires that the correlations of pseudonyms established
through the conversion procedure must be consistent across queries. More precisely, if a
conversion query reveals that two pseudonym µ1 and µ2 are linked, and another one that
µ2 and µ3 are linked, then it must also hold that a conversion query for µ1 and µ3 re-
turns linked pseudonyms. We require that this property even holds for maliciously formed
pseudonyms, which will be a helpful property in some of our security proofs.
The detailed definitions for correctness are given in Figure 4.2 and follow the game-based
style already used in [14] for correctness definitions.
Definition 4.2 (Correctness). A CLS scheme satisfies correctness if, for all adversaries
A, Pr[Expcorr−sigA,CLS (τ) = 1] = 0, Pr[Expcorr−convA,CLS (τ) = 1] ≤ negl(τ), and, Pr[ExpconsistA,CLS (τ) =
1] = 0.
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For the correctness of conversion, the negligible chance that the adversary has of winning
corresponds to the negligible chance that multiple user identifiers have the same secret
key.
Anonymity (Corrupt Issuer and Verifier). This security requirement captures the
desired anonymity properties when the converter is honest and the issuer is corrupt. The
verifier is honest–but–curious, which we model by only allowing unblinded valid signatures
to be input to the conversion oracle, which can be verified. Just as in conventional group
signatures, we want that the signatures of honest users are unlinkable and cannot be traced
back to a user’s join session with the corrupt issuer. To model this property, we let the
adversary output uids of two honest users together with a message and return a challenge
(µ∗, σ∗) that is created either by user uid0 or uid1. For anonymity, the adversary should
not be able to determine the user’s identity better than by guessing.
In our setting, this property must hold when the adversary has access to the conversion
oracle where it can obtain linked subsets of the pseudonymous data. To avoid trivial wins,
the adversary is not allowed to make conversion queries that link the challenge pseudonym
µ∗ to another pseudonym belonging to one of the two honest challenge users.
Definition 4.3 (Anonymity). A CLS scheme satisfies anonymity if for all polynomial–time
adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−0A,CLS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−1A,CLS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expanon−bA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
(uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗0] =⊥ or uid∗1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return 0
(µ∗, σ∗)←$CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid∗b ],m∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗)
return b∗
Non–transitivity (Corrupt Issuer and Verifier). The second privacy-related prop-
erty we want to guarantee is the strict non-transitivity of conversions. This ensures that
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Experiment: Expcorr−sigA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL← ∅, (uid,m)←$AADDU(gpk)
if gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
(µ, σ)←$CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid],m)
if CLS.Verify(gpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Experiment: Expcorr−convA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL← ∅, (bpk, bsk)←$CLS.BKGen(param)
((uid1,m0), ..., (uidk,mk))←$AADDU(gpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] st gsk[uidi] =⊥ return 0
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi, σi)←$CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uidi],mi)
∀j ∈ [1, k] (cµj , cj)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µj ,mj))
{(cµi, ci)}k←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, {(cµi, ci)}k; Π)
∀j ∈ [1, k] (µj ,mj)← CLS.Unblind((cµj , cj), bsk)
if ∃ permutation Π : [1, k]→ [1, k] s.t.
1.∀i ∈ [1, k] mΠ(i) = mi
2.∀(i, j) ∈ [1, k] with uidi = uidj µΠ(i) = µΠ(j)
3.∀(i, j) ∈ [1, k] with uidi 6= uidj µΠ(i) 6= µΠ(j)
return 0
else return 1
Experiment: ExpconsistA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((m0, µ0, σ0), (m1, µ1, σ1), (m2, µ2, σ2))←$A(gpk, isk, csk)
if UnLink(µ0, µ1) = 1 or UnLink(µ1, µ2) = 1 return 0
if UnLink(µ0, µ2) = 1 return 1
else return 0
Figure 4.2: Security games for correctness of CLS
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the outputs of separate convert queries cannot be linked together, further than what is
already possible due the messages queried. For example, if µ1 and µ2 are outputs from two
separate convert queries, the adversary should not be able to decide whether they were
derived from the same pseudonym or not. Otherwise the verifier could gradually build lists
of linked pseudonyms, adding to these during every convert query and eventually recover
the linkability among all pseudonymous signatures. This requirement should hold if the
issuer is corrupt, the converter is honest, and the verifier is honest–but–curious, therefore
again we only allow unblinded valid signatures to be input to the conversion oracle.
To model non-transitivity of conversions we use a simulation-based approach, requiring the
indistinguishability of an ideal and a real world. In the real world, all convert queries are
handled normally through the CONVERT oracle defined in Figure 4.1. Whereas in the ideal
world, the converted pseudonyms are produced by a simulator SIM through the CONVSIM
oracle. For a conversion request of input (µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), the simulator will
only learn which of the messages belong together, i.e., are associated to pseudonyms that
belong to the same user uid. For honest users, this can be looked up through the records
of the signing oracle that stores tuples (uid,mi, µi, σi) for each signing query. Thus, we
let the simulator mimic the conversion output for all pseudonyms stemming from honest
users, and convert pseudonyms from corrupt users normally (as there is no privacy to
guarantee for them anyway). Finally, the CONVSIM oracle outputs a random shuffle of
the correctly converted pseudonyms of corrupt users, and the simulated ones for honest
users. As mentioned before, we assume the verifier to be honest-but-curious, which we
enforce by requesting the adversary to output valid signatures along with the pseudonyms
to be converted and handle the blinding step within the conversion oracle.
Definition 4.4 (Non–transitivity). A CLS scheme satisfies non-transitivity if for all polynomial–
time adversaries A there exists an efficient simulator SIM such that the following advantage
is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expnontrans−0A,CLS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expnontrans−1A,CLS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
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Experiment: Expnontrans−bA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(guess, gpk, isk)
where the oracle CONVX works as follows:
if b = 0 (real world) then CONVX is the standard CONVERT oracle
if b = 1 (ideal world) then CONVX is the simulated CONVSIM oracle
return b∗
CONVSIM((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 or bpk /∈ BK return ⊥
Set CL← ∅
Compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); ri) for i = 1, . . . , k
∀i ∈ [1, k] // determine message clusters Luid for honest users and list CL of corrupt pseudonyms
if (uid,mi, µi, σi) ∈ SL // pseudonyms from honest users
if Luid does not exist, create Luid ← {mi} else set Luid ← Luid ∪ {mi}
else CL← CL ∪ {(ci, cµi)} // pseudonyms from corrupt users
{(cµi, ci)}i=1,...k′ ←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk,CL) for k′ ← |CL| // normally convert corrupt µs
Let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
{(cµi, ci)}i=k′+1,...k←$SIM(gpk, bpk, Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ ) // simulate conversion for honest µs
Let {(cµ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k be a random permutation of {(cµi, ci)}i=1,...k
return ({(cµi, ci, ri)}i=1,...,k, {(cµ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k, r1, . . . , rk)
Anonymity versus Non–transitivity. Note that non-transitivity is not covered by
the anonymity notion defined before. A scheme that satisfies anonymity could output the
converted pseudonyms in the exact same order as the input ones, allowing trivial link-
age between the in- and output of each conversion request. Thus, whenever the same
pseudonym is used as input to several conversion queries, this would enable the linka-
bility of the transformed pseudonyms across the different conversions, which is exactly
what non-transitivity aims to avoid. On the first glance, it might seem odd that having
transitive conversions does not harm our anonymity property. However, transitivity is
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only useful when several pseudonyms belonging to the same user appear in each conver-
sion request with one pseudonym being re-used in all these sessions. In the anonymity
game, the challenge pseudonym is not allowed to be used in combination with any other
pseudonym stemming from either of the challenge users (as this would make the definition
unachievable), and thus the transitivity of conversions can not be exploited.
Conversion Blindness (Corrupt Issuer and Converter). A crucial property of
our signatures is that they can be converted in an oblivious manner, i.e., without the
converter learning anything about the pseudonyms or messages it converts. In particular,
this blindness property ensures the unlinkability of blinded inputs across several conversion
requests. Conversion blindness should hold if both the issuer and converter are corrupt, but
the verifier is honest. We formalise this property in a classic indistinguishability style: the
adversary outputs two tuples of pseudonym-message pairs and receives a blinded version
of either of them. Given that blinding of pseudonyms is a public-key operation, we do
not need an additional blinding oracle. In fact, we do not provide the adversary with any
oracle access at all in this game. They already have corrupted the issuer and converter,
and this property does not distinguish between honest and corrupt users, thus we simply
assume that the adversary also has full control over all users.
Definition 4.5 (Conversion Blindness). A CLS scheme satisfies conversion blindness if
for all polynomial–time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expblind−conv−0A,CLS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expblind−conv−1A,CLS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expblind−conv−bA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk), (bpk, bsk)←$CLS.BKGen(param)
(st, (µ0,m0), (µ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, isk, csk, bpk)
(cµ∗, c∗)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µb,mb))
b∗←$A(guess, st, cµ∗, c∗)
return b∗
Join Anonymity (Corrupt Issuer, Converter and Verifier). The final privacy
related property we require from a CLS scheme is the anonymity of joins even if all cen-
tral entities are corrupt. Here the challenge is that the adversary, controlling the issuer,
112
4.2 Definition and Security Model for CLS
converter and verifier, should not be able to link signatures of an honest user back to a
particular join session. This is the best one can hope for in this corruption setting as un-
linkability of signatures (as guaranteed by our anonymity property) is no longer possible:
the corrupt converter can simply convert all signatures/pseudonyms into a consistent rep-
resentation. Such a property does not exist in conventional group signatures, as a corrupt
opener can always reveal the join identity. In our setting, signatures can only be linked
instead of being opened and thus anonymity of the join procedure can be preserved.
To model this property we let the adversary output two identities of honest users uid0, uid1
that have successfully joined. We then provide the adversary access to a signing oracle
for one of them. This is done by adding the challenge user uid∗ (where uid∗ stands for a
dummy handle) to the list of honest users HUL with user secret key gsk[uidb]. Thus, in
the second stage of the game, the adversary can invoke the SIGN oracle on uid∗ to receive
signatures of messages of their choice for the challenge user. The adversary wins if they
can determine the bit b better than by guessing. To avoid trivial wins, the adversary is
not allowed to see any signature directly from uid0 or uid1.
Definition 4.6 (Join Anonymity). A CLS scheme satisfies join anonymity if for all
polynomial–time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−join−0A,CLS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−join−1A,CLS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expanon−join−bA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
(st, uid0, uid1)←$ASNDU,SIGN(choose, gpk, isk, csk)
if uid0 or uid1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid0] =⊥ or gsk[uid1] =⊥ return 0
Choose uid∗,HUL← HUL ∪ {uid∗},gsk[uid∗]← gsk[uidb]
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN(guess, st, uid∗)
return b∗ if (uidd, ∗) /∈ SL for d = 0, 1 else return 0
Non–frameability (Corrupt Issuer, Converter and User) This notion captures the
desired unforgeability properties when the issuer, converter, verifier and some of the users
are corrupt, and requires that an adversary should not be able to impersonate an honest
user. Our definition is very similar to the non-frameability definitions in standard group
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signature or DAA schemes [12, 14, 15]. Roughly, the only part we have to change is how
we detect that an honest user has been framed. In group signatures, non-frameability
exploits the presence of the group manager that can open signatures and requires that an
adversary cannot produce signatures that will open to an honest user who has not created
this signature. Here we have the converter instead of the group manager (or dedicated
opening authority), and thus express non-frameability through the linkage that is created
in a conversion. More precisely, an adversary should not be able to produce a valid
signature (µ∗, σ∗) that within a conversion request would falsely link to a signature of an
honest user. For generality (and sake of brevity), we use our helper function Identify that
we introduced at the beginning of this section to express that the adversary’s signature
should not be recognised as a signature of an honest user. For our unforgeability guarantees
we assume an honest but curious converter. This materialises in our requirement by using
the Identify function, which honestly performs CLS.Convert, to determine whether a forgery
has occurred.
Definition 4.7 (Non–frameability). A CLS scheme satisfies non–frameability if for all
polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[ExpnonframeA,CLS (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExpnonframeA,CLS (τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
(uid,m∗, µ∗, σ∗)←$ASNDU,SIGN(gpk, isk, csk)
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
CLS.Verify(gpk,m∗, µ∗, σ∗) = 1 and
Identify(uid,m∗, µ∗) = 1 where uid ∈ HUL and
(uid,m∗, µ∗, σ∗) /∈ SL
Traceability (Corrupt Converter and User) Our final requirement formalises the
unforgeability properties when only the converter, verifier and some users are corrupt,
whereas the issuer and some users are honest. In this setting, an adversary should not be
able to output more pseudonymous signatures that remain unlinkable in a conversion than
the number of users it has corrupted. This is again an adaptation of the existing trace-
ability notions for group signatures with an opening authority [12, 14] or user-controlled
linkability [15]. Interestingly, in the latter work given in Section 2.8.1 (that is closer to our
setting than standard group signatures), two traceability notions were introduced. While
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one is similar in spirit to our notion, a second property guarantees that all signatures of
corrupt users can be traced back to the exact signing key that the corrupt user has estab-
lished in the join protocol with the honest issuer. This seems to be an odd requirement, as
it is not noticeable in the real world. In fact, we do not limit the strategy of the adversary
in that way and only require their power to be bounded by the amount of corrupt users
they control.
Our definition uses our helper algorithm UnLink that we introduced at the beginning of this
section and that internally uses the CLS.Convert algorithm to detect whether pseudonyms
are unlinkable or not. Note that UnLink returns 1 only if all inputs are mutually unlinkable,
i.e., there is not a single tuple of input pseudonyms that was converted to the same value.
As in non–frameability we assume an honest but curious converter. This materialises in
this requirement by using the UnLink function, which honestly performs CLS.Convert, to
determine whether signatures are unlinkable.
Definition 4.8 (Traceability). A CLS scheme satisfies traceability if for all polynomial–
time adversaries A the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,CLS(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExptraceA,CLS(τ)
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
((m1, µ1, σ1), ..., (mk, µk, σk))←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, csk)
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
∀j ∈ [1, k] : CLS.Verify(gpk,mj , µj , σj) = 1 and (∗,mj , µj , σj) /∈ SL and
k > |CUL| and
UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ1,m1), ..., (µk,mk))) = 1
4.3 Our CLS Construction
We now present our construction that securely realises such CLS group signatures. Our
scheme follows the classical sign-and-encrypt paradigm: we use BBS+ signatures [9], as
discussed in Section 2.5.6, for attesting group membership, i.e., a user will blindly receive
a BBS+ signature from the group issuer on the user’s secret key y. To sign a message
m on behalf of the group, the user computes a SPK for m, where they prove knowledge
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of a BBS+ signature on y, and also encrypts hy under the converter’s public key. The
ElGamal ciphertext that encrypts hy serves as the associated pseudonym µ.
We discuss the homomorphic and re-randomisable properties of ElGamal encryption in
Section 2.5.2. To blind a set of k pseudonym-message pairs (µ1,m1), . . . (µk,mk) for
conversion, the verifier encrypts each value under its own ElGamal public key. As the
pseudonyms are already ElGamal ciphertexts themselves, this results in a nested double-
encryption of hy being encrypted under both keys. The converter then decrypts the
“inner” part of the ciphertext and blindly raises the result to a random value r. This
r is chosen fresh for every conversion query, but used consistently within. That is, all
pseudonyms belonging to the same user will be mapped to the same query-specific DDH
tuple hyr. Finally, the converter re-randomises all ciphertexts and shuffles them to destroy
any linkage between the in- and output tuples — this is crucial for achieving the desired
non-transitivity property. The verifier then simply decrypts the received tuples and can
link correlated data via the converted pseudonyms cµi.
4.3.1 Detailed Description of CLS–DDH
Setup and Key Generation. We use a type–3 bilinear group (p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2)
with g1 and g2 being generators of G1 and G2 respectively. Further, we need four additional
generators g, h and h1, h2 in G1, where h1, h2 are used for the BBS+ signature and g, h
will be used for the ElGamal encryption.
CLS.Setup(1τ )
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g, h, h1, h2←$G1
return param← (G1,G2,GT , p, e, g1, g2, g, h, h1, h2)
CLS.IKGen(param)
isk←$Z∗p, ipk ← gisk2
return (ipk, isk)
CLS.CKGen(param)
csk←$Z∗p, cpk ← gcsk
return (cpk, csk)
CLS.BKGen(param)
bsk←$Z∗p, bpk ← gbsk
return (bpk, bsk)
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Join. To join the group, users perform an interactive protocol with the issuer to obtain
their user secret key and group credential. Roughly, the gsk[uid] of a user consists of a
secret key y ∈ Z∗p and a BBS+ signature (A, x, s) of I on y, where A = (g1hy1hs2)1/(isk+x).
The detailed protocol of 〈CLS.Join(gpk),CLS.Issue(isk, gpk)〉 is given in Figure 4.3.
U .CLS.Join(gpk) 
 I.CLS.Issue(isk, gpk)
choose n←$ {0, 1}τ
ff n
y←$Z∗p, H ← hy1,
piH ←$SPK{(y) : H = hy1}(n)
-H,piH
Verify piH and that H ∈ G1
x←$Z∗p, s←$Z∗p
A← (Hhs2g1)1/(isk+x)
ff A, x, s
check that A 6= 1G1 and that
e(A, g2)
xe(A, ipk) = e(g1Hh
s
2, g2)
return gsk[uid]← (A, x, y, s)
Figure 4.3: Join protocol of our CLS–DDH construction
Sign and Verify. To sign a message m under gsk[uid] = (A, x, y, s), the user proves
knowledge of a BBS+ credential (A, x, s) on its secret key y and also encrypts hy under
the converter’s public key cpk. The proof pi proves knowledge of the BBS+ credential and
asserts that the encryption contains the same value y. From pi we only need the value y
to be online extractable. We use the improved proof of knowledge of a BBS+ credential
from Camenisch et al. [32], who have shown how to move most of the work from GT to
G1 and thus yield a much faster instantiation than the original proof by Au et al. [9]. For
verification, one verifies the proof pi and some correctness properties of the re-randomised
versions of A that are sent along with the proof. In more detail, CLS.Sign and CLS.Verify
are defined as follows:
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CLS.Sign(gpk,gsk[uid],m)
parse gsk[uid] = (A, x, y, s), gpk = (ipk, cpk)
α←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαhy, r1, r2←$Z∗p,
A′ ← Ar1 , Aˆ← A′−x(g1hy1hs2)r1 , d← (g1hy1hs2)r1h−r22 , r3 ← r−11 , s′ ← s− r2r3
pi←$SPK{(x, y, r2, r3, s′, α) : µ1 = gα ∧ µ2 = cpkαhy ∧ Aˆ/d = A′−xhr22 ∧ g1hy1 = dr3h−s
′
2 }(m)
σ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi), µ← (µ1, µ2)
return (µ, σ)
CLS.Verify(gpk,m, µ, σ)
parse σ = (A′, Aˆ, d, pi)
return 1 if A′ 6= 1G1 , e(A′, ipk) = e(Aˆ, g2),
and pi holds for A′, Aˆ, d, µ,m w.r.t. gpk
Blind Conversions. When the verifier wants to learn which of the pseudonymously
received messages belong together, it sends a batch of pseudonym-message pairs in blinded
form to the converter. That is, it encrypts the messages and pseudonyms using ElGamal
encryption. The pseudonyms are ElGamal ciphertexts already and we roughly wrap them
in another encryption layer. The converter then blindly decrypts the pseudonyms, i.e.,
decrypts the “inner” part of the ciphertext, which yields hy encrypted under the verifiers
blinding key bpk. To ensure non-transitivity, i.e., restrict the linkage of pseudonyms to
hold only within the queried batch, the converter blindly raises the encrypted hy to a
random exponent r. This value is chosen afresh for every batch but used consistently
within the query, i.e., all pseudonyms that belong to the same user with secret key y will
be mapped consistently to hyr. To ensure that the ciphertexts and their order cannot leak
any additional information, we let the converter re-randomise and shuffle all ciphertexts
before they returns them to the verifier. Both the verifier and the converter are assumed
to be at most honest-but-curious, and so proofs that they have performed CLS.Blind and
CLS.Convert correctly are not needed.
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CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, µ,m)
parse gpk = (ipk, cpk), µ = (µ1, µ2)
α, β, γ←$Z∗p, cµ1 ← µ1gβ , cµ2 ← gα, cµ3 ← µ2cpkβbpkα
c1 ← gγ , c2 ← bpkγm, cµ← (cµ1, cµ2, cµ3), c← (c1, c2)
return (cµ, c)
CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, ((cµ1, c1), ..., (cµk, ck)))
parse cµi = (cµi,1, cµi,2, cµi,3), ci ← (ci,1, ci,2), r←$Z∗p
for i = 1, . . . k :
cµ′i,1 ← cµri,2, cµ′i,2 ← (cµi,3cµ−cski,1 )r // decrypt µ and raise to r
r1, r2←$Z∗p // re-randomise all ciphertexts
cµ′′i,1 ← cµ′i,1gr1 , cµ′′i,2 ← cµ′i,2bpkr1
c′i,1 ← ci,1gr2 , c′i,2 ← ci,2bpkr2
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k : (cµi, ci)← (cµ′′Π(i), c′Π(i))
return ((cµ1, c1), ..., (cµk, ck))
CLS.Unblind(bsk, (cµ, c))
parse cµ = (cµ1, cµ2), c = (c1, c2)
µ← cµ2cµ−bsk1 , m← c2c−bsk1
return (µ,m)
4.4 Security of CLS–DDH
We now show that our scheme satisfies all security properties defined in Section 4.2. More
precisely, we show that the following theorem holds (using the type–3 pairing version of
the q-SDH assumption given in [20]).
Theorem 4.1. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 is a secure CLS
as defined in Section 4.2 if the DDH assumption holds in G1, the q-SDH assumption
holds, and the SPK is simulation-sound, zero-knowledge and online extractable (for the
underlined values).
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4.4.1 Correctness
The construction satisfies correctness of sign due to the correctness of the signature
zero–knowledge proofs used, and because Aˆ = A−xr1Ar1(isk+x) = Ar1isk = A′isk.
Let (Ai, xi, yi, si) be the secret signing key for the user with identifier uidi. Then ∀i ∈ k, for
ai, a
′
i, a
′′
i chosen randomly, µi = (g
ai , cpkaihyi), cµi = (g
ai+a
′
i , ga
′′
i , cpkai+a
′
ihyibpka
′′
i ). Then
for r, r′i←$ {0, 1}∗ and a random permutation Π, cµΠ(i) = (ga
′′
i r+r
′
i , hyirbpka
′′
i r+r
′
i), and
µΠ(i) = h
yir. Therefore µΠ(i) = µΠ(j) if and only if yi = yj . Except with negligible proba-
bility, as y is chosen randomly, this only occurs if and only if uidi = uidj . ∀i ∈ [1, k], for α
chosen randomly, ci = (g
α,mibpk
α), for r′′i chosen randomly, cΠ(i) = (g
α+r′′i ,mibpk
α+r′′i ),
therefore mΠ(i) = mi. Therefore, the construction satisfies correctness of conversion.
Assume UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ0,m0), (µ1,m1))) = 0 and UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ1,m1),
(µ2, m2))) = 0. Due to the same argument, letting r1, r2 be the randomness chosen
in CLS.Convert, (µ0,2µ
−csk
0,1 )
r1 = (µ1,2µ
−csk
1,1 )
r1 and (µ1,2µ
−csk
1,1 )
r2 = (µ2,2µ
−csk
2,1 )
r2 . There-
fore, µ0,2µ
−csk
0,1 = µ2,2µ
−csk
2,1 . However, if UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ0,m0), (µ2,m2))) = 1, then
(µ0,2µ
−csk
0,1 )
r3 6= (µ2,2µ−csk2,1 )r3 , where r3 was chosen during Convert. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, the construction satisfies consistency.
4.4.2 Anonymity
Lemma 4.1. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies anonymity
if the DDH assumption holds in G1, and the SPK is unbounded simulation-sound, zero–
knowledge and online extractable (for the underlined values).
Proof. We assume that an adversary A exists that makes q queries to the SNDU oracle
for distinct user identifiers and qconv queries to the CLS.Convert oracle, guesses b correctly
in the anonymity game and wins with probability + 1/2.
We define Game (0,0) to be the anonymity experiment, with b chosen randomly at the
beginning, using the CLS–DDH construction. Let P0,0 be the event that an adversary A
correctly guesses b after Game (0,0).
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CONVERT((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
if bpk /∈ BPK return ⊥
if ∃i s.t. µi = µ∗ and ∃j 6= i s.t. Identify(uid∗d, µj) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); r′i) for i = 1, . . . , k
r←$Z∗p,∀i ∈ [1, k]
α←$Z∗p, c′i ← (ci,1gα, ci,2bpkα)
if µi = µ
∗ µ′i←$G1, β←$Z∗p, cµ′i ← (gβ , µ′ibpkβ)
if µi 6= µ∗
β←$Z∗p, cµ′i,1 ← cµri,2gβ , cµ′i,2 ← cµri,3cµ−rcski,1 bpkβ
Choose random permutation Π;∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµi, ci)← (cµ′Π(i), c′Π(i))
return ({(cµi, ci)}k, {(cµi, ci)}k, r′1, . . . , r′k)
Figure 4.4: Convert oracle used during the first j queries of Game (0, j) in the CLS
anonymity proof
Game (0, j) is identical to Game (0,0), except for during the first j queries to the CONVERT
oracle, when µ∗ is queried. We provide the new convert oracle used for the first j queries
of Game (0, j) in Figure 4.4. Let P0,j be the event that the adversary A correctly guesses
b after Game (0, j).
We show that Game (0,j) and Game (0, j+1) are indistinguishable assuming the DDH
assumption. We provide a distinguishing algorithm Dj in Figure 4.5, and explain why Dj
simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically to Game (0, j) if a DDH tuple is
input, and Dj simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically to Game (0, j + 1) if
a DDH tuple is not input.
The values gpk, csk, isk are distributed identically to the anonymity game, as everything
but h, h1 are chosen in the same way, and χ is chosen randomly and independently, there-
fore h1 is distributed correctly.
Simulating the SNDU Oracle. The SNDU oracle only differs from the oracle in the
anonymity experiment during the k-th query. In this case H is distributed identically, and
piH can be simulated due to the zero-knowledge property of the proof system used. The
value y is not defined, but this is not output to A or used in the next stage of the protocol.
Therefore the outputs of SNDU are distributed identically to the anonymity experiment.
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SNDU(uid, n)
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1,gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if l = k uid′ ← uid,H ← Dχ2 , simulate piH with H,n, stuid ← (⊥, H, piH)
return ((H,piH), cont)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in anonymity experiment
SIGN(uid,m)
if uid 6= uid′ perform SIGN oracle from anonymity experiment
else α, β←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαD2
A′, d←$Z∗p, Aˆ← A′isk, simulate pi with A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m
σ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi) return ((µ1, µ2), σ)
CONVERT((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
s← s+ 1 if s ≤ j perform CONVERT given in Figure 4.4
if s > j + 1 perform CONVERT given in anonymity experiment
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
if bpk /∈ BPK return ⊥
if ∃i s.t. µi = µ∗ and ∃j 6= i s.t. Identify(uid∗d, µj) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); r′i) for i = 1, . . . , k
if ∃i s.t. µi = µ∗ r←$Z∗p
∀j ∈ [1, k]
α←$Z∗p, c′j ← (cj,1gα, cj,2bpkα) Let σj = (., ., ., pij)
if µj = µ
∗ µ′j ← Dr4
if µj 6= µ∗
if (uid, ., µj , σj) ∈ SL yj ← yuid else extract yj from pij
µ′j ← Dryj3
β←$Z∗p, cµ′j ,← (gβ , µ′jbpkβ)
Choose random permutation Π;∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµi, ci)← (cµ′Π(i), c′Π(i))
else ((cµ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, ck))←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk, ((cµ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, ck)))
return ({(cµi, ci)}k, {(cµi, ci)}k, r′1, . . . , r′k)
Dj(D1, D2, D3, D4)
s, l← 0, k←$ [1, q], b, b′←$ {0, 1}, h← D1, χ←$Z∗p, h1 ← hχ
Finish computing gpk, csk, isk as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen
HUL, SL← ∅
(uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(gpk, isk, choose)
if uid∗b 6= uid′ return 0
if uid∗0 /∈ HUL or uid∗1 /∈ HUL return b′
(µ∗, σ∗)←$ SIGN(uid′,m∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(st, µ∗, σ∗, guess)
if b∗ = b return 1
Figure 4.5: Dj a distinguishing algorithm for the DDH problem in the CLS anonymity
proof
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Simulating the SIGN Oracle. The SIGN oracle is identical to the oracle in the anonymity
experiment, when uid 6= uid′ is queried. When uid′ is queried, we write logD1(D2) as y˜, and
so D2 = h
y˜. This is consistent with SNDU, as H = Dχ2 = h
y˜
1. A
′, d′ are chosen randomly
and independently and Aˆ = A′isk and so these are distributed identically to CLS.Sign. The
signature proof of knowledge pi can be simulated due to the zero-knowledge property of
the proof system used. Therefore the outputs of SIGN are distributed identically to the
anonymity experiment.
Simulating the CONVERT Oracle. Other than the jth query, the CONVERT oracle
is identical to both Games (0, j) and (0, j + 1).
For the jth query, if the input to Dj is a DDH tuple, then outputs from the CONVERT
oracle are identically distributed to the anonymity game. This is because, if µ∗ is not
queried, the oracle behaves identically to the anonymity game. If µ∗ is queried, the ci
are computed identically to the anonymity game. Writing logD1(D3) as r˜, D
r
4 = h
y˜r˜r
and D
ryj
3 = h
rr˜yj . The µ′ are then blinded, and shuffled with a random permutation.
Therefore, due to the re-randomisation property, the freshly blinded µ′ are distributed
identically to the re-randomised µ′. Therefore, if a DDH tuple is input, the outputs of the
CONVERT oracle are identically distributed to Game (0, j).
Simulating challenge signature. The challenge signature (µ∗, σ∗) input to A in the
guessing stage is distributed identically to the anonymity game, due to outputs of the
SIGN oracle being distributed identically to the anonymity game.
Reduction to the DDH problem. If the input to Dj is not a DDH tuple, then outputs
of the CONVERT oracle for the jth query are identically distributed to Figure 4.4. This is
because for all pseudonyms µi input, except for µ
∗, the pseudonyms output are distributed
identically to the oracle in the anonymity game. When µ∗ is queried, as D4 is random
and independent, µ′i is now chosen randomly and independently, and so is identically
distributed to Figure 4.4. Therefore, if the input to Dj is not a DDH tuple, then the
outputs to A are identically distributed to Game (0, j + 1)
The distinguisher Dj only aborts early if uid∗b 6= uid′, which occurs with probability q−1/q.
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Therefore, the probability that Dj outputs 1 given a DDH tuple was input is Pr[P0,j ]/q.
The probability that Dj outputs 1 given a DDH tuple was not input is Pr[P0,j+1]/q. The
advantage of Dj is therefore |Pr[P0,j ] − Pr[P0,j+1]|/q, therefore |Pr[P0,j ] − Pr[P0,j+1]| =
qDDH.
We define Game 1 to be Game (0, qconv), where qconv is the number of queries to the
CONVERT oracle. Let P1 be the event that an adversary A correctly guesses b after
Game 1. As |Pr[P0,j ]− Pr[P0,j+1]| = qDDH, then |Pr[P0,0]− Pr[P1]| ≤ qconvqDDH.
Next, we show that |Pr[P1]−1/2| ≤ DDH. We build an adversary A′ that distinguishes
between DDH tuples, given A that successfully guesses b in Game 1 with probability
Pr[P1]. We provide A′ in Figure 4.6, and explain why the simulation input to A given
in Figure 4.6 is identically distributed to Game 1, provided a DDH tuple is input, and A
guesses correctly with probability 1/2, if a DDH tuple is not input.
The group public key and issuer secret key (gpk, isk) are computed identically to Game 1,
except for g, cpk, which are distributed identically to Game 1.
Simulating the Oracles. The SNDU and SIGN oracles are identical to Game 1. In the
CONVERT oracle, if µj = µ
∗, µ′j is distributed identically to Game 1. Otherwise, µ
′
i is
computed using yuid, which is already known if µ
′
i was output by the SIGN oracle, and for
other signatures yuid can be extracted using the soundness property of the zero-knowledge
proofs used. Due to the re-randomisation property, the freshly blinded µ′ are distributed
identically to the re-randomised µ′. Therefore, the cµ′i generated are distributed identically
to Figure 4.4.
Reduction to the DDH problem. If a DDH tuple is input, (D3, D4h
yb) are distributed
identically to CLS.Sign. The values A′, d are chosen randomly, Aˆ = A′isk, and so they are
distributed identically to the CLS.Sign algorithm. The signature proof of knowledge pi
can be simulated, due to the zero-knowledge property of the zero-knowledge proofs used.
Therefore, µ∗, σ∗ are distributed identically to Game 1, and so A guesses successfully with
probability Pr[P1]. If the input is not a DDH tuple, then all inputs to A are independent
of b, therefore A guesses successfully with probability 1/2. On input a DDH tuple, A′
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SNDU(uid,Min)
Same as in anonymity experiment
SIGN(uid,m)
Same as in anonymity experiment
CONVERT((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
if bpk /∈ BPK return ⊥
if ∃i s.t. µi = µ∗ and ∃j 6= i s.t. Identify(uid∗d, µj) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); r′i) for i = 1, . . . , k
r←$Z∗p,∀j ∈ [1, k]
α←$Z∗p, c′j ← (cj,1gα, cj,2bpkα)
Let σj = (., ., ., pij)
if µj = µ
∗ µ′j ←$G1
if µj 6= µ∗
if (uid, ., µj , σj) ∈ SL yj ← yuid else extract yj from σj
µ′j ← hryj
β←$Z∗p, cµ′j ,← (gβ , µ′jbpkβ)
Choose random permutation Π;∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµi, ci)← (cµ′Π(i), c′Π(i))
return ({(cµi, ci)}k, {(cµi, ci)}k, r′1, . . . , r′k)
A′(D1, D2, D3, D4)
Set g ← D1, b, b′←$ {0, 1}, cpk ← D2
Otherwise set gpk, isk as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen
(uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(choose, gpk, isk)
Let gsk[uid∗0] = (·, ·, y0, ·) and gsk[uid∗1] = (·, ·, y1, ·), if y0, y1 undefined return b′
µ∗1 ← D3, µ∗2 ← D4hyb
A′, d←$G1, Aˆ← A′isk, simulate pi with A′, Aˆ, d, µ∗1, µ∗2,m∗
µ∗ ← (µ∗1, µ∗2), σ∗ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi), b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗)
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
Figure 4.6: A′ which distinguishes between DDH tuples using A in the CLS anonymity
proof
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outputs 1 with probability Pr[P1]. On an input that is not a DDH tuple, A′ outputs 1
with probability 1/2. Therefore Pr[P1]− 1/2 ≤ DDH, and so |Pr[P1]− 1/2| = DDH.
Therefore |Pr[P0,0] − 1/2| ≤ (qqconv + 1)DDH. As DDH is negligible, our construction
satisfies anonymity.
4.4.3 Non–transitivity
Lemma 4.2. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies non-transitivity
if the DDH assumption holds in G1, and the SPK is unbounded simulation-sound, zero–
knowledge and online extractable (for the underlined value).
Proof. For proving non-transitivity, we have to show that there exists an efficient simulator
SIM that makes the real and simulated game indistinguishable. We start by describing
the simulator and then explain why the real and simulated conversion oracles CONVERT
and CONVSIM are indistinguishable.
SIM(gpk, bpk, Luid1 , . . . Luidk′ )
l← 0,∀j ∈ [1, k′]
µ′←$G1;∀m ∈ Luidj
l← l + 1, β, γ←$Z∗p, cl ← (gγ ,m · bpkγ), cµl ← (gβ , µ′ · bpkβ)
return ((cµ1, c1), . . . (cµl, cl))
We assume that an adversary A exists that makes q queries to the SNDU oracle for
distinct user identifiers and qconv queries to the CONVX oracle, guesses b correctly in the
non-transitivity game with SIM as described and wins with probability + 1/2.
We will stepwise make the real-world (b=0) and the simulated world (b=1) equivalent,
using a sequence of Games Hj for j = 0, . . . , q. The idea is that in Game Hj we will not
use simulated conversions for all users uid1, . . . , uidj in order of when they were queried
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to SNDU. More precisely, we define Game Hj to be as given in Figure 4.7 with all other
oracles identical to the non–transitivity experiment. Let Pj be the event that A guesses
b correctly in Game Hj , with the simulator given. Game Hj keeps track of the queries to
SNDU, adding the first j queries uid to a set UL. Then during queries to CONVSIM, if a
signature of a user in UL is queried, these are treated in the same way as pseudonyms for
corrupted users, i.e., they are normally converted using the CLS.Convert algorithm. If a
signature of an honest user that is not in UL is queried, we add this user to NUL. These
conversions are simulated as usual.
Game H0 is identical to the non-transitivity game because UL is empty. Therefore,
Pr[P0] = + 1/2. In Game Hq, UL contains all honest users, and so the CONVSIM oracle
is now identical to the CONVERT oracle, and inputs to the adversary are now independent
of b , therefore Pr[Pq] = 1/2.
We now show that if an adversary can distinguish Games Hj and Hj+1, we can turn this
into a distinguisher Dj that can break the DDH assumption. We describe the reduction
and the additional simulation that is needed in Figures 4.8 and 4.9. The CONVERT oracle
remains unchanged. To avoid confusion, we write uid′ to refer to the j + 1-th user that
has joined the group (and for which Dj embedded the DDH challenge).
We now argue that when a DDH tuple (D1, D2, D3, D4) is input to Dj , the inputs to A
are distributed identically to Game Hj+1; when a DDH tuple is not input, the inputs to
A are distributed identically to Game Hj . That is for D1 = h,D2 = ha, D3 = hb, D4 = hc,
the oracles provided by Dj will be exactly as in Hj+1 when c = ab, and as in Hj otherwise.
We first note that due to the DDH random self-reduction given in [127], if a DDH tuple is
input to Dj , then for all i ∈ [qconv], D1, D2, D3,i, D4,i is a DDH tuple. If a DDH tuple is not
input to Dj , then D1, D2, D3,1, D4,1, · · · , D3,qconv , D4,qconv is randomly and independently
distributed.
The keys gpk, csk, isk are distributed identically to the non–transitivity game, as χ is
chosen randomly and independently when setting h1 ← hχ.
Simulating the SNDU Oracle. The SNDU oracle only differs from the oracle in the
non–transitivity experiment during the (j+1)-th query by embedding D2 of the DDH chal-
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Game Hj
t← 0, b←$ {0, 1}, param←$CLS.Setup(1τ )
HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
(ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk), b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(guess, gpk, isk)
return b∗
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid /∈ HUL, t← t+ 1, if t ≤ j UL← UL ∪ {uid}
Continue from line 2 of standard SNDU oracle
CONVSIM((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 or bpk /∈ BK return ⊥
Set CL← ∅
Compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); ri) for i = 1, . . . , k
∀i ∈ [1, k]
if (uid,mi, µi, σi) ∈ SL
if Luid does not exist, create Luid ← {mi},CLuid ← {(ci, cµi)}
else set Luid ← Luid ∪ {mi},CLuid ← CLuid ∪ {(ci, cµi)}
else CL← CL ∪ {(ci, cµi)}
{(cµi, ci)}i=1,...k′ ←$CLS.Convert(gpk, csk, bpk,CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid)
for k′ ← |CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid|
let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
Let NUL← {uid1, . . . uidk′′}\UL
{(cµi, ci)}i=k′+1,...k←$SIM(gpk, bpk,
⋃
uid∈NUL
Luid)
Choose random permutation Π;∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµ′i, c′i)← (cµΠ(i), cΠ(i))
return ({(cµi, ci, ri)}i=1,...,k, {(cµ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k, r1, . . . , rk)
Figure 4.7: Description of Game Hj and the changes to the SNDU and CONVSIM oracles
in the CLS non–transitivity proof
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Dj(D′1, D′2, D′3, D′4)
Expand D′1, D
′
2, D
′
3, D
′
4 into D1, D2, {D3,i, D4,i : i ∈ [qconv]} using DDH random self-reduction [127]
s, t← 0, b, ←$ {0, 1}, h← D1, χ←$Z∗p, h1 ← hχ
Finish computing gpk, csk, isk as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen
HUL, CUL, SL← ∅
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(guess, gpk, isk)
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
SNDU(uid, n)
if uid /∈ HUL, t← t+ 1, if t ≤ j UL← UL ∪ {uid}
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if t = j + 1 uid′ ← uid,H ← Dχ2 simulate piH with H,n, stuid ← (⊥, H, piH)
return ((H,piH), cont)
Continue from line 5 of standard SNDU oracle
SIGN(uid,m)
if uid 6= uid′ perform SIGN oracle from anonymity experiment
else α, β←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαD2
A′, d←$Z∗p, Aˆ← A′isk
Simulate pi with A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m
σ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi) return ((µ1, µ2), σ)
Figure 4.8: Oracles for Dj our distinguishing algorithm for the DDH problem in the CLS
non–transitivity proof
lenger into the user’s “public key” H using knowledge of χ. Clearly, H is distributed iden-
tically as when computed normally, and piH can be simulated due to the zero-knowledge
property of the proof system. Note that y is not defined for this honest user, but this is
not output to A, or used in the next stage of the protocol.
Simulating the SIGN Oracle. The SIGN oracle is identical to the oracle in the non–
transitivity experiment when uid 6= uid′ is queried. When uid′ is queried, we simply
encrypt D2 instead of h
y.
This is consistent with SNDU, as H = Dχ2 . Further, A
′, d′ are chosen randomly and
independently, and Aˆ = A′isk, so these are distributed identically to CLS.Sign. The SPK
pi can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge property of the proof system.
Simulating the CONVSIM Oracle. What remains to be shown is that the CONVSIM
oracle created by Dj either behaves identically to the CONVSIM oracle in Game Hj or
as in Hj+1, depending on whether its input was a DDH tuple or not. We know that
D3,s = h
r˜ for some r˜ and thus it must hold that Dyr3,s = h
r˜ry. Finally, we derive cµ by
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CONVSIM((µ1,m1, σ1), . . . , (µk,mk, σk), bpk)
s← s+ 1, if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t. CLS.Verify(gpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 or bpk /∈ BK return ⊥
Set CL← ∅, r←$Z∗p
Compute (cµi, ci)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi,mi); ri) for i = 1, . . . , k
∀i ∈ [1, k]
if (uid,mi, µi, σi) ∈ SL
if Luid does not exist Luid ← {mi},CLuid ← {(mi, yuid)}
else Luid ← Luid ∪ {mi},CLuid ← CLuid ∪ {(mi, yuid)}
else Extract yi from σi,CL← CL ∪ {(mi, yi)}
n← 0; ∀(m, y) ∈ CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid
n← n+ 1, γ1, γ2←$Z∗p, (cµn, cn)← ((gγ1 , Dyr3,sbpkγ1), (gγ2 ,mbpkγ2))
if Luid′ exists ∀m ∈ Luid′
n← n+ 1, γ1, γ2←$Z∗p, (cµn, cn)← ((gγ1 , Dr4,sbpkγ1), (gγ2 ,mbpkγ2))
let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
Let NUL← {uid1, . . . uidk′′}\UL
{(cµi, ci)}i=n+1,...k←$ SIM(gpk, bpk,
⋃
uid∈NUL,uid 6=uid′
Luid)
Choose random permutation Π;∀i ∈ [1, k] (cµ′i, c′i)← (cµΠ(i), cΠ(i))
return ({(cµi, ci)}i=1,...,k, {(cµ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k, r1, . . . , rk)
Figure 4.9: The CONVSIM oracle used by distinguisher Dj in the CLS non–transitivity
proof
encrypting Dyr3,s from scratch under bpk, which is not noticeable to the adversary due to
the re-randomisation that is applied in the conversion algorithm.
If (D1, D2, D3, D4) is a DDH tuple, then D
r
4,s = h
r˜ry˜. Therefore as y˜ = yuid′ , the inputs
to A are also distributed identically to Game Hj+1. Whereas, if (D1, D2, D3, D4) is not
a DDH tuple, then Dr4,s, is distributed identically to µ
′, which was chosen randomly and
independently. Therefore the inputs to A are distributed identically to Game Hj .
Reduction to the DDH problem. Therefore, the probability that Dj outputs 1 if it
was given a valid DDH tuple as input is Pr[Pj+1], and Pr[Pj ] is the probability that Dj
outputs 1 when the input was not a DDH tuple. The advantage of Dj is then |Pr[Pj ] −
Pr[Pj+1]|, therefore |Pr[Pj ]− Pr[Pj+1]| = DDH.
Overall, for our sequence of games H0 to Hq, it holds that |Pr[P0]− Pr[Pq]| ≤ qDDH and
thus  ≤ qDDH is negligible. This concludes our proof that the CLS–DDH construction
satisfies non–transitivity.
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4.4.4 Conversion Blindness
Lemma 4.3. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies conversion
blindness if the DDH assumption holds in G1.
Proof. We define Game 0 be the conversion blindness experiment, using the CLS–DDH
construction. Let P0 be the event that an adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 0.
We define Game 1 to be identical to Game 0, except instead cµ∗ is chosen randomly. Let
P1 be the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 1.
Game 1
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk), (bpk, bsk)←$CLS.BKGen(param)
(st, (µ0,m0), (µ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, isk, csk, bpk)
(., c∗)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µb,mb)), cµ∗←$G31
b∗←$A(guess, st, cµ∗, c∗)
return 1 if b∗ = b
We define Game 2 to be identical to Game 1, except c∗ is chosen randomly. Let P2 be
the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 2. Clearly the probability
that A correctly guesses b is 1/2, as they are given no information about b. Therefore
Pr[P2] = 1/2.
Game 2
param←$CLS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk), (bpk, bsk)←$CLS.BKGen(param)
(st, (µ0,m0), (µ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, isk, csk, bpk)
c∗←$G21, cµ∗←$G31
b∗←$A(guess, st, cµ∗, c∗)
return 1 if b∗ = b
We show that Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption.
We provide a distinguishing algorithm D1 in Figure 4.10.
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D1(D1, D2, D3, D4)
b←$ {0, 1}
g ← D1, bpk ← D2, otherwise generate gpk, isk, csk as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen
(st, ((µ0, µ
′
0),m0), ((µ1, µ
′
1),m1))←$A(choose, gpk, isk, csk, bpk)
(., c∗)←$CLS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µb,mb)), β←$Z∗p, cµ∗ ← (µbgβ , D3, µ′bD4cpkβ)
b∗←$A(guess, st, cµ∗, c∗)
return 1 if b∗ = b
Figure 4.10: D1 that distinguishes between Game 0 and Game 1 in the CLS conversion
blindness proof
D2(D1, D2, D3, D4)
b←$ {0, 1}
g ← D1, bpk ← D2, otherwise generate gpk, isk, csk as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen
(st, ((µ0, µ
′
0),m0), ((µ1, µ
′
1),m1))←$A(choose, gpk, isk, csk, bpk)
c∗ ← (D3,mbD4), cµ∗←$G31
b∗←$A(guess, st, cµ∗, c∗)
return 1 if b∗ = b
Figure 4.11: D2 that distinguishes between Game 1 and Game 2 in the CLS conversion
blindness proof
If D1 is input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 0. This is
because, letting α = loggD3, then D4 = bpk
α, and therefore cµ∗ is distributed identically
to the CLS.Blind algorithm.
If D1 is not input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 1.
This is because, β,D3, D4 are now chosen independently and randomly.
Therefore |Pr[P0] − Pr[P1]| ≤ DDH, where DDH is the DDH advantage, and therefore
negligible.
We show that Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption.
We provide a distinguishing algorithm D2 in Figure 4.11.
If D2 is input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 1. This
is because letting α = loggD3, then D4 = bpk
α, and so c∗ is distributed identically to an
output of the CLS.Blind algorithm.
If D2 is not input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 2.
This is because D3, D4 are now chosen independently and randomly.
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Therefore |Pr[P1]− Pr[P2] ≤ DDH, and so|Pr[P0]− 1/2| ≤ 2DDH.
4.4.5 Join Anonymity
Lemma 4.4. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies join anon-
ymity if the DDH assumption holds in G1, and the SPK is zero–knowledge.
Proof. First we show that if an adversary A exists that makes q queries for distinct user
identifiers to the SNDU oracle, such that
|Pr[Expanon−join−0A,CLS–DDH (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−join−1A,CLS–DDH (τ) = 1]| = ,
where  is non-negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′,that breaks the DDH
assumption with non-negligible probability. We provide A′ in Figure 4.12. We then
describe why the simulation given in Figure 4.12 is indistinguishable to the join anonymity
experiment to A if a DDH tuple is input, and that A guesses correctly with probability
1/2 if a DDH tuple is not input.
Assuming the input to A′ is not a DDH tuple, then the probability A′ aborts due to uidb 6=
u˜id is (q-1)/q. If u˜id is input to the SIGN oracles, then A′ outputs 1 with probability 1/2.
As D4 is random and independent to all other variables, all inputs to A are independent
of b, therefore the probability they guess correctly is 1/2. Therefore, the probability that
A′ outputs 1 is 1/2q.
Assuming the input to A′ is a DDH tuple, u˜id = uidb, and A does not cheat by querying
uid0 or uid1 to the signing oracle, we now show that all inputs to A are distributed
identically to the join anonymity experiment.
The keys (gpk, isk, csk) given to A are distributed identically to the join anonymity ex-
periment. The only difference is in choosing h1, h, which are distributed randomly and
independently.
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SNDU(uid, n)
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1,gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if l = k u˜id← uid,H ← D2, simulate piH with H,n, stuid ← (⊥, H, piH)
return ((H,piH), cont)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in second converter anonymity experiment
SIGN(uid,m)
if uid /∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid = u˜id return ⊥
if uid 6= uid∗ perform SIGN oracle from join anonymity
else α, β←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαD4
A′, d←$G1, Aˆ← A′isk, simulate pi with A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m
σ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi) return ((µ1, µ2), σ)
A′(D1, D2, D3, D4)
b←$ {0, 1}, gpk, csk, isk chosen as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen except h1 ← D1, h← D3
k←$ [1, q], l = 0,HUL← ∅
(st, uid0, uid1)←$ASNDU,SIGN(choose, gpk, isk, csk)
if uid0 or uid1 /∈ HUL or decuid0 6= accept or decuid1 6= accept b∗ ← 0
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
if uidb 6= u˜id return 0
Choose uid∗ as in experiment,HUL← HUL ∪ {uid∗}, b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN(guess, st, uid∗)
if (uidd, ∗) ∈ SL for d = 0, 1 b∗ ← 0
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
Figure 4.12: A′, which breaks the DDH assumption, using A, which breaks the join
anonymity of CLS–DDH with probability 
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Simulating the SNDU Oracle. The SNDU oracle only differs from the oracle in the
join anonymity experiment during the k-th query. In this case H is distributed identically,
and piH can be simulated due to the zero-knowledge property of the proof system used.
The value yu˜id is not defined but this is not output to A, or used in the next stage of the
protocol. Therefore, the output of SNDU is distributed identically to the join anonymity
experiment.
Simulating the SIGN Oracle. The SIGN oracle is identical to the oracle in the join
anonymity experiment when uid 6= uid∗ is queried. When uid∗ is queried, letting y∗ =
logD1(D2), D4 = h
y∗ . This is consistent with SNDU, as H = D2 = h
y∗
1 . The values
A′, d′ are chosen randomly and independently, and Aˆ = A′isk, so these are distributed
identically to CLS.Sign. The proof pi can be simulated due to the zero-knowledge property
of the proof system used. Therefore the output of SIGN is distributed identically to the
join anonymity experiment.
Reduction to the DDH problem. Assume A′ is input a DDH tuple, and uidb output
by A is u˜id, which occurs with probability 1/q, then A′ will not abort early. If the
adversary queries the signing oracle with uid0 or uid1, or does not output honestly joined
users, then b∗ = 0 is the same as the output of the join anonymity experiment with
adversary A. If the adversary does not query the signing oracle with uid0 or uid1, then
all inputs to A are identically distributed to the join anonymity experiment, and so b∗ = b
with the same probability as 1 is output in the join anonymity experiment for adversary
A.
Therefore, the probability that A′ outputs 1 is:
1/2 Pr[Expanon−join−0A,CLS–DDH (τ) = 0] + 1/2 Pr[Exp
anon−join−1
A,CLS–DDH (τ) = 1] = (+ 1)/2.
Therefore A′ outputs 1 with probability (+ 1)/2q.
Therefore, A′ has advantage /2q in distinguishing DDH tuples, and so our CLS–DDH
construction satisfies join anonymity.
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SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
yuid←$Z∗p, H ← Dyuid2 , simulate piH with H, stuid ← (⊥, H, piH)
return ((H,piH), cont)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in non-frameability experiment
SIGN(uid,m)
α←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαDzyuid2
A′, d←$G1, Aˆ← A′isk, simulate pi with A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m
σ ← (A′, Aˆ, d, pi) return ((µ1, µ2), σ)
A′(D1, D2)
gpk, csk, isk chosen as in CLS.Setup,CLS.IKGen,CLS.CKGen except h1 ← D1, z←$Z∗p, h← Dz1
HUL← ∅, (uid∗,m∗, µ∗, σ∗)←$ASNDU,SIGN(gpk, isk, csk)
Extract y∗ from pi∗ included in σ∗ return y∗y−1uid∗
Figure 4.13: A′, which breaks the discrete log assumption, using A, which breaks the
non-frameability of CLS–DDH with probability 
4.4.6 Non–frameability
Lemma 4.5. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies non-frameability
if the DL assumption holds in G1, and the SPK is simulation-sound and zero–knowledge.
Proof. We show that if there exists an adversary A such that Pr[ExpnonframeA,CLS–DDH(τ) = 1] =
, where  is non-negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′ that breaks the discrete
log assumption with non-negligible probability. We provide A′ in Figure 4.13, where we
describe how A′ simulates the oracles needed in the non-frameability game and extracts
the DL solutions. We then describe why the simulation given in Figure 4.13 and the
non–frameability experiment are indistinguishable towards A.
All inputs to A are distributed identically to the non-frameability experiment.
The values gpk, csk, isk are distributed identically to the non–frameability game, as ev-
erything but h, h1 is chosen in the same way. The value z is chosen randomly and inde-
pendently, therefore h is distributed correctly.
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Simulating the SNDU Oracle. When a new user identifier is queried to SNDU, H
is distributed identically as yuid is chosen randomly and independently, and piH can be
simulated due to the zero-knowledge property of proof system used. Note that y is set as
⊥, but this is not output to A, or used in the next stage of the protocol.
Simulating the SIGN Oracle. Letting y˜ = logD1(D2), then D
zyuid
2 = h
y˜yuid . This is
consistent with SNDU because H = hy˜yuid1 . Therefore, µ1, µ2 are distributed correctly.
A′, Aˆ, d are distributed identically to CLS.Sign because Aˆ = A′isk, and A′, d are chosen
randomly. The proof pi can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge property of the zero–
knowledge proofs used. Therefore the output of SIGN is distributed identically to the
non-frameability experiment.
Reduction to the DL problem. We assume A is successful. The output of A,
(m∗, µ∗, σ∗), cannot have been returned by the SIGN oracle, as A is successful, there-
fore we can extract y∗, due to the soundness property of the zero–knowledge proof used.
As Identify(gpk, csk, uid∗,m∗, µ∗) = 1, this means that µ∗2µ∗
−csk
1 = D
zyuid∗
2 = h
y˜yuid∗ .
Therefore due to the soundness of the zero–knowledge proof, hy˜yuid∗ = hy
∗
and y˜ is output
by A′.
If A is successful with probability , A′ solves the discrete logarithm problem with prob-
ability at least , and so our CLS–DDH construction satisfies non–frameability.
4.4.7 Traceability
Lemma 4.6. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1 satisfies traceability
if the q-SDH assumption holds, and the SPK is simulation-sound, zero–knowledge and
online extractable.
Proof. First we show that if there exists an adversary A such that Pr[ExptraceA,CLS–DDH(τ) =
1] = , where  is non-negligible, which makes q queries to the SNDI oracle for distinct
user identifiers, then we can can build an adversary A′ that breaks the q-SDH problem
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with non-negligible probability. We provide the detailed description of A′ in Figure 4.14,
and explain here how A′ works.
First note that all inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically to the trace-
ability experiment. This is because G1,G2,GT , p, e, g2, ipk are distributed identically to
the traceability experiment, and g, h, cpk, csk were chosen identically to the traceability
experiment. The generators g1, h2 are distributed correctly, due to the fact µ and ν1
were chosen randomly and independently. As θ is chosen randomly, h1 is also distributed
correctly. Therefore, (gpk, csk) given to A are distributed identically to the traceability
experiment.
We will later use the fact that Γ = gisk1 , and Bi = g
1/(isk+xi)
1 . This is because g1 =∏q−1
i=0 S
µζi
i = g˜
µf(isk)
1 , therefore Γ =
∏q−1
i=0 S
µζi
i+1 =
∏q−1
i=0 S
µζiisk
i = g
isk
1 , andBi =
∏q−2
j=0 S
µηi,j
j
= g˜
µfi(isk)
1 = g
1/(isk+xi)
1 .
Simulating the ADDU Oracle. The ADDU oracle simply returns accept when a valid
uid is input, as in the traceability experiment.
Simulating the SNDI Oracle. In the case of SNDI, y can be extracted due to the
soundness property of the zero-knowledge proofs used. We now show that answers to
SNDI queries are correctly distributed.
During the kth query to SNDI, suid, xuid are distributed correctly, as ν2 is chosen randomly
and independently. Because ν2 = suid + θy,
Auid = g
ν1
1 = (g1g
ν1(isk+x)−1
1 )
1/(isk+x) = (g1h
ν2
2 )
1/(isk+x) = (g1h
suid+θy
2 )
1/(isk+x)
= (g1h
suid
2 h
y
1)
1/(isk+x).
Therefore Auid is also distributed correctly.
For all other queries, suid, xuid are chosen randomly and independently and so are dis-
tributed correctly. Auid is also distributed correctly due to the following:
Auid = Bl(B
((x−xl)ν1−1)/ν2
l g
ν1/ν2
1 )
suid+θy = Bl(B
((x−xl)ν1−1)/ν2
l B
ν1(isk+xl)/ν2
l )
suid+θy
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ADDU(uid)
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥ else HUL← HUL ∪ {uid} return accept
SNDI(uid, (H,piH))
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥ else CUL← CUL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1
Extract y as a witness of piH
if l = k suid ← ν2 − θy, xuid ← x,Auid ← gν11 , yuid ← y
else xuid ← xl, suid←$Z∗p, Auid ← Bl(B((x−xl)ν1−1)/ν2l gν1/ν21 )suid+θy, yuid ← y
return ((Auid, xuid, suid), cont)
SIGN(uid,m)
if uid /∈ HUL return ⊥
if yuid undefined yuid←$Z∗p
α, β←$Z∗p, µ1 ← gα, µ2 ← cpkαhyuid , a←$Z∗p, A′ ← ga1 , Aˆ← Γa, d←$G1
Simulate pi using A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m
return ((µ1, µ2), (A
′, Aˆ, d, pi))
A′(G1,G2,GT , p, e, g˜1, S1, ..., Sq, g2, w)
G1,G2,GT , p, e, g2 given as input, ipk ← w,HUL, CUL← ∅
g, h chosen as in CLS.Setup, csk, cpk chosen as in CLS.CKGen
∀i ∈ [1, q − 1] xi←$Z∗p
µ←$Z∗p, let f(X) =
q−1∏
i=1
(X + xi) =
q−1∑
i=0
ζiX
i, g1 ←
q−1∏
i=0
Sµζii ,Γ←
q−1∏
i=0
Sµζii+1
x, ν1, ν2←$Z∗p, h2 ← ((Γgx1 )ν1g−11 )1/ν2 , θ←$Z∗p, h1 ← hθ2, gpk ← (cpk, ipk, param)
∀i ∈ [1, q − 1] let fi(X) =
q−1∏
j=1,j 6=i
(X + xi) =
q−2∑
j=0
ηi,jX
j , Bi ←
q−2∏
j=0
S
µηi,j
j
l← 0, k←$ [1, q], ((m1, µ1, σ1), ..., (mr, µr, σr))←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, csk)
Parse σi = (A
′
i, Aˆi, di, pii)
∀i ∈ [1, r] H˜i ← µi,2µ−cski,1
if ∃i ∈ [1, r] s.t. ∀uid ∈ CUL H˜i 6= hyuid
Extract x˜, y˜, r˜2, r˜3, s˜′ from pii
if r˜3 = 0, A˜← 1, s˜← s˜′
else A˜← A′r˜3i , s˜← s˜′ + r˜2r˜3
s∗ ← s˜+ θy˜ return ((A˜g−ν1s∗/ν21 )
ν2
ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x) , x˜)
else return ⊥
Figure 4.14: A′ which breaks the q-SDH assumption, using A which breaks the traceability
of CLS–DDH with probability 
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= BlB
(suid+θy)(ν1(isk+x)−1)/ν2
l = (g1g
(suid+θy)(ν1(isk+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(isk+xl)
= (g1h
suid+θy
2 )
1/(isk+xl) = (g1h
suid
2 h
y
1)
1/(isk+xl).
Therefore, answers to SNDI queries are distributed identically to the traceability experi-
ment.
Simulating the SIGN Oracle. For the SIGN oracle, µ1, µ2 are chosen identically to
the traceability experiment. As a is chosen randomly and independently, A′, d are chosen
randomly, and as Γ = gisk1 , Aˆ = A
′isk, therefore (A′, Aˆ, d) are distributed identically to
CLS.Sign. Due to the zero-knowledge property of SPK, pi can be simulated identically to
the traceability experiment using A′, Aˆ, d, µ1, µ2,m. Therefore, answers to these queries
are distributed identically to the traceability experiment.
Reduction to q-SDH. We assume A is successful. Then it outputs at least q+ 1 valid
signatures that are unlinkable and not returned by the SIGN oracle for an uncorrupted
user. As there are at least q + 1 unlinkable signatures, there will be i such that ∀uid ∈
CUL, H˜i 6= hyuid . As the signatures were not returned by the SIGN oracle, we can extract
the witnesses for pii due to soundness of the zero-knowledge proofs used.
We now show that we correctly extract a BBS+ signature A˜ on s˜, x˜, y˜ from piH .
If r˜3 = 0, then g1h
y˜
1, h
s˜′
2 = 1. Therefore A˜ = (g1h
y˜
1h
s˜
2)
1/(isk+x˜) = 1.
If r˜3 6= 0, then Aˆi = A′−x˜i dihr˜22 , and Aˆi = A′iski , thereforeA′isk+x˜i = dihr˜22 = (g1hy˜1hs˜′2 )1/r˜3hr˜22
= (g1h
y˜
1h
s˜′+r˜2r˜3
2 )
1/r˜3 = (g1h
y˜
1h
s˜
2)
1/r˜3 . Therefore A˜ = A′r˜3i = (g1h
y˜
1h
s˜
2)
1/(isk+x˜).
There are three possible cases for the BBS+ signature A˜, x˜, y˜, s˜.
Consider the first case, when x˜ /∈ {x1, ..., xq−1} ∪ {x}. If ν2 − s∗ − ν1s∗(x˜ − x) = 0, then
ν1 =
ν2−s∗
s∗(x˜−x) . If s
∗ = 0, then ν2 = 0, which is not possible. Therefore the adversary can
obtain ν1 and so break the discrete logarithm problem, which is implied by the q-SDH
problem.
We now show that A′ outputs g1/(isk+x˜)1 , with which we can obtain a solution to the q-SDH
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problem.
(A˜g
−ν1s∗/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x) = (g1h
s∗
2 )
ν2
(isk+x˜)(ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x)) g
−ν1s∗
ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x)
1
= (g1g
s∗(ν1(isk+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(isk+x˜)(ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x)) g
−ν1s∗
ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x)
1
= g
s∗ν1(isk+x)−s∗+ν2−s∗ν1(isk+x˜)
(isk+x˜)(ν2−s∗−ν1s∗(x˜−x))
1 = g
1/(isk+x˜)
1 .
Given this, which is a forgery as x˜ /∈ {x1, ..., xq−1}, A can break the q-SDH assumption as
shown in [20].
For the second case, if for some uid, x˜ = xuid, and A˜ = Auid, but y˜ 6= yuid, then A′
can break the discrete log assumption implied by the q-SDH assumption. This is because
logh2(h1) =
s˜−suid
yuid−y˜ .
Finally we consider the third case, where x˜ ∈ {x1, ..., xq−1} ∪ {x}, but for x˜ = xuid,
then A˜ 6= Auid. We assume x˜ = x, which occurs with probability 1/q. As A˜ 6= Auid,
ν2 − s∗ = (suid − s˜) + θ(y − y˜) 6= 0.
We now show that A′ outputs g1/(isk+x˜)1 , with which we can obtain a solution to the q-SDH
problem:
(A˜g
−ν1s∗/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−s∗ = (g1h
s∗
2 )
ν2
(isk+x)(ν2−s∗) g
−ν1s∗
ν2−s∗
1
= (g1g
s∗(ν1(isk+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(isk+x)(ν2−s∗) g
−ν1s∗
ν2−s∗
1 = g
s∗ν1(isk+x)−s∗+ν2−s∗ν1(isk+x)
(isk+x)(ν2−s∗)
1 = g
1/(isk+x)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20].
Therefore, if A is successful with probability , A′ solves the q-SDH problem with proba-
bility at least /q.
Therefore, our CLS–DDH construction satisfies traceability.
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4.5 Instantiation of SPK and Efficiency
We now discuss how to securely instantiate the online-extractable SPKs used in our
CLS–DDH construction and state the computational cost and lengths of signatures and
pseudonyms.
4.5.1 Instantiation of SPKs
We have two non-interactive zero–knowledge proofs of knowledge in our scheme:
piH = SPK{(y) : H = hy1}(n)
used in the join protocol for proving knowledge of y in H = hy1, and
pi = SPK{(x, y, r2, r3, s′, α) : µ1 = gα ∧ µ2 = cpkαhy
∧ Aˆ/d = A′−xhr22 ∧ g1hy1 = dr3h−s
′
2 }(m)
proving knowledge of a BBS+ signature on y and that µ encrypts the same y. In both
cases we need the witness y to be online extractable. For this, we additionally encrypt y
under a public key that needs to be added to param (and to which in security proof we will
know the secret key for), and extend pi and piH to prove that the additional encryption
contains the same y that is used in the rest of the proof. For the verifiable encryption of y
we use Paillier encryption [40], which is secure under the DCR assumption [109]. Proving
correct encryption for such Paillier ciphertexts can be done using standard techniques
from [40].
For transforming interactive into non-interactive zero–knowledge proofs we rely on the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic that ensures security in the random oracle model. Due to this, we
can now state Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.1. The CLS–DDH construction presented in Section 4.3.1, with the SPK
instantiated as described, is a secure CLS as defined in Section 4.2 under the DDH, q-SDH
and DCR assumption in the random oracle model.
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4.5.2 Computational Cost
We provide the operations required for the entities involved in the scheme in Table 4.1.
We denote k exponentiation in group Gi by kexpGi , k hash function calls by khash, and
k pairing operations by kpair. We denote k exponentiations in Z∗n2 due to the Paillier
encryption used, by kexpZ∗
n2
.
Entity Algorithm Computational Cost
User CLS.Sign 16expG1 + 15expZn2 + 1hash
Verifier
CLS.Verify 12expG1 + 11expZn2 + 1hash + 2pair
CLS.Blind 6expG1
CLS.Unblind 2expG1
Converter CLS.Convert 7kexpG1
(k pseudonyms input )
Table 4.1: Computational costs for our CLS–DDH instantiation
4.5.3 Pseudonym and Signature Length
We provide the sizes of pseudonyms and signatures in terms of the number of group
elements in Table 4.2. We denote the length required to represent k elements in G1 as
kG1, k outputs of a hash function as kH, and k elements in Z∗n2 , due to the Paillier
encryption used, as kZ∗n2 .
Pseudonym Signature
Original Blinded Converted Unblinded and
µ cµ cµ Converted µ σ
2G1 3G1 2G1 1G1 3G1 6Zp 1H 6Z∗n2
Table 4.2: Size of pseudonyms and signatures for our CLS–DDH instantiation
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a new form of group signatures that support flexible
and controlled linkability. Data can be collected in an authenticated and fully unlinkable
form, whilst still allowing the data to be obliviously relinked by queries to a central entity.
We have formalised the required security properties in a dynamic model and proposed
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an efficient scheme that satisfies these requirement under discrete logarithm and Paillier
assumptions in the random oracle model.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces commuting group signatures, which allow group signatures to be
blinded whilst remaining publicly verifiable. We present a formal security model for this
new primitive and a construction that provably satisfies this model.
5.1.1 Motivation and Background
The opener in standard group signatures is the central entity that is invoked when a
signature is de-anonymised. As discussed earlier, this role poses a privacy risk, as the
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opener learns all messages and identities of users whose signatures are under dispute.
Commuting group signatures mitigate this by realising the opening obliviously. We model
blinding by introducing another type of entity — the data processors P. When requesting
signatures to be opened, the signature and message get blinded under P’s key and the
opener returns a blinded user identity that only the data processor can unblind. The
commuting aspect — following the notation of commuting signatures by Fuchsbauer [66]—
is used to preserve the validity of a group signature during the various blinding operations.
A data processor may entrust a data lake to collect and store data for them. The data
lake should not be able to see the messages and user identities, however they should still
be able to check that they hold valid user data suitable for processing. Commuting group
signatures allow a user to sign data and blind messages under the key of a trusted data
processor. The data lake can still verify these blinded signatures, and pass them on to the
data processor on request. The data processor can then unblind the messages/ signatures.
If the data processor wishes to know the correlation of data by user, they can request that
the opener obliviously opens these signatures.
Commuting group signatures can also be used as a building block in the context of group
signatures with selective linkability. The fact that the blinded signatures can be verified,
allows the converter to check inputs are well formed. This means we no longer need
the honest–but–curious assumption for the verifier. This also allows authentication to
be preserved, provided we still assume that the converter is honest–but–curious. This is
because, the converter can attest that their inputs were valid blinded group signatures.
Assuming that the converter is honest–but–curious this ensures that their output originates
from valid user data and has been honestly blinded and converted.
5.1.2 Existing Work
Verifiably encrypted signatures [22] allow a signer to sign a message, encrypt the signature
and prove that this is an encryption of a valid signature. In [66], commuting signatures
were introduced that provide a verifiably encrypted signature on an encrypted message,
starting from either an unencrypted message–signature tuple, or an encrypted message.
Commuting group signatures similarly prove that there exists a valid group signature on an
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encrypted message. Therefore, as in commuting signatures [66], data is publicly verifiable
even when encrypted.
5.1.3 Our Contribution
We formally define the functionality and security requirements of commuting group sig-
natures, adapting the standard notions of anonymity, traceability and non-frameability of
group signatures to this blinded setting.
We then build a construction that provably satisfies these requirements. At a high level:
a user’s and issuer’s key pair is each a signing and verification key of an automorphic
signature scheme [65]. When joining the group, the issuer signs the user’s verification
key, yielding the user’s membership credential. During signing, the user encrypts its
verification key under the opener’s public key, and proves knowledge of a valid automorphic
signature on the message with respect to this verification key, as well as knowledge of a
valid credential for this key.
In order to blind signatures for opening while preserving their verifiability, we use zero-
knowledge proofs that are controlled malleable [45], which can be realised with Groth-Sahai
proofs [77]. This allows the signature and message to be encrypted under a blinding key
and the proof transformed accordingly. Because the malleability is controlled, this does
not affect the unforgeability of the signatures.
Finally, we prove that our construction is secure based on the DDH assumption, and the
security of the automorphic signatures and the controlled malleable NIZKs.
5.2 Chapter Preliminaries
We now present all building blocks and assumptions that are needed for our CGS con-
struction. We use ElGamal encryption as a chosen–plaintext secure, re-randomisable and
homomorphic encryption scheme, and standard proof protocols, as defined in Chapter 2.
We also use automorphic signatures [65] and controlled malleable proof protocols.
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5.2.1 Automorphic Signatures
An automorphic signature [65] over a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2) is an EUF–
cma secure signature whose verification keys are contained in the message space. Moreover,
the messages and signatures consist of elements ofG1 andG2, and the verification predicate
is a conjunction of pairing-product equations over the verification key, the message and
the signature. They consist of the following algorithms:
• ASetup(1τ ) outputs the parameters for the signature scheme paramauto.
• AKeyGen(paramauto) on input the parameters, outputs a public verification key and
a secret signing key, (apk, ask).
• ASign(ask,m) on input a signing key and message, outputs a signature Ω.
• AVerify(Ω, apk,m): checks that Ω is a valid signature on m under apk.
We now present the automorphic signature scheme [65] that will be used in our concrete
instantiation. We have rewritten the scheme so that the message is an element of G1 and
the verification key is an element of G2. This can be done analogously so that the message
is an element of G2 and the verification key is an element of G1.
ASetup(1τ )
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), F,K, T ←$G1 return ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), F,K, T )
AKeyGen(paramauto)
ask←$Z∗p, apk ← gask2 return (apk, ask)
ASign(ask,M)
r, c←$Z∗p, A← (K · T r ·M)1/(ask+c), C ← F c, D ← gc2, R← gr1, S ← gr2 return (A,C,D,R, S)
AVerify(Ω, apk,M)
Check e(A, apk ·D) = e(K ·M, g2)e(T, S), e(C, g2) = e(F,D), e(R, g2) = e(g1, S)
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5.2.2 Controlled Malleable NIZKs
A controlled malleable proof [45] for a relation R and transformation class T , which gives
the set of allowed transformations, consists of three algorithms constituting a regular
non-interactive proof:
• CRSSetup(1τ ): generates a common reference string σcrs.
• P(σcrs, x, w): takes as input the common reference string σcrs, as a well as a statement
x and a witness such that (x,w) ∈ R, and outputs a proof pi.
• V(σcrs, x, pi): takes as input the common reference string σcrs, as a well as a statement
x, and a proof pi and outputs 1 if pi is valid, and 0 otherwise.
As detailed in Chapter 2, such a proof is called zero–knowledge (NIZK) if there exists a
PPT simulator (S1, S2) such that an adversary can’t distinguish between proofs formed
by the prover and proofs formed by the simulator; and a proof of knowledge (NIZKPoK)
if there exists a PPT extractor (E1, E2) that can produce a valid witness from any valid
proof. The fourth algorithm, specific to malleable proof systems, is:
• ZKEval(σcrs, T, x, pi): which, on input σcrs, a transformation T = (Tinst, Twit) (in some
transformation class T ), an instance x, and a proof pi, outputs a mauled proof pi′
for instance Tinst(x).
The controlled-malleable simulation-sound extractability requirement reconciles malleabil-
ity with simulation-sound extractability [52, 75] and requires that, for any instance x, if
an adversary can produce a valid proof pi that x ∈ R then an extractor can extract from
pi either a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R or a previously proved instance x′ and transfor-
mation T ∈ T such that x = Tinst(x′). This guarantees that any proof that the adversary
produces is either generated from scratch using a valid witness, or formed by applying a
transformation from the class T to an existing proof.
Definition 5.1. Let (CRSSetup,P,V,ZKEval) be a NIZKPoK system for an efficient rela-
tion R, with a simulator (S1, S2) and an extractor (SE1, E2). Let T be an allowable set of
unary transformations for the relation R such that membership in T is efficiently testable.
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Let SE1 be an algorithm that, on input (1
τ ), outputs (σcrs, τs, τe) such that (σcrs, τs) is
distributed identically to the output of S1. Consider the following game with adversary
A:
• Step 1. (σcrs, τs, τe)←$SE1(1τ )
• Step 2. (x, pi)←$AS2(σcrs,τs,·)(σcrs, τe)
• Step 3. (w, x′, T )← E2(σcrs, τe, x, pi).
The proof system satisfies controlled-malleable simulation-sound extractability (CM-SSE)
with respect to T if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function negl such
that the probability (over the choices of SE1, A, and S2) that V(σcrs, x, pi) = 1 and
(x, pi) /∈ Q (where Q is the set of queried statements and their responses) but either:
• w 6=⊥ and (x,w) /∈ R;
• (x′, T ) 6= (⊥,⊥) and either x′ /∈ Qinst (the set of queried instances), x 6= Tinst(x′), or
T /∈ T ;
• (w, x′, T ) = (⊥,⊥,⊥);
is at most negl(τ).
In [45] strong derivation privacy for such proofs is also defined. This ensures simulated
proofs are indistinguishable from those formed via a transformation.
Definition 5.2. For a malleable NIZK (CRSSetup,P,V,ZKEval) with an associated sim-
ulator (S1, S2), a given adversary A, and bit b, let pAb (τ) be the probability of the event
that b′ = 1 in the following game:
• Step 1. (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ );
• Step 2. (state, x1, pi1, ..., xq, piq, T )←$A(σcrs, τs);
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• Step 3. If V(σcrs, xi, pii) = 0 for some i, (x1, · · · , xq) is not in the domain of Tinst, or
T /∈ T , abort and output ⊥. Otherwise, form
pi←$

S2(σcrs, τs, Tinst(x1, · · · , xq)), if b = 0
ZKEval(σcrs, T, {xi, pii}i∈[q]), if b = 1
• Step 4. b′←$A(state, pi).
The proof system is strongly derivation private if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a
negligible function negl such that |pA0 (τ)− pA1 (k)| < negl(τ).
Putting these two definitions together, a cm-NIZK is defined to be a proof system that is
CM-SSE, strongly derivation private, and zero–knowledge.
A cm-NIZK Construction We now present the construction given in [45] that provably
satisfies the above definitions. Let R be an efficient relation, and suppose T is an allowable
set of transformations for R that contains the identity transformation; suppose further
that membership in T is efficiently testable.
Let (SigKGen,Sign,Verify) be a structure preserving signature scheme that is EUF-cma
secure as defined in Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4. Let (CRSSetupWI,PWI,VWI,ZKEvalWI) be a
non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge (NIWIPoK), as defined in Sec-
tion 2.6.1, for the relation: ((x, vk), (w, x′, T,Ω)) ∈ RWI if (x,w) ∈ R or Verify(vk,Ω, x′) =
1, x = Tinst(x
′), and T ∈ T . We also require the NIWIPoK to be derivation pri-
vate with respect to RWI and a set of transformations TWI such that for every T ′ =
(T ′inst, T
′
wit) ∈ T there exists a TWI(T ′) ∈ TWI. For TWI(T ′) = (Tinst,WI, Twit,WI) we require
that Tinst,WI(x, vk) = (T
′
inst(x), vk), and Twit,WI(w, x
′, T,Ω) = (T ′wit(w), x
′, T ′ ◦ T,Ω).
The cm-NIZK is defined as follows:
• CRSSetup(1τ ): Generate σcrs,WI←$CRSSetupWI(1τ ) and (vk, sk)←$ SigKGen(1τ ), out-
put σcrs = (σcrs,WI, vk).
• P(σcrs, x, w): Output pi←$PWI(σcrs,WI, xWI, wWI), where xWI = (x, vk) and wWI =
(w,⊥,⊥,⊥).
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• V(σcrs, x, pi): Output VWI(σcrs,WI, xWI, pi) where xWI = (x, vk).
• ZKEval(σcrs, T, x, pi): Output ZKEvalWI(σcrs,WI, TWI(T ), xWI, pi) where xWI = (x, vk).
Instantiation In [45] it is shown that Groth Sahai proofs [77] can be used to instantiate
the derivation private NIWIPoKs used in this construction, and a structure preserving
signature was identified [44].
5.3 Definition and Security Model for Commuting Group
Signatures
In this section we first introduce the syntax and generic functionality of commuting group
signatures CGS and then present the desirable security and privacy properties for such
schemes.
The entities involved in a commuting group signature scheme are an issuer I, a set of
users U = {uidi}, an opener O, and — additionally — data processors P. Once joining the
group via the issuer I, a user can either sign as in standard group signatures, or output
blinded signatures directly (with respect to the blinding public key of P). Standard
signatures and attached messages can also be blinded afterwards. Opening can be done
for both standard group signatures and blinded ones, where it returns the user identity
in plain and in blinded form respectively. Signatures, messages, or user identities that
are blinded can only be retrieved by the designated data processor P. Our model allows
for several data processors. However, the blinding public key must be input to CGS.Sign.
This enables users, and only them, to choose their preferred and trusted data processor,
but also limits the flexibility as they have to be chosen at the moment the signatures are
created.
5.3.1 Syntax of CGS
Definition 5.3 (CGS). A commuting group signature CGS scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
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Setup and Key Generation. We refer to (param, ipk, opk) as the group public key
gpk, and BK as the public/ private key space induced by CGS.BKGen.
CGS.Setup(1τ )→ param on input the security parameter 1τ , outputs param, the public
parameters for the scheme.
CGS.IKGen(param)→ (ipk, isk) performed by the issuer I; outputs the issuer secret key
isk, and the issuing public key ipk.
CGS.OKGen(param)→ (opk, osk) performed by the opener O; outputs the opener secret
key osk, and the opener public key opk.
CGS.BKGen(param)→ (bpk, bsk) performed by a data processor P; outputs a blinding
secret key, bsk, and blinding public key, bpk.
Join, Sign and Verify. As in dynamic group signatures, a user joins via the issuer, and
they can then sign standard and blinded signatures. In contrast to the model for standard
group signatures [14], we split the signature into a pseudonym µ and a signature σ, for ease
of notation. All group signatures following the predominant Sign-Encrypt-Prove paradigm
can be matched to this notation.
CGS.UKGen(param)→ (usk[uid],upk[uid]) a user generates their own secret key
usk[uid] and their user public key upk[uid].
〈CGS.Join(gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid]),CGS.Issue(isk, gpk,upk[uid])〉 a user uid joins the
group by engaging in an interactive protocol with the issuer I. The user uid and
issuer I perform algorithms CGS.Join and CGS.Issue respectively. These are input
a state and an incoming message respectively, and output an updated state, an
outgoing message, and a decision, either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to
CGS.Join is the group public key, gpk, their user secret key usk[uid], and user public
key upk[uid], whereas the initial input to CGS.Issue is the issuer secret key, isk, the
issuer public key ipk and user public key upk[uid]. If the user uid accepts, CGS.Join
has a private output of gsk[uid].
CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)→ (µ, σ) performed by the user with identifier uid, with
input the group public key gpk, blinding public key bpk, the user’s secret key
gsk[uid], and a message m; outputs a pseudonym µ and signature σ.
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CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)→ {0, 1} performed by a verifier; outputs 1 if σ is a valid
signature on m for pseudonym µ under the group public key gpk and blinding public
key bpk, and 0 otherwise.
Blinding. A successfully joined user can also create blinded group signatures directly,
where blinding is done with respect to bpk. Anyone knowing a standard group signature
can also blind it for the particular data processor. Importantly, despite being fully blinded,
the correctness of these signatures can still be verified.
CGS.BlindSign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)→ (c, cµ, cσ) performed by the user with identifier
uid with input the group public key gpk, including the blinding public key bpk, the
user’s secret key gsk[uid], and a message m; outputs a blinded message, pseudonym,
and signature.
CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk)→ cupk performed on input a user public key upk, and the
blinding public key bpk; outputs a blinded user public key.
CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)→ (c, cµ, cσ) performed by the verifiers with input the group
public key gpk including the blinding public key bpk, a message m, a pseudonym µ
and a signature σ; outputs a blinded message, pseudonym, and signature.
CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ)→ {0, 1} performed by a verifier; outputs 1 if cσ is a
valid blinded signature on c for pseudonym cµ under the group public key gpk, and
0 otherwise.
Opening and Unblinding. Both standard and blinded group signatures can be de-
anonymised by the opener O, which outputs a plain user public key and a blinded one
respectively. The unblinding of user public keys or messages can be done with the corre-
sponding bsk only.
CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ)→ {upk,⊥} performed by the opener O, on input their
opening secret key, a message m, pseudonym µ and signature σ; outputs a user
public key or a failure symbol ⊥.
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CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ)→ {cupk,⊥} performed by the opener O, on in-
put their opening secret key, and a blinded message c, pseudonym cµ and signature
cσ; outputs a blinded user public key or a failure symbol ⊥.
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk)→ upk on input a blinded user public key cupk, and the
blinding secret key bsk, outputs a user public key.
CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c)→ m on input a blinded message c, and the blinding secret key
bsk; outputs the message m.
Re–randomisation. When used in privacy-preserving protocols, such as the CLS+
scheme presented in Chapter 6, it may be useful if both types of signatures can be re-
randomised, which we therefore make explicit here. When re-randomising blinded signa-
tures, the algorithm also refreshes the blinded message. Sometimes we do not need the
full tuple c, cµ, cσ to be re-randomised and omit the unnecessary outputs for brevity.
CGS.RRand(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)→ (µ′, σ′) performed by a verifier, on input the group pub-
lic key, the blinding public key, and a message m, pseudonym µ and signature σ;
outputs a re-randomised pseudonym and signature.
CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ)→ (c′, cµ′, cσ′) performed by a verifier, on input the
group public key, the blinding public key, and a blinded message c, pseudonym cµ and
signature cσ; outputs a re-randomised blinded message, pseudonym and signature.
5.3.2 Security Properties of CGS
Like standard dynamic group signatures [14], commuting group signatures must satisfy
the anonymity, traceability and non–frameability requirements. However, the anonymity
requirement must now take the blinding capabilities into account, and capture the opening
of blinded signatures and its impact in particular. Likewise, as blinded signatures can still
be verified against the group public key, the traceability and non-frameability requirements
must be extended as well. Finally, we additionally require that blinded signatures cannot
be linked to the signature before blinding, which we formalise in the blindness definition.
155
5.3 Definition and Security Model for Commuting Group Signatures
Oracles and State. Our security notions make use a number of oracles: ADDU, SNDU,
SNDI, SIGN, OPEN, BOPEN, which keep joint state.
We present the detailed description of these oracles in Figure 5.1 and an overview of them
and their maintained records. We do not provide oracles for all of the CGS algorithms,
however we require that they are indistinguishable from algorithms we do capture in our
security model.
ADDU (join of honest user and honest issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and internally runs a join protocol between the honest user and honest issuer. At
the end, the honest user’s secret key gsk[uid] and public key upk[uid] are generated,
and from then on signing/ opening queries for uid will be allowed.
SNDU (join of honest user and corrupt issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and runs the join protocol on behalf of uid with the corrupt issuer. If the join
session completes, the oracle will store the user’s secret key gsk[uid], and public key
upk[uid].
SNDI (join of corrupt user and honest issuer) Runs the join protocol on behalf of
the honest issuer with corrupt users. If the issue session completes, upk[uid] will be
stored. For joins of honest users, the ADDU oracle must be used.
SIGN This oracle returns signatures for honest users that have successfully joined (via
ADDU or SNDU, depending on the game).
OPEN This oracle opens standard signatures, and outputs a user public key.
BOPEN This oracle opens blinded signatures, and outputs a blinded user public key.
All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state:
HUL List of uids of honest users, initially set to ∅. New honest users can be added by
queries to the ADDU oracle (when the issuer is honest) or SNDU oracle (when the
issuer is corrupt).
CUL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group, initially set to ∅. New
corrupt users can be added through the SNDI oracle if the issuer is honest. If the
issuer is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
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ADDU(uid)
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥
(usk[uid],upk[uid])←$CGS.UKGen(param)
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥
decuid ← cont, stuidJoin ← (gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid])
stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk,upk[uid])
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CGS.Join(stuidJoin,⊥)
while decuid = cont
(stuidIssue,MJoin,dec
uid)←$CGS.Issue(stuidIssue,MIssue)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CGS.Join(stuidJoin,MJoin)
if decuid = accept
gsk[uid]← stuidJoin,
return (accept,upk[uid])
SNDI(uid,Min, upk)
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CUL
CUL← CUL ∪ {uid},upk[uid]← upk
decuid ← cont, stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk, upk)
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
(stuidIssue,Mout,dec
uid)←$CGS.Issue(stuidIssue,Min)
return (Mout,dec
uid)
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, bpk)}
return (σ, µ)
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
(usk[uid],upk[uid])←$CGS.UKGen(param)
return (upk[uid], cont)
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidJoin undefined st
uid
Join ← (gpk,usk[uid],upk[uid])
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$CGS.Join(stuidJoin,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return (Mout,dec
uid)
OPEN(m,µ, σ, bpk)
upk ← CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ)
if m = m∗ and upk = upk[uid∗d] for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else return upk
BOPEN(c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
upk ← CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ)
m← CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c), upk ← CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, upk)
if m = m∗ and upk = upk[uid∗d] for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
else return upk
Figure 5.1: Oracles used in our CGS security model
SL List of (uid,m, bpk) tuples requested from the SIGN oracle.
Correctness. The standard signature scheme should be correct as in the original defini-
tion for dynamic group signatures [14]. We further need to ensure that honestly generated
blinded signatures verify and open correctly, and that the blinding can be reversed.
The game defining the correctness requirements for commuting group signatures is given
in Figure 5.2.
Definition 5.4 (Correctness). A commuting group signature scheme CGS satisfies cor-
rectness if for all adversaries A: Pr[ExpcorrA,CGS(τ) = 1] = 0.
Commutative Behaviour of CGS. Our model now contains a multitude of algorithms,
essentially providing all functionality for blinded as well as for unblinded inputs. To avoid
a complexity blow-up in the security games, we require the indistinguishability of certain
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Experiment: ExpcorrA,CGS(τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bsk, bpk)←$CGS.BKGen(param),CUL,HUL← ∅, gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(uid,m)←$AADDU(gpk), if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
(µ, σ)←$CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m), if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return 1
upk ← CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ), if upk[uid] 6= upk return 1
(c, cµ, cσ)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpkm, µ, σ)
if CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = 0 return 1
if CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c) 6= m return 1
upk′ ← CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
if upk 6= upk′ return 1
Figure 5.2: Game defining correctness for CGS
operations, or in fact their commutative behaviour.
First, we require that directly blinded signatures are indistinguishable from standard ones
that were blinded later:
CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, (CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m))) ≈
CGS.BlindSign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m).
Likewise, outputs of CGS.BlindUser must be indistinguishable from the output of
CGS.OpenBlind on a valid blinded signature with the same public key:
CGS.BlindUser(bpk, (CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ))) ≈
CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ).
Further, we want that verification and opening of blinded signatures
(c, cµ, cσ)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) must yield the same result as their unblind coun-
terparts for (µ, σ)←$CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m):
CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ)) =
CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ).
The full requirements for the commutative behaviour of CGS are given in Figure 5.3. They
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Experiment: Expindbsign-bA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(uid,m, µ, σ, bpk)←$AADDU(gpk, isk, osk)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ or CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return 0
(c0, cµ0, cσ0)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ), (c′1, cµ′1, cσ′1)←$CGS.BlindSign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
b∗←$A(cb, cµb, cσb), return b∗
Experiment: Expindbuser-bA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(m,µ, σ, bpk)←$A(gpk, isk, osk), if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return 0
cupk0 ← CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk,CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ))
cupk1←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk,CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ))
b∗←$A(cupkb), return b∗
Experiment: ExpindbverifA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(m,µ, σ, bpk)←$A(gpk, isk, osk), (c, cµ, cσ)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) 6= CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bsk,CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)) return 1
if CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ) 6= CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.3: Games defining commutative behaviour of CGS
allow us to omit redundant oracles and simplify our model.
Definition 5.5 (Commutative Behaviour of CGS). A commuting group signature scheme
CGS satisfies commutative behaviour of CGS if for all ppt adversaries A the following
advantages are negligible in τ : |Pr[Expindbsign−0A,CGS (τ) = 1] − Pr[Expindbsign−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]|,
|Pr[Expindbuser−0A,CGS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expindbuser−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]|, and Pr[ExpindbverifA,CGS (τ) = 1].
Anonymity. This requirement ensures that group signatures cannot be de-anonymised
by an adversary that has corrupted the issuer and data processor, but not the opener.
The adversary has access to the opener, which they can query now on standard signatures
as well as on blinded ones (via the BOPEN oracle). Opening blinded inputs might seem a
risky choice, as it might lead to trivial wins by blinding and re-randomising the challenge
signature. To avoid this, we opt for an RCCA-version of the classic (CCA) anonymity
notion, and let the BOPEN oracle check whether it was queried on a blinded signature
that opens to either of the challenge users and the challenge message, and abort in such
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cases. In order to do so, the adversary must also provide the blinding key pair to the
oracle. The key pair is first checked for correctness and then used to unblind the blinded
message and user identity.
The indistinguishability requirement of CGS.BlindSign ≈ CGS.Blind(CGS.Sign) ensures that
this requirement also covers the anonymity of signatures originated from CGS.BlindSign.
Definition 5.6 (CGS Anonymity). A commuting group signature scheme CGS satisfies
anonymity if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, the following advantage is negligible
in τ : ∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−0A,CGS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expanon-bA,CGS(τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, bpk)←$ASNDU,SIGN,OPEN,BOPEN(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return 0
(µ∗, σ∗)←$CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid∗b ],m∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,OPEN,BOPEN(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗) return b∗
Blindness. This requirement ensures that blinded group signatures and messages cannot
be linked to the group signature and message they originate from, when the issuer and
opener are corrupted. We also capture that CGS.BlindUser securely blinds user public
keys. As the adversary has corrupted the issuer and opener, and this property does not
distinguish between honest and corrupted users, we do not provide them with any oracle
access.
Definition 5.7 (CGS Blindness). A commuting group signature scheme CGS satisfies
blindness if for all polynomial–time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in
τ : ∣∣∣Pr[Expblind−0A,CGS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expblind−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
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Experiment: Expblind−bA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
(c∗, cµ∗, σ∗)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,mb, µb, σb)), cupk←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkb)
b∗←$A(guess, st, cupk, c∗, cµ∗, σ∗) return b∗
Traceability. This requirement ensures that group signatures can always be traced to a
user identifier from a join session. Here the adversary can corrupt the opener and data
processor, but not the issuer. We formulate this property for blinded signatures only, but
the guarantees carry over to standard ones as well, due to the commutative behaviour of
CGS.BlindVerify(CGS.Blind) = CGS.Verify and
CGS.UnblindUser(CGS.OpenBlind) = CGS.Open.
That is, if an adversary could forge a standard group signature that does not trace to a
join session, then it could blind this signature and so forge a valid blinded group signature
(as required by the experiment).
Definition 5.8 (CGS Traceability). A commuting group signature scheme CGS scheme
satisfies traceability if for all polynomial–time adversaries A the advantage
Pr[ExptraceA,CGS(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExptraceA,CGS(τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, osk), if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return 0
upk ← CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = 1 and
@uid ∈ CUL ∪ HUL such that upk[uid] = upk
Non–frameability. This requirement ensures that an adversary that has corrupted all
central entities, i.e., the opener, data processors and issuer, cannot frame an honest user.
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Our game requires the adversary to output blinded values but again, due to the com-
mutative behaviour, this requirement also captures non-frameability for standard group
signatures.
Definition 5.9 (CGS Non–frameability). A commuting group signature scheme CGS sat-
isfies non–frameability if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage
Pr[ExpnonframeA,CGS (τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExpnonframeA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(uid, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗, bpk, bsk)←$ASNDU,SIGN(gpk, isk, osk)
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗) = 1 and (bpk, bsk) ∈ BK
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗)) = upk[uid] where uid ∈ HUL
and (uid,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c∗), bpk) /∈ SL
Indistinguishability of Re–randomisable Signatures. If the standard and blinded
group signatures should have the additional capability to be re-randomisable, we formalise
the security of that operation through an indistinguishability game, requiring that re-
randomised signatures and fresh signatures are indistinguishable from each other. Such
indistinguishability is used in our CLS+ security proof, given in Chapter 6, to allow for
the simulation of the convert oracle.
This requirement is not implied by the anonymity and blindness requirements. Consider a
construction that satisfies both blindness and anonymity. If this construction was adjusted
so that standard signatures include a counter which indicates how many times it has
been re-randomised (this counter would otherwise be ignored in verification, blinding and
opening), the resulting construction would still satisfy both anonymity and blindness. For
both the anonymity and blindness games, given an adversary A′ that breaks the new
construction, an adversary A could be constructed to break the original construction.
In the case of anonymity, A provides the same inputs to A′ that they receive, except that
a counter of 0 will be added to signatures returned by SIGN and in the guessing phase. If
A′ guesses correctly then A will guess correctly. In the case of blindness, A will provide A′
with the same inputs in the choosing phase. The two signatures returned by A′ will include
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a counter, but this can simply be removed by A. The resulting signature returned to A will
be distributed identically to those in the blindness game for the new construction, as the
counter is ignored by blinding. Therefore all inputs to A′ are distributed correctly and so
if A′ guesses correctly A will guess correctly. Therefore a construction that clearly would
not satisfy indistinguishability of re-randomised and fresh standard signatures, does satisfy
anonymity and blindness. The same argument also holds for the indistinguishability of
re-randomised and fresh blinded signatures.
Experiment: Exprrand−bA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk),HUL, CUL← ∅
(st, uid,m, µ, σ, bpk)←$ASNDU,USK(gpk, isk, osk)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ or CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ) 6= upk[uid] return 0
if b = 0 (µ′, σ′)←$CGS.RRand(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
if b = 1 (µ′, σ′)←$CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
b∗←$A(st, µ′, σ′) return b∗
Experiment: Expblindrrand−bA,CGS (τ)
param←$CGS.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, opk),HUL, CUL← ∅
(st, uid, c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)←$ASNDU,USK(gpk, isk, osk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK or uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
if CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ) 6= upk[uid] return 0
if b = 0 (c′, cµ′, cσ′)←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ)
if b = 1 (c′, cµ′, cσ′)←$CGS.BlindSign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c))
b∗←$A(st, c′, cµ′, cσ′) return b∗
Definition 5.10 (Re–randomisable). A commuting group signature scheme CGS scheme
is re-randomisable if for all polynomial–time adversaries A the following advantages are
negligible in τ : ∣∣∣Pr[Exprrand−0A,CGS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Exprrand−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣
and
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∣∣∣Pr[Expblindrrand−0A,CGS (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expblindrrand−1A,CGS (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
5.4 Our CGS Construction
To build our CGS–cmNIZK construction for commuting group signatures, we make use of
automorphic signatures, ElGamal encryption and controlled malleable NIZKs. Automor-
phic signatures are structure-preserving signatures, for which the verification key space
is contained within the message space. Controlled-malleable NIZKs allow proofs to be
mauled to take into account a transformation of the instance, as long as this transfor-
mation is within an allowable set. This allows signatures to be blinded, but because the
malleability is controlled the unforgeability properties are still satisfied.
High–level Idea. The issuer’s key pair is the signing and verification key of an auto-
morphic signature [65], which we recall in Section 5.2, and the opening key is an ElGamal
encryption key pair. When joining the group, a user first generates a signing and verifi-
cation key of an automorphic signature, which will be their secret and public key. The
issuer then signs the user’s public key to form a credential, which is possible due to the
automorphic property.
When a user signs m, they encrypt their public key under the opening public key – which
forms a pseudonym – and “normally” sign the message using the automorphic signature.
The latter is never revealed, but gets used only in a proof of knowledge. More precisely,
using a cm-NIZK, the user proves knowledge of a signature of m under its public key, an
issuer’s credential on its public key and correctness of the pseudonym.
During blinding, the pseudonym is re-randomised, and an extra layer of encryption under
the blinding public key is added. The message is also encrypted under the blinding public
key. The malleability of the cm-NIZK is then used to update the signature. The pseudonym
can be opened by decrypting under the opening secret key – both in plain and blinded
form. Finally, messages and opened pseudonyms can be unblinded by decrypting with the
blinding secret key. The bpk must be fixed in signing, as it must be part of the statement
proved by the cm-NIZK to allow for the proof to be transformed in blinding. This is because
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cm-NIZKs are defined for relations that are closed under all allowable transformations.
Additional Structural Assumptions of Automorphic Signatures. We make the
following assumptions satisfied by our concrete instantiation which we present later. The
automorphic signature scheme can be simplified so either messages are elements of G1 and
the verification key is an element of G2, in which case we will refer to (ASetup1,AKeyGen1,
ASign1,AVerify1), or messages are elements of G2 and the verification key is an element of
G1, in which case we will refer to (ASetup2,AKeyGen2,ASign2,AVerify2). We also assume
our automorphic signatures are in the type–3 setting, ASetup takes as input the bilinear
group, and that the signing key sk and verification key vk are of the form sk ∈ Z∗p and
vk = gskj when vk ∈ Gj .
5.4.1 Detailed Description of our CGS–cmNIZK Construction
Setup and Key Generation. In CGS.Setup, parameters for the automorphic signature
scheme, ElGamal encryption scheme and cm-NIZKs are formed. The issuing secret and
public key is set to be the signing and verification key of an automorphic signature. The
opening secret and public keys are ElGamal decryption and encryption keys in G2, and
the blinding secret and public keys are ElGamal decryption and encryption keys in both
G1 and G2 .
CGS.Setup(1τ )
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, σcrs←$CRSSetup(1τ )
return ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
CGS.IKGen(param)
(ipk, isk)←$AKeyGen2(paramauto2) return (ipk, isk)
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CGS.OKGen(param)
osk←$Z∗p, opk ← gˆosk
return (opk, osk)
CGS.BKGen(param)
bsk1, bsk2←$Z∗p, bpk1 ← gbsk1 , bpk2 ← gˆbsk2
return ((bpk1, bpk2), (bsk1, bsk2))
Join. To join the group, the user first generates a key pair (usk, upk) for an automorphic
signature and then obtains an issuer’s signature on their public key upk. The user must
first prove knowledge of usk with an SPK. However, the knowledge soundness of of this
SPK is not required in any of our security proofs. This is because our security model, like
the standard model for dynamic group signatures [14], ensures that even the issuer cannot
frame an honest user. Therefore if an adversary could complete a join protocol fully on
behalf of another user, without knowing the associated secret key, they still cannot forge
signatures. However, even if impersonating another user in the join protocol does not lead
to a forgery, it could still lead to a denial of service attack, and so we include the SPK.
CGS.UKGen(param)
return (upk, usk)←$AKeyGen1(paramauto1)
U .CGS.Join(gpk, usk, upk) 
 I.CGS.Issue(isk, gpk, upk)
choose n←$ {0, 1}τff n
pijoin←$ SPK{usk : upk = gusk2 }(n)
-
pijoin
Verify pijoin with respect to upk
cred←$ASign2(isk, upk)
ff cred
check that
AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1
upk′ ← gusk1 return
gsk[uid]← (usk, upk, upk′, cred),
Figure 5.4: Join protocol of our CGS–cmNIZK construction
Sign and Verification of standard group signatures. When signing a message m
under the signing key gsk[uid] = (usk, upk, upk′, cred), the user’s public key is encrypted
under the opening public key. By setting µ2 = 1, µ can also be seen as an encryption
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under the blinding key with encryption randomness 0. The tuple (1,m) can also be seen
as an encryption of m under the blinding key with encryption randomness 0. This is
necessary so that blinding encryption can be added by “re-randomising” these ciphertexts
in CGS.Blind, while maintaining the capability to update the associated proof. This is
because cm-NIZKs are defined for relations that are closed under all allowable transforma-
tions and so encryption under the blinding key must be included during signing to allow
for the later blinding of the signature. The user then signs m with their user secret key
to output Ω.
The signature is never output, but instead a cm-NIZK is computed which proves that µ is
an encryption of upk, c is an “encryption” of m (with randomness 0), and knowledge of a
correct Ω. The latter comprises showing that Ω is a valid signature on m under upk, and
knowledge of a membership credential cred that is a valid signature on upk under ipk.
More formally we define the relation R such that ((opk, bpk1, bpk2, ipk, µ, c),
(upk′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , g
β
1 , g
γ
2 ,m)) ∈ R if and only if:
e(g1, µ1) = e(g
α
1 , gˆ), e(g1, µ2) = e(g
β
1 , gˆ), and (5.1)
e(g1, µ3) = e(g1, upk)e(g
α
1 , opk)e(g
β
1 , bpk2), and (5.2)
AVerify1(Ω, upk,m) = 1, AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1, and (5.3)
e(c1, g2) = e(g, g
γ
2 ), e(c2, g2) = e(m, g2)e(bpk1, g
γ
2 ), and (5.4)
e(upk′, g2) = e(g1, upk). (5.5)
These checks ensure that a pseudonym is the ElGamal encryption of the upk under the
blinding and opening key (5.1,5.2), the ciphertext c is an ElGamal encryption of the
message under the blinding key (5.4), Ω is a valid signature under the user public key on
the message (5.3), the credential is a valid signature under the issuing public key on the
user public key (5.3), and that upk′ = gusk1 (5.5).
We define the allowable set of transformations to be:
T = {(renc1, renc2, renc3) : renc1, renc2, renc3 ∈ Zp},
such that for T = (renc1, renc2, renc3), the transformation
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Tinst(opk, bpk, ipk, µ, c) =
(opk, bpk, ipk, (µ1gˆ
renc1 , µ2gˆ
renc2 , µ3 · opkrenc1bpkrenc22 ), (c1grenc3 , c2bpkrenc31 )),
and Twit(upk
′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , g
β
1 , g
γ
2 ,m) =
(upk′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 g
renc1
1 , g
β
1 g
renc2
1 , g
γ
2g
renc3
2 ,m).
We show later that this relation and transformation can be instantiated as a cm-NIZK.
We note that upk′ is only included as a witness, to allow for the extractability requirement
necessary for the building of a CLS+ scheme, as shown in Chapter 6. This requirement
ensures that if a valid blinded signature does not open to a user public key that was
input to a simulator, upk′ can be extracted. If this is not necessary, upk′ can be removed,
which will not affect the security of the scheme. In Chapter 6, we define the extractability
property and show that this construction satisfies it.
In more detail, CGS.Sign and CGS.Verify are defined as follows:
CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
parse gsk[uid] = (usk, upk, upk′, cred), α←$Z∗p, (µ1, µ2, µ3)← (gˆα, 1, upk · opkα)
β ← 0, γ ← 0, c← (1,m),Ω←$ASign1(usk,m)
σ←$ cm-NIZK{(upk′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , gβ1 , gγ2 ,m) : e(g1, µ1) = e(gα1 , gˆ)∧
e(g1, µ2) = e(g
β
1 , gˆ) ∧ e(g1, µ3) = e(g1, upk)e(gα1 , opk)e(gβ1 , bpk2)∧
AVerify1(Ω, upk,m) = 1 ∧ AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1 ∧ e(c1, g2) = e(g, gγ2 )∧
e(c2, g2) = e(m, g2)e(bpk1, g
γ
2 ) ∧ e(upk′, g2) = e(g1, upk)} return ((µ1, µ2, µ3), σ)
CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
Check µ2 = 1 ,Verify σ with respect to (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, (1,m))
Blinding and blind verification. During blinding, the pseudonym and message are
encrypted under the blinding public key, and the encryption under the opening public
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key is re-randomised, so that this encryption randomness cannot be used to unblind
pseudonyms. The cm-NIZK is transformed with ZKEval so that it is consistent with
the blinded pseudonym, and message. When ZKEval is performed, the proof is also re-
randomised due to the derivation privacy property. In CGS.BlindSign, the pseudonym is
encrypted under the blinding and opening public key, and the message is encrypted under
the blinding public key. The proof cm-NIZK is then computed as in CGS.Sign.
CGS.BlindSign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
parse gsk[uid] = (usk, upk, upk′, cred), α, β, γ←$Z∗p
cµ← (gˆα, gˆβ , upk · opkαbpkβ2 ), c← (gγ ,m · bpkγ1 ),Ω←$ASign1(usk,m)
cσ←$ cm-NIZK{(upk′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , gβ1 , gγ2 ,m) : e(g1, cµ1) = e(gα1 , gˆ)∧
e(g1, cµ2) = e(g
β
1 , gˆ) ∧ e(g1, cµ3) = e(g1, upk)e(gα1 , opk)e(gβ1 , bpk2)∧
AVerify1(Ω, upk,m) = 1 ∧ AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1 ∧ e(c1, g2) = e(g, gγ2 )∧
e(c2, g2) = e(m, g2)e(bpk1, g
γ
2 ) ∧ e(upk′, g2) = e(g1, upk)}
return (c, cµ, cσ)
CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return ⊥
α′, β′, γ′←$Z∗p, cµ← (µ1gˆα
′
, µ2gˆ
β′ , µ3opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 ), c← (gγ
′
,m · bpkγ′1 )
cσ←$ZKEval(σcrs, (α′, β′, γ′), (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, (1,m)), σ), return (c, cµ, cσ)
CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ)
Check cσ with respect to cµ, c, gpk and bpk
CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk)
β←$Z∗p return cupk ← (gˆβ , upk · bpkβ2 )
Opening and unblinding. The opener first checks the validity of the provided input
and decrypts the standard or blinded pseudonym under its opening secret key osk. It
outputs the decrypted value, which is either the plain user public key or an encryption
thereof.
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CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ)
if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0
return ⊥
return upk ← µ3µ−osk1
CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ)
if CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = 0
return ⊥
return cupk ← (cµ2, cµ3 · cµ−osk1 )
To unblind messages and user public keys, they are simply decrypted via bsk.
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk)
return upk ← cupk2cupk−bsk21
CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c)
return c2c
−bsk1
1
Re-randomisation. In order to re-randomise both standard and blinded signatures,
firstly the encryption under both the opening and blinding public key is re-randomised.
The cm-NIZK is then updated with ZKEval to take this into account.
CGS.RRand(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return ⊥, α′←$Z∗p, µ′ ← (µ1gˆα
′
, µ2, µ3opk
α′)
σ′←$ZKEval(σcrs, (α′, 0, 0), (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, (1,m)), σ), return (µ′, σ′)
CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ)
if CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = 0 return ⊥, α′, β′, γ′←$Z∗p
cµ′ ← (cµ1gˆα′ , cµ2gˆβ′ , cµ3opkα′bpkβ
′
2 ), c
′ ← (c1gγ′ , c2bpkγ
′
1 )
cσ′←$ZKEval(σcrs, (α′, β′, γ′), (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c), cσ), return (c′, cµ′, cσ′)
5.5 Security of our CGS–cmNIZK construction
We now show that our CGS–cmNIZK construction satisfies the security properties for
commuting group signatures defined in Section 5.3.2; i.e., the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.1. The CGS–cmNIZK construction presented in Section 5.4 is a secure CGS
as defined in Section 5.3.2 if
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• the automorphic signatures schemes are EUF-cma secure and satisfy the additional
structural assumptions given in Section 5.4,
• the cm-NIZK is zero–knowledge, strongly derivation private and controlled-malleable
simulation-sound extractable (cm-SSE),
• the SPK (used in Join) is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge,
• the DDH assumptions holds in G1 and G2.
We now show that our CGS–cmNIZK construction satisfies the correctness, commutative
behaviour, re-randomisability, traceability, non-frameability, anonymity and blindness re-
quirements given in Section 5.3.2.
5.5.1 Correctness
The first twos conditions are clearly satisfied due to the correctness of the cm-NIZKs used,
and because if µ = (gˆα, 1, upk · opkα), then µ3µ−osk1 = upk. Due to the correctness of the
cm-NIZKs used, the transformed proof will still be valid and so the signature will still be
valid after blinding. As c = (gγ
′
,m ·bpkγ′1 ), we have CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c) = c2c−bsk11 = m.
Because upk = µ3µ
−osk
1 and µ2 = 1, we have cµ = (µ1gˆ
α, gˆβ, µ3opk
αbpkβ2 ). Therefore,
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
= CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, (gˆβ, µ3bpk
β
2µ
−osk
1 )) = µ3µ
−osk
1 = upk.
5.5.2 Commutative Behaviour
CGS.BlindSign is indistinguishable from CGS.Sign followed by CGS.Blind because c, cµ are
distributed identically when they are computed in CGS.Blind with input a valid signature,
to when they are computed in CGS.BlindSign. A polynomial–time adversary cannot distin-
guish between cσ generated in CGS.Blind or CGS.BlindSign due to the derivation privacy
of cm-NIZKs.
CGS.BlindUser is indistinguishable from the output of CGS.OpenBlind on a valid blinded
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signature with the same user public key, because the adversary must return µ of the form
(gˆα, 1, upk · opkα), which will be of the form (gˆα+α′ , gˆβ, upk · opkα+α′bpkβ2 ) after blinding,
and (gˆβ, upk ·bpkβ2 ) after opening. This is identically distributed to CGS.BlindUser on input
upk.
For the final requirement, if the adversary outputs an invalid signature, then CGS.Blind
will also fail. If the adversary outputs a valid signature, then due to the correctness of the
cm-NIZK used, CGS.Blind will output a valid proof, and so CGS.BlindVerify will output 1.
Because upk = µ3µ
−osk
1 and µ2 = 1, cµ = (µ1gˆ
α, gˆβ, µ3opk
αbpkβ2 ). Then
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
= CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, (gˆβ, µ3bpk
β
2µ
−osk
1 )) = µ3µ
−osk
1 = upk.
5.5.3 Re-randomisability
The pseudonyms output by CGS.Sign and CGS.RRand and the pseudonyms and blinded
messages output by CGS.BlindSign and CGS.RRandBlind are identically distributed. The
adversary cannot distinguish between a fresh cm-NIZK and a transformed one due to the
derivation privacy property. Therefore, the CGS–cmNIZK construction is re-randomisable.
5.5.4 Anonymity
Lemma 5.1. The CGS–cmNIZK construction presented in Section 5.4 satisfies anonymity
if the DDH assumption holds in G2, and the cm-NIZK is zero–knowledge and cm-SSE.
Proof. First we show that if an adversary A exists, such that
|Pr[Expanon−0A,CGS–cmNIZK(τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−join−1A,CGS–cmNIZK(τ) = 1]| = ,
where  is non-negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′ that distinguishes DDH
tuples with non-negligible probability. We provide A′ in Figure 5.5. We then describe why
the simulation given in Figure 5.5 and the anonymity experiment are indistinguishable
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towards A, provided A′ is input a DDH tuple, and otherwise that A guesses correctly
with probability 1/2.
The simulator SE1 outputs a σcrs that is identical to CRSSetup. The values gˆ, opk are
distributed identically to the anonymity experiment. Therefore, gpk, isk are distributed
identically to the anonymity experiment. Assuming a DDH tuple is input, the inputs to A
in the guessing phase are identically distributed. This is because µ∗ = (D3, 1, D4upk[uid∗b ])
is identically distributed to CGS.Sign, as logD3 D4 = loggˆ opk. The ciphertext c
∗ is gener-
ated identically to CGS.Sign. The proof σ∗ can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge
property of the cm-NIZK used.
Simulating the Oracles. The SNDU and SIGN oracles are identical to the anonymity
experiment.
The OPEN and BOPEN oracles are identically distributed, provided they successfully ex-
tract upk and do not abort.
The only case in which they will not successfully extract upk is the case where instead
the extraction algorithm outputs a statement x′, and a transformation T , where x′ =
(opk, bpk∗, ipk, µ∗, c∗), as this is the only statement for which a simulation is generated,
and x = Tx(x
′) and T is a valid transform. This means that cµ/ µ, and c/ (1,m), are re-
randomisations of µ∗, c∗, and so c/ (1,m) is an encryption of m∗, and cµ/ µ are encryptions
of upk[uid∗b ]. Also bpk = bpk
∗. In this case the OPEN and BOPEN oracles would have
aborted anyway.
Both oracles will also abort due to invalid inputs identically to the anonymity game. In
BOPEN, the blinding encryption randomness is preserved by outputting (cµ2, upkcµ
bsk2
2 )
which is identically distributed to the output of CGS.OpenBlind.
Reduction to the DDH problem. If a DDH tuple is not input, D4 was chosen ran-
domly, and so the input to A is independent of b. Therefore A guesses correctly with
probability 1/2.
173
5.5 Security of our CGS–cmNIZK construction
SNDU(uid, n)
Identical to the anonymity experiment.
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
Identical to the anonymity experiment.
OPEN(m,µ, σ, bpk)
if CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return ⊥
((·, upk, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ·, ·)← E2(σcrs, τe, (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, (1,m)), σ)
if upk =⊥ return ⊥
if upk = upk[uid∗d] s.t d ∈ {0, 1} and m = m∗ and bpk = bpk∗ return ⊥
else return upk
BOPEN(c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, c) = 0 return ⊥
((·, upk, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ·, ·)← E2(σcrs, τe, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c), cσ)
m← CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c)
if upk =⊥ return ⊥
if upk = upk[uidd] s.t d ∈ {0, 1} and m = m∗ and bpk = bpk∗ return ⊥
else return (cµ2, upkcµ
bsk2
2 )
A′(D1, D2, D3, D4)
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(1τ ), paramauto2←$ASetup2(1τ )
g←$G1, gˆ ← D1, (σcrs, τs, τe)←$SE1(1τ ),
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), opk ← D2, gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, bpk∗)←$ASNDU,SIGN,OPEN,BOPEN(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0, uid
∗
1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗0],gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ b∗ ← 0
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
µ∗ ← (D3, 1, D4upk[uid∗b ]), c∗ ← (1,m∗)
σ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk∗, ipk, µ∗, c∗))
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,OPEN,BOPEN(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗)
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
Figure 5.5: A′ which distinguishes DDH tuples in G2 using A which breaks the anonymity
of CGS–cmNIZK with probability 
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The probability A is successful is:
1/2 Pr[Expanon−0A,Π (τ) = 0] + 1/2 Pr[Exp
anon−1
A,Π (τ) = 1] = (+ 1)/2.
Therefore A′ has an /2 advantage in distinguishing DDH tuples.
5.5.5 Blindness
Lemma 5.2. The CGS–cmNIZK construction presented in Section 5.4 satisfies blindness
if the DDH assumption holds in G1 and G2, and the cm-NIZK is zero–knowledge and
strongly derivation private.
Proof. In this proof we will show that the following Games 0 -5 are indistinguishable. As
Game 0 is the blindness game with the CGS–cmNIZK construction, and in Game 5 all
inputs to the adversary are independent of the bit they must guess, our CGS–cmNIZK
construction satisfies blindness. We give a summary of the games in Table 5.1.
Game Change Indistinguishability to previous game
Game 0 The blindness game with the
CGS–cmNIZK construction.
Game 1 σcrs generated by S1 instead of
CRSSetup.
Outputs of S1 and CRSSetup identi-
cally distributed.
Game 2 cσ∗ generated by S2 instead of
ZKEval.
Due to the strong derivation privacy
of the cm-NIZK.
Game 3 cµ∗ chosen randomly. Due to the DDH assumption which
implies the security of Elgamal en-
cryption.
Game 4 c∗ chosen randomly. Due to the DDH assumption which
implies the security of Elgamal en-
cryption.
Game 5 cupk chosen randomly. Due to the DDH assumption which
implies the security of Elgamal en-
cryption.
Table 5.1: Games in our blindness proof
We define Game 0 to be the blindness experiment with the commuting group signature
construction. Let P0 be the event that an adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 0.
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We define Game 1 to be identical to Game 0, except that σcrs is generated by S1 instead
of CRSSetup, and a simulation trapdoor is also generated. As outputs of S1 and CRSSetup
are identically distributed, letting P1 be the event that the adversary A correctly guesses
b after Game 1, then Pr[P0] = Pr[P1].
We define Game 2 to be identical to Game 1, except during blinding instead of transforming
the proof with ZKEval instead the proof is simulated. Let P2 be the event that the
adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 2.
Game 2
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g←$G1, gˆ←$G2
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
cupk←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkb)
α, β, γ←$ {0, 1}∗, cµ∗ ← (µb,1gˆα, µb,2gˆβ , µb,3opkαbpkβ2 ),
c∗ ← (gγ ,mbbpkγ1 ), cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗))
b∗←$A(guess, st, cupk, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗) return b∗
We show that Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable, assuming the cm-NIZK proof is
strongly derivation private. We provide a distinguishing algorithm D1 in Figure 5.6 that
aims to guess b′ in the Strongly Derivation Private security game.
We now show that when b′ = 1, inputs to A are identical to Game 1, and when b′ = 0
inputs to A are identical to Game 2.
The gpk, isk, osk input to A is the same as in both Game 1 and Game 2. The challenge
pseudonym and ciphertext cµ∗ and c∗ are re-randomisations of cµb and cb, which is identical
to the CGS.Blind algorithm, and therefore identical to both Game 1 and Game 2. The
blinded user public key cupk is computed identically to both Game 1 and Game 2.
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D1(σcrs)
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st1, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 b∗ ← 0
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
α, β, γ←$ {0, 1}∗
return (st2, (opk, bpk, ipk, µb, (1,mb)), σb, (α, β, γ))
D1(st2, pi∗)
cµ∗1 ← µb,1gˆα, cµ∗2 ← µb,2gˆβ , cµ∗3 ← µb,3opkαbpkβ2
c∗1 ← gγ , c∗2 ← mbbpkγ1 , cupk←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkb)
b∗←$A(guess, st1, cupk, c∗, cµ∗, pi∗), if b∗ = b return 1
Figure 5.6: D1 that distinguishes between Game 1 and Game 2 in the CGS blindness proof
If b′ = 0, D1 is returned with the simulation of a proof for the statement
T (opk, bpk, ipk, µb, (1,mb)) = (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ
∗, c∗),
which is identical to Game 2.
If b′ = 1, D1 is returned with the transformation, defined by (α, β, γ), of the proof. This
is identical to Game 1.
Therefore |Pr[P1] − Pr[P2]| ≤ sdp, where sdp is the advantage in breaking the strong
derivation privacy of the cm-NIZK.
We define Game 3 to be identical to Game 2, except cµ∗ is chosen randomly. Let P3 be
the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 3.
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Game 3
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
γ←$ {0, 1}∗, cµ∗←$G32, c∗1 ← gγ , c∗2 ← mbbpkγ1
cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗)), cupk←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkb)
b∗←$A(guess, st, cupk, c∗cµ∗, cσ∗) return b∗
We define Game 4 to be identical to Game 3, except c∗ is chosen randomly. Let P4 be the
event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 4.
Game 4
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
cµ∗←$G32, c∗←$G21
cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗)), cupk←$CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkb)
b∗←$A(guess, st, cupk, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗) return b∗
We define Game 5 to be identical to Game 4, except cupk is chosen randomly. Let P5 be
the event that the adversary A correctly guesses b after Game 5. Clearly the probability
that A correctly guesses b is 1/2, as all inputs are now independent of b. Therefore
Pr[P5] = 1/2.
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D2(D1, D2, D3, D4)
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g←$G1, gˆ ← D1, (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
bsk1←$Z∗p, bpk1 ← gbsk1 , bpk2 ← D2, gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (µ0, σ0,m0), (µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, (bpk1, bpk2), isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 b∗ ← 0
if b∗ = b return 1 return 0
γ, β←$Z∗p, cµ∗ ← (µb,1gˆβ , D3, µb,3D4opkβ), c∗1 ← gγ , c∗2 ← mbbpkγ1
cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗))
b∗←$A(guess, st, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗) if b∗ = b return 1 return 0
Figure 5.7: D2 that distinguishes between Game 2 and Game 3 in the CGS blindness proof
Game 5
b←$ {0, 1}, (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CGS.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(st, (upk0, µ0, σ0,m0), (upk1, µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
cµ∗←$G32, c∗←$G21, cupk←$G22
cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗))
b∗←$A(guess, st, cupk, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗) return b∗
We show that Game 2 and Game 3 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption
in G2. We provide a distinguishing algorithm D2 in Figure 5.7.
If D2 is input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 2. This is
because, letting α = loggˆD3, then D4 = bpk
α
2 , and therefore cµ
∗ is distributed identically
to Game 2.
If D2 is not input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 3.
This is because, β,D3, D4 are now chosen independently and randomly.
Therefore |Pr[P2] − Pr[P3] ≤ DDH, where DDH is the DDH advantage, and therefore
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D3(D1, D2, D3, D4)
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), g ← D1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs)←$S1(1τ )
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param)
bsk2←$Z∗p, bpk2 ← gˆbsk2 , bpk1 ← D2, gpk ← (param, ipk, opk),
(st, (µ0, σ0,m0), (µ1, σ1,m1))←$A(choose, gpk, (bpk1, bpk2), isk, osk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
cµ∗←$G32, c∗1 ← D3, c∗2 ← mbD4
cσ∗←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ∗, c∗))
b∗←$A(guess, st, c∗cµ∗, cσ∗) if b∗ = b return 1 return 0
Figure 5.8: D3 that distinguishes between Game 3 and Game 4 in the CGS blindness proof
negligible.
We show that Game 3 and Game 4 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption
in G1. We provide a distinguishing algorithm D3 in Figure 5.8.
If D3 is input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 3. This
is because, letting γ = loggD3, then D4 = bpk
γ
1 , and so c
∗ is distributed identically to
Game 3.
If D3 is not input a DDH tuple, all inputs to A are distributed identically to Game 4.
This is because D3, D4 are now chosen independently and randomly.
Game 4 and Game 5 are indistinguishable assuming the DDH assumption in G2, by the
exact same argument as that Game 3 and Game 4 are indistinguishable, as cupk is an
ElGamal encryption of upkb and c
∗ is an ElGamal encryption of mb.
Therefore |Pr[P3] − Pr[P4] ≤ DDH, and |Pr[P4] − Pr[P5] ≤ DDH. Therefore |Pr[P0] −
Pr[P5]| ≤ 3DDH + sdp, and so |Pr[P0] − 1/2| ≤ 3DDH + sdp. Therefore, assuming the
DDH assumption and the Strong Derivation Privacy of the cm-NIZK, the advantage of any
polynomial–time adversary in the blindness game with the CGS–cmNIZK construction is
negligible
180
5.5 Security of our CGS–cmNIZK construction
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}, Q← Q+ 1, if Q = k uid∗ ← uid
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if uid = uid∗ usk[uid]←⊥ upk[uid]← apk
else (usk[uid],upk[uid])←$CGS.UKGen(param)
return (upk[uid], cont)
else continue from line 7 except if uid = uid∗ simulate pijoin
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
if uid = uid∗
if decuid 6= accept return ⊥
Generate µ, c as usual using upk[uid]
σ←$S2(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, c)),SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, bpk)}
return (σ, µ)
else identical to non–frameability experiment
A′SIGNauto((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto, apk)
Q← 0, k←$ [q], paramauto1 ← paramauto, paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs, τe)←$SE1(1τ ),
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
(ipk, isk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(uid, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗, bpk∗, bsk∗)←$ASNDU,SIGN(gpk, isk, osk)
if (bpk∗, bsk∗) /∈ BK return 0
((·, upk, ·,Ω, ·, ·, ·,m), ·, ·)← E2(σcrs, τe, (opk, bpk∗, ipk, cµ∗, c∗), cσ∗)
if upk = apk return (m,Ω) else return ⊥
Figure 5.9: A′ which breaks the EUF-cma security of the automorphic signatures used,
using A which breaks the non–frameability requirement of CGS–cmNIZK with probability

5.5.6 Non–frameability
Lemma 5.3. The CGS–cmNIZK construction presented in Section 5.4 satisfies non–
frameability if the automorphic signature scheme is EUF-cma secure, the SPK is zero–
knowledge, and the cm-NIZK is zero–knowledge and cm-SSE.
Proof. First we show that if there exists an adversary A that makes q queries to the
SNDU oracle for distinct users, such that Pr[Expnon−frameA,CGS–cmNIZK(τ) = 1] = , where  is non-
negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′ that breaks the EUF-cma security of the
automorphic signature scheme with non-negligible probability. We provide the detailed
description of A′ in Figure 5.9, and explain here how A′ works.
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First note that all inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically to the non–
frameability experiment. This is because SE1 outputs a σcrs that is identical to CRSSetup.
The automorphic signature parameters paramauto are distributed identically to the output
of ASetup.
Simulating the SNDU oracles. When uid 6= uid∗, the SNDU oracle is identical to
the non–frameability experiment. When uid = uid∗, upk[uid∗] is set to apk, which is
distributed identically to the output of CGS.UKGen. The values usk[uid], upk′ are set to
⊥, but these are only used in the protocol when generating pijoin. Instead, due to the
zero–knowledge property of the SPK, pijoin can be simulated using upk[uid].
Simulating the SIGN oracle. In the case of uid 6= uid∗, this is identical to the non–
frameability experiment. When uid = uid∗, we first test decuid 6= accept instead of
whether the secret key is defined, because in our simulation the secret key will not be
defined even for a completed join protocol. The µ, c are generated identically to CGS.Sign.
The proof σ can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge property of the cm-NIZK proofs.
Reduction to EUF-cma security of Automorphic Signatures. If A is successful,
then they output a valid blinded signature that opens to the upk of an honest user. We
assume, with probability 1/q, that A′ guesses correctly and uid = uid∗.
With 1 − negl probability, E2 will either extract a valid witness such that AVerify1(Ω,
upk[uid∗],m) = 1; or E2 will extract a statement x′ and transformation T such that
x = Tinst(x
′), where x is the statement output, T ∈ T and x′ ∈ Q.
In the first case A′ wins because upk[uid∗] = apk and A′ has never used their signing
oracle. Therefore Ω is a valid forgery in the EUF-cma game.
In the second case, a proof must have been simulated during signing for a statement
x′ = (opk, bpk∗, ipk, cµ′, c′) such that cµ∗ is a re-randomisation of cµ′ and c∗ is a re-
randomisation of c′. Therefore, cµ′ must be an encryption of upk[uid∗] and c′ must
be an encryption of m, and so (uid∗,m, bpk∗) was queried to the SIGN oracle. This
is a contradiction given that A is successful. Therefore A′ wins with the probability
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ADDU(uid)
Identical to the traceability experiment except cred←$SIGNauto(upk[uid])
SNDI(uid,Min)
Identical to the traceability experiment except cred←$SIGNauto(upk[uid])
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
Identical to the traceability experiment
A′SIGNauto((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto, apk)
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2 ← paramauto
g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs, τe)←$SE1(1τ )
param← ((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs)
ipk ← apk, (opk, osk)←$CGS.OKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, osk), if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
((·, upk, cred, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·), ·, ·)← E2(σcrs, τe, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c), cσ) return (upk, cred)
Figure 5.10: A′ which breaks the EUF-cma security of automorphic signatures, using A
which breaks the traceability of CGS–cmNIZK with probability 
(1− negl)/q.
5.5.7 Traceability
Lemma 5.4. The CGS–cmNIZK construction presented in Section 5.4 satisfies traceabil-
ity if the automorphic signature scheme is EUF-cma secure, and the cm-NIZK is cm-SSE.
Proof. First, we show that if there exists an adversaryA such that Pr[ExptraceA,CGS–cmNIZK(τ) =
1] = , where  is non-negligible, then we can can build an adversary A′ that breaks the
EUF-cma security of the automorphic signature scheme with non-negligible probability.
We provide the detailed description of A′ in Figure 5.10, and explain here how A′ works.
First note that all inputs that A′ provides to A are distributed identically to the trace-
ability experiment. This is because SE1 outputs a σcrs that is identical to CRSSetup. The
inputs apk and paramauto are the public key and public parameters of an automorphic
signature scheme and so ipk and paramauto2 are distributed correctly.
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Simulating the oracles. The ADDU and SNDI oracles are only different to the trace-
ability experiment when cred is generated, because the issuing secret key is not available.
As the signing oracle in the EUF-cma experiment outputs a valid signature under isk on
the user public key, the resulting credential is distributed correctly. The SIGN oracle is
identical to the traceability experiment, as all user secret keys are known.
Reduction to EUF-cma security of Automorphic Signatures. If A is successful,
they output a valid blinded signature that does not open to the same upk as a corrupted
or honest user.
We have not used S1 to obtain simulations of the cm-NIZK proofs, therefore E2 will extract
a valid witness with 1−negl probability. This ensures that AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1. As
upk is not the public key of any corrupted or honest users, upk was not queried to SIGNauto
by ADDU or SNDI. Therefore, cred is a valid forgery under apk, and A′ is successful with
probability (1− negl).
5.6 Concrete Instantiation and Efficiency
5.6.1 Signature Proofs of Knowledge
For transforming interactive into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs we rely on the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic that ensures security in the random oracle model.
5.6.2 Automorphic Signatures
An instantiation of an automorphic signature scheme that is EUF-cma secure, based on
the Asymmetric Double Hidden SDH (ADHSDH) assumption, is given in [65]. It is easy
to see that this scheme also satisfies the additional structural assumptions needed for our
construction.
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5.6.3 Controlled Malleable NIZKs
We now show that cm-NIZKs for the relation R, and set of allowable transformations T
used in our construction can be instantiated.
It is shown in Theorem 4.5 in [45] that cm-NIZKS for (R, T ) can be instantiated if (R, T )
are CM-friendly which they define fully in Section C.1.
More formally we define the relation R such that ((opk, bpk1, bpk2, ipk, cµ, c),
(upk′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , g
β
1 , g
γ
2 ,m) ∈ R if and only if:
e(g1, µ1) = e(g
α
1 , gˆ), e(g1, µ2) = e(g
β
1 , gˆ), e(g1, µ3) = e(g1, upk)e(g
α
1 , opk)e(g
β
1 , bpk2);
AVerify1(Ω, upk,m) = 1,AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1;
e(c1, g2) = e(g, g
γ
2 ), e(c2, g2) = e(m, g2)e(bpk1, g
γ
2 );
e(upk′, g2) = e(g1, upk).
We define the allowable set of transformation T = {(renc1, renc2, renc3) : renc1, renc2, renc3 ∈
Z∗p}, such that for T = (renc1, renc2, renc3), the transformation is as follows:
Tinst(opk, bpk, ipk, µ, c) = (opk, bpk, ipk, (µ1gˆ
renc1 , µ2gˆ
renc2 , µ3opk
renc1bpkrenc22 ),
(c1g
renc3 , c2bpk
renc3
1 )),
Twit(upk
′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 , g
β
1 , g
γ
2 ,m) = (upk
′, upk, cred,Ω, gα1 g
renc1
1 , g
β
1 g
renc2
1 , g
γ
2g
renc3
2 ,m).
We now show that (R, T ) is CM-Friendly which means six conditions are satisfied.
1. Representable statements: any instance and witness of R can be represented as a set
of group elements
Verification keys, messages and signatures of automorphic signatures are all group
elements and so ipk, upk, cred,Ω,m are all group elements. The value upk′ = gusk1
is also a group element.
The values opk, bpk1, bpk2, cµ = (cµ1, cµ2, cµ3), c = (c1, c2) can all clearly be rep-
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resented by group elements due to the ElGamal encryption used. The encryption
randomness α, β, γ can be represented by (gα1 , g
β
1 , g
γ
2 ).
2. Representable transformations: any transformation in T can be represented as a set
of group elements
Represent randomness renc1, renc2, renc3 with (g
renc1
1 , gˆ
renc1 , opkrenc1 , grenc21 , gˆ
renc2 ,
bpkrenc22 , g
renc3
2 , g
renc3 , bpkrenc31 ).
3. Provable statements: we can prove the statement (x,w) ∈ R (using the representa-
tion in condition 1 for x and w) using pairing product equations.
AVerify1(Ω, upk,m) = 1, and AVerify2(cred, ipk, upk) = 1 can be written as a con-
junction of pairing product equations over upk,m,Ω, cred, ipk due to the properties
of automorphic signatures.
All other equations are already in the form of pairing product equations.
4. Provable transformations: we can prove the statement Tinst(x) = x
′ for T ∈ T
(using the representations for x and T in conditions 1 and 2) using a pairing product
equation.
Given x = (opk, bpk1, bpk2, ipk, (cµ1, cµ2, cµ3), (c1, c2)),
x′ = (opk′, bpk′1, bpk′2, ipk′, (cµ′1, cµ′2, cµ′3), (c′1, c′2)),
T = (R1, R
′
1, R
′′
1 , R2, R
′
2, R
′′
2 , R3, R
′
3, R
′′
3), then Tinst(x) = x
′ and T ∈ T iff:
e(g1, opk) = e(g1, opk
′),e(bpk1, g2) = e(bpk′1, g2), e(g1, bpk2) = e(g1, bpk′2), e(ipk, g2) =
e(ipk′, g2) and
e(c′2, g2) = e(bpk1, R3)e(c2, g2), e(c′1, g2) = e(g,R3)e(c1, g2), and
e(g1, cµ
′
3) = e(R1, opk)e(R2, bpk)e(g1, cµ3) ,
e(g1, cµ
′
1) = e(R1, gˆ)e(g1, cµ1) , e(g1, cµ
′
2) = e(R2, gˆ)e(g1, cµ2).
5. Transformable statements: for any T ∈ T , there is a valid transformation s(T ) that
takes the statement (x,w) ∈ R (phrased using pairing products as in condition 3)
and produces the statement (Tinst(x), Twit(w)) ∈ R.
We transform the pairing product equations for an instance (opk, bpk1, bpk2,
ipk, (cµ1, cµ2, cµ3), (c1, c2)) into mauled equations for an instance
(opk, bpk1, bpk2, ipk, (cµ1gˆ
α′ , cµ2gˆ
β′ , cµ3opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 ), (c1g
γ′ , c2bpk
γ′
1 )) as follows:
First of all we re-randomise cµ.
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• Add(eq1 := e(g1, gˆα′)−1e(gα′1 , gˆ) = 1)
Add(eq2 := e(g1, gˆ
β′)−1e(gβ
′
1 , gˆ) = 1)
Add(eq3 : e(g1, opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 )
−1e(gα′1 , opk)e(g
β′
1 , bpk2) = 1)
• MergeEq(eq1, e(g1, cµ1)−1e(gα1 , gˆ) = 1 ) to create equation eq4.
MergeEq(eq2, e(g1, cµ2)
−1e(gβ1 , gˆ) = 1) to create equation eq5.
MergeEq(eq3, e(g1, cµ3)
−1e(gα1 , opk)e(g
β
1 , bpk2)e(g1, upk) = 1 ) to create equa-
tion eq6.
• MergeVar(cµ1, gˆα′ , ˆcµ1, {g1}), will create equation
e(g1, cµ1gˆ
α′)e(g1, ˆcµ1)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ1gˆ
α′)e(g1, ˆcµ1)
−1 = 1,eq4 ) to create equation eq7.
MergeVar(cµ2, gˆ
β′ , ˆcµ2, {g1}), will create equation
e(g1, cµ2gˆ
β′ , )e(g1, ˆcµ2)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ2gˆ
β′ , )e(g1, ˆcµ2)
−1 = 1,eq5 ) to create equation eq8.
MergeVar(cµ3, opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 , ˆcµ3, {g1}), will create equation
e(g1, cµ3opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 )e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ3opk
α′bpkβ
′
2 )e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1 = 1,eq6) to create equation eq9.
• MergeVar(gα′1 , gα1 , gα˜1 , {gˆ, opk}), will create equations e(gα
′
1 g
α
1 , gˆ)
−1e(gα˜1 , gˆ) = 1
and e(gα
′
1 g
α
1 , opk)
−1e(gα˜1 , opk) = 1.
MergeEq(e(gα
′
1 g
α
1 , gˆ)
−1e(gα˜1 , gˆ) = 1,eq7 ).
MergeVar(gβ
′
1 , g
β
1 , g
β˜
1 , {gˆ, bpk2}), will create equations e(gβ
′
1 g
β
1 , gˆ)
−1e(gβ˜1 , gˆ) = 1
and e(gβ
′
1 g
β
1 , bpk2)
−1e(gβ˜1 , bpk2) = 1.
MergeEq(e(gβ
′
1 g
β
1 , gˆ)
−1e(gβ˜1 , gˆ) = 1,eq8 ).
MergeEq(e(gα
′
1 g
α
1 , opk)
−1e(gα˜1 , opk) = 1,e(g
β′
1 g
β
1 , bpk2)
−1e(gβ˜1 , bpk2) = 1) to cre-
ate equation eq10 .
MergeEq(eq9, eq10 ).
Remove obsolete equations and variables with RemoveEq and RemoveVar.
We now re-randomise c.
• Add(eq11 := e(gγ′ , g2)−1e(g, gγ
′
2 ) = 1)
Add(eq12 := e(bpk
γ′
1 , g2)
−1e(bpk1, g
γ′
2 ) = 1)
• MergeEq(eq11,e(c1, g2)−1e(g, gγ2 ) = 1 ) to create equation eq13.
MergeEq(eq12, e(c2, g2)
−1e(bpk1, g
γ
2 )e(m, g2) = 1 ) to create equation eq14.
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• MergeVar(c1, gγ′ , cˆ1, {g2}), will create equation e(c1gγ′ , g2)e(cˆ1, g2)−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(c1g
γ′ , g2)e(cˆ1, g2)
−1 = 1, eq13 ) to create eq15.
MergeVar(c2, bpk
γ′
1 , cˆ2, {g2}), will create equation e(c2bpkγ
′
1 , g2)e(cˆ2, g2)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(c2bpk
γ′
1 , g2)e(cˆ2, g2)
−1 = 1,eq14) to create eq16.
• MergeVar(gγ2 , gγ
′
2 , g
γ˜
2 , {bpk1, g}), will create equations e(g, gγ2gγ
′
2 )
−1e(g, gγ˜2 ) = 1
and e(bpk1, g
γ
2g
γ′
2 )
−1e(bpk1, g
γ˜
2 ) = 1.
MergeEq(e(g, gγ2g
γ′
2 )
−1e(g, gγ˜2 ) = 1, eq15 ).
MergeEq(e(bpk1, g
γ
2g
γ′
2 )
−1e(bpk1, g
γ˜
2 ) = 1,eq16 ).
Finally remove obsolete equations and variables with RemoveEq and RemoveVar.
(6) Transformable transformations: for any T, T ′ ∈ T there is a valid transformation
t(T ) that takes the statement Tinst(x
′) = x for T ∈ T (phrased using pairing products
as in condition 4) and produces the statement T ′inst◦Tinst(x′) = T ′inst(x) for T ′◦T ∈ T
and that preserves the variables in x′ (does not perform RemoveVar on variables in
x′).
We transform the pairing product equations defined in (4) for proving knowledge
of a transformation from instance (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ′, c′) to (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c), into
mauled equations for proving knowledge of a transformation from instance
(opk, bpk, ipk, cµ′, c′) to (opk, bpk, ipk, (cµ1gˆα, cµ2gˆβ, cµ3bpk
β
2 opk
α), (c1g
γ , c2bpk
γ
1 )). We
can use the same strategy (and the same constant equations) as for transforming
statements.
• MergeVar(c1, gγ , cˆ1, {g2}), will create equation e(c1gγ , g2)e(cˆ1, g2)−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(c1, g2)
−1e(g,R3)e(c′1, g2) = 1, e(c1gγ , g2)e(cˆ1, g2)−1 = 1).
MergeVar(R3, g
γ
2 , Rˆ3, {g, bpk1}), will create equations e(g,R3gγ2 )−1e(g, Rˆ3)
= 1 and e(bpk1, R3g
γ
2 )
−1e(bpk1, Rˆ3) = 1.
MergeEq(e(cˆ1, g2)
−1e(g,R3)e(g, g
γ
2 )e(c
′
1, g2), e(g,R3g
γ
2 )
−1e(g, Rˆ3) = 1).
MergeVar(c2, bpk
γ
1 , cˆ2, {g2}), will create equation e(c2bpkγ1 , g2)e(cˆ2, g2)−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(c2, g2)
−1e(bpk1, R3)e(c′2, g2) = 1, e(c2bpk
γ
1 , g2)e(cˆ2, g2)
−1 = 1).
MergeEq(e(cˆ2, g2)
−1e(bpk1, R3g
γ
2 )e(c
′
2, g2) = 1, e(bpk1, R3g
γ
2 )
−1e(bpk1, Rˆ3)
= 1 ).
• MergeVar(cµ1, gˆα, ˆcµ1, {g1}), will create equation
e(g1, cµ1gˆ
α)e(g1, ˆcµ1)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ1)
−1e(R1, gˆ)e(g1, cµ′1) = 1, e(g1, cµ1gˆα) e(g1, ˆcµ1)−1 = 1).
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MergeVar(R1, g
α
1 , Rˆ1, {gˆ, opk}), will create equations e(R1gα1 , gˆ)−1e(Rˆ1, gˆ) = 1
and e(R1g
α
1 , opk)
−1e(Rˆ1, opk) = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, ˆcµ1)
−1e(R1, gˆ)e(gα1 , gˆ)e(g1, cµ′1) = 1, e(R1gα1 , gˆ)−1 e(Rˆ1, gˆ) = 1).
MergeVar(cµ2, gˆ
β, ˆcµ2, {g1}), will create equation e(g1, cµ2gˆβ)e(g1, ˆcµ2)−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ2)
−1e(R2, gˆ)e(g1, cµ′2) = 1, e(g1, cµ2gˆβ) e(g1, ˆcµ2)−1 = 1).
MergeVar(R2, g
β
1 , Rˆ2, {gˆ, bpk2}), will create equations e(R2gβ1 , gˆ)−1e(Rˆ2, gˆ) = 1
and e(R2g
β
1 , bpk2)
−1e(Rˆ2, bpk2) = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, ˆcµ2)
−1e(R2, gˆ)e(g
β
1 , gˆ)e(g1, cµ
′
2) = 1, e(R2g
β
1 , gˆ)
−1 e(Rˆ2, gˆ) = 1).
MergeVar(cµ3, opk
αbpkβ2 , ˆcµ3, {g1}), will create equation
e(g1, cµ3opk
αbpkβ2 )e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1 = 1.
MergeEq(e(g1, cµ3)
−1e(R1, opk)e(R2, bpk2)e(g1, cµ′3) = 1,
e(g1, cµ3opk
αbpkβ2 )e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1 = 1).
MergeEq(e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1e(R1, opk)e(gα1 , opk)e(R2, bpk2)e(g
β
1 , bpk2) e(g1, cµ
′
3) = 1,
e(R1g
α
1 , opk)
−1e(Rˆ1, opk) = 1 ).
MergeEq(e(g1, ˆcµ3)
−1e(Rˆ1, opk)e(R2, bpk2)e(g
β
1 , bpk2)e(g1, cµ
′
3)
= 1, e(R2g
β
1 , bpk2)
−1e(Rˆ2, bpk2) = 1 ).
Finally remove obsolete equations and variables with RemoveEq and RemoveVar,
(cµ′, c′) will be unaffected by RemoveVar.
The instantiation in [45] makes use of Groth Sahai proofs [77] to build malleable NI-
WIPOKs. The instantiation of Groth Sahai proofs based on the DLIN assumption and
structure preserving signatures based on the DLIN assumption were chosen for their in-
stantiation. However, for our instantiation as we are working in the type–3 pairing setting,
we make use of the instantiation of Groth Sahai proofs based on the SXDH assumption,
i.e. the DDH assumption holds in both groups G1 and G2. We make use of a more re-
cently introduced structure preserving signature scheme [6] with better efficiency also in
the type–3 setting and based on the SXDH assumption.
5.6.4 Efficiency
We now provide the sizes of signatures for the CGS–cmNIZK construction in terms of
the number of group elements. We denote the length required to represent k elements
in Gi such that i ∈ {1, 2} as kGi. A signature consists of a cm-NIZK which in turn
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consists of a Groth Sahai NIWIPoK [77] instantiated under the SXDH assumption. The
cost of variables and equation for such proofs is given in Table 3 of [77]. The statement
proven by the NIWIPoK includes: the statement from our cm-NIZK, of size 10G1 + 9G2
as well as two automorphic signatures of total size 5G1 + 5G2 and parameters for this
scheme 3G1 + 3G2; the verification key of the SPS in the cm-NIZK instantiation of size
36G1 + 30G2; a signature of the SPS in the cm-NIZK instantiation of size 14G1 + 14G2;
another transformed statement also of size 18G1 + 17G2; and the transformation of size
4G1 + 5G2. In total this gives 90G1 + 83G2. Therefore the total cost of variables is
180G1 + 166G2. The total number of pairing equations in the NIWIPoK includes: 12
equations from our cm-NIZK, 16 equations to verify the SPS, and 9 equations to ensure
that the transformation is valid and transforms the two statements. In total this is 37
equations and the cost of these equations will be 148G1 + 148G2. Therefore the total size
of a signature is 328G1 + 314G2.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we propose commuting group signatures, which allow group signatures to
be blinded whilst preserving the verifiability of signatures. We have formally defined the
security for such a primitive, and given a provably secure construction in this model. This
construction makes use of ElGamal encryption, automorphic signatures, and controlled
malleable proof protocols. We then provide a concrete instantiation for these building
blocks and analyse the efficiency of our construction.
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Convertible Group Signatures –
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we strengthen the security of the CLS primitive introduced in Chapter
4, by removing the assumption that the entity that submits signatures to a converter is
honest–but–curious. We strengthen the existing security model to take this into account,
and provide a construction that provably satisfies this model using commuting group
signatures.
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6.1.1 Motivation and Background
In Chapter 4 a flexible variant of linkability was proposed for group signatures in the form
of convertible group signatures with selective linkability (CLS). While all group signatures
are fully unlinkable by default, certain subsets can be converted into a linked representa-
tion. The conversion is performed obliviously by a trusted converter that blindly trans-
forms a batch of pseudonyms, mapping different pseudonyms stemming from the same
user into the same one. To avoid the gradual reconstruction of all correlations, converted
pseudonyms obtained through different queries remain unlinkable, i.e., conversions are
strictly non-transitive.
However, this assumes that the party receiving fully unlinkable signatures (the data lake)
and the one obtaining the converted ones (the data processor) to be the same entity, or
at least belong to the same trust domain: the scheme only converts pseudonyms but not
the actual signatures, i.e., the authenticity of data gets lost in the conversion process.
Therefore a data processor must trust the data lake that converted data originates from
actual user data. It also assumes this combined entity to be honest, as the input to the
converter is considered to be well-formed, in the sense that the security guarantees only
hold when “valid” pseudonyms are converted for which correct group signatures exist. As
the converter receives blinded pseudonyms and no group signatures, this assumption is
impossible to enforce other than by considering honest requests only.
6.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter we strengthen the concept of convertibly linkable group signatures (CLS+)
to overcome these assumptions. We guarantee the desired security and privacy properties
even when conversion is triggered by malicious entities. Further, we leverage the trusted
converter to not only blindly transform the pseudonyms but also blindly re-authenticate
the associated messages, thus preserving the authenticity of the data during the conversion
process.
We start by extending the security and privacy definition given in Chapter 4 to this
stronger setting. Our security model takes inspiration from the RCCA security notion [43],
and grants the adversary the power to request conversions of arbitrary and blinded inputs,
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while still preventing trivial replay attacks. We then propose a construction that provably
satisfies the desired properties. The core building block for our construction is the primitive
of commuting group signatures defined in Chapter 5.
Commuting group signatures naturally lend themselves to building convertible group sig-
natures. When requesting a conversion, group signatures first get blinded, yet still allow
verification by the converter. The converter then blindly opens the signatures and raises
the blinded user identity to the power of r, which is chosen fresh for every conversion query,
but used consistently within the query. The converter then blindly signs the converted
pseudonym and message to attest that they originate from a valid query that contained
blinded, yet verifiable, signatures. As we assume the converter is at most honest-but-
curious, the authentication of converted signatures is carried over from that of the blinded
signatures. During unblinding, the message and public key are unblinded, and the original
output of the converter is included in the signature, along with a proof that unblinding
has been performed correctly. We prove that our construction is secure, assuming the
security of the commuting group signatures, as well as the DDH assumption.
6.2 Definition and Security Model for CLS+
In this section we recall the functionality and security model for CLS signatures given in
Section 4.2 and extend them to our setting, which no longer assumes that conversion of
pseudonymous signatures is triggered by honest verifiers only — we refer to these extended
CLS signatures as CLS+. In fact, whereas CLS only converts pseudonyms but not the
actual group signatures, our CLS+ scheme transforms pseudonyms while preserving the
validity of the associated signatures. This requires several extensions to the algorithms
and changes to the security model.
As in CLS, our CLS+ scheme assumes the following entities: an issuer I, a set of users
U = {uidi}, and a converter C. In contrast to CLS, we split the verifier role into two
parts: a data lake1 L and data processor P. This reflects our setting which allows a
data processor to still verify the validity of the converted group signatures, whereas CLS
assumed that unlinkable and converted signatures are both used by the same entity (or at
1We sometimes make the role of the data lake explicit for illustrative purposes, but this entity does not
have any dedicated keys and any verifier can take this role.
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least within the same trust domain).
The issuer I is the central entity that allows users to join the group. Once joined, a
user can then sign on behalf of the group in a pseudonymous way. The data lake (or any
verifier) can collect and verify these signatures with respect to the group’s public key, but
does not learn anything about the user that created the signature. While group signatures
are fully unlinkable by default, they can be linked in a controlled, yet blind, manner. Such
conversion can be requested by the data lake from the converter C that can blindly trans-
form pseudonym-message-signature tuples into a consistent authenticated representation.
The data lake blinds the signatures in the conversion request for a particular data proces-
sor P, who can finally unblind and verify the converted signatures. Once unblinded, again
any verifier can check the validity of the converted signature.
6.2.1 Syntax of CLS+
Our notation closely follows the definitional framework for CLS given in Section 4.2.1,
but extends the blinding, conversion and unblinding procedure to not only transform
pseudonyms and messages, but also signatures. Verification is extended to handle “stan-
dard” group signatures as well as converted signatures, allowing the data processor (or
any verifier) to verify the transformed and linkable signatures.
Definition 6.1 (CLS+). A convertibly linkable group signature scheme with preserved
verifiability CLS+ consists of the following algorithms:
Setup and Key Generation. We model key generation per party, each generating
their individual key pair. We refer to (param, ipk, cpk) as the group public key gpk and
write BK to denote the public/private key space induced by CLS+.BKGen.
CLS+.Setup(1τ )→ param: on input a security parameter 1τ , outputs param, the public
parameters for the scheme.
CLS+.IKGen(param)→ (ipk, isk): performed by the issuer I, outputs the issuer secret
key isk, and the issuing public key ipk.
CLS+.CKGen(param)→ (cpk, csk): performed by the converter C, outputs the converter
secret key csk, and the converter public key cpk.
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CLS+.BKGen(param)→ (bpk, bsk): performed by the data processor P, outputs the
blinding public key bpk and blinding private key bsk.
Join, Sign and Verify. We have a dedicated join procedure that a user has to com-
plete with the issuer. All users that have successfully joined the group can then create
pseudonymous signatures on behalf of the group. For ease of expression, we treat the
pseudonym µ as a dedicated part of the signature.
Our construction requires that the user already specifies the data processor’s key bpk when
creating signatures, and thus we reflect this in the syntax. While this limits the flexibility
of the data lake — it has to adhere to the choice of the user — it gives the users strong
control over the usage of their data, as only they can choose who can unblind the converted
(= linkable) signatures.
To handle our setting where converted signatures can also be verified, CLS+.Verify takes
an extra input type = {tier-1, tier-2} that indicates the type of signature: We de-
note standard, fully unlinkable signatures produced by CLS+.Sign as tier-1 signatures,
whereas converted ones (generated via processing a tier-1 signature with CLS+.Blind −
CLS+.Convert− CLS+.Unblind) are referred to as tier-2 signatures.
〈CLS+.Join(gpk),CLS+.Issue(isk, gpk)〉: a user uid joins the group by engaging in an
interactive protocol with the Issuer I. The user uid and Issuer I perform algorithms
CLS+.Join and CLS+.Issue respectively. These are input a state and an incoming
message respectively, and output an updated state, an outgoing message, and a
decision, either cont, accept, or reject. The initial input to CLS+.Join is the group
public key, gpk, whereas the initial input to CLS+.Issue is the issuer secret key, isk,
and the group public key. If the user uid accepts, CLS+.Join has a private output of
gsk[uid].
CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)→ (µ, σ): performed by the user uid with respect to a
particular data processor with key bpk. On input the group public key gpk, the
user’s secret key gsk[uid], and a message m, outputs a pseudonym µ and signature
σ.
CLS+.Verify(type, gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)→ {0, 1}: performed by any verifier. Outputs 1 if σ
is a valid {tier-1, tier-2}-signature, on m for pseudonym µ under the group public
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key gpk and data processor key bpk, and 0 otherwise.
Blind Conversion. Finally, we want our pseudonymous group signatures to be blindly
convertible. Thus, there is a dedicated CLS+.Blind and CLS+.Unblind procedure for the
data lake and data processor respectively, and a CLS+.Convert algorithm that requires
the converter’s secret key. The latter transforms the unlinkable pseudonyms in a consis-
tent manner; i.e., outputting converted pseudonyms and signatures that are consistent
whenever the input pseudonyms belong to the same user. As our scheme preserves the
validity of the signatures, all algorithms from Section 4.2.1 are extended to also handle
the signatures as in- and outputs.
CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µ, σ,m))→ (cµ, cσ, c): performed by the data lake with respect to
a particular data processor bpk (and the converter specified in gpk); on input a
pseudonym, signature and message, outputs a blinded pseudonym, signature and
message.
CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)→ {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k: performed by the con-
verter C; on input k blinded pseudonym-signature-message tuples (cµ1, cσ1, c1), · · · ,
(cµk, cσkck), outputs converted tuples (cµ1, cσ1, c1), · · · , (cµk, cσk, ck).
CLS+.Unblind(bsk, (cµ, cσ, c))→ (µ, σ,m): performed by the data processor; on input a
converted and blinded tuple, and the blinding secret key bsk, outputs an unblinded
converted tuple (µ, σ,m).
6.2.2 Security Properties of CLS+
We want CLS+ schemes to enjoy (roughly) the same security and privacy properties as CLS
schemes, without the assumption that conversion is triggered by honest parties only, and
with the additional feature that converted data is also verifiable. We stress that our CLS+
schemes still rely on the converter being at most honest-but-curious though. We believe
this to be an acceptable assumption in practice, as the converter is a central entity that
can undergo more scrutiny than the multitude of verifiers and data lakes. To allow for a
modular construction based on commuting group signatures, we no longer include the join
anonymity requirement from Chapter 4. This is because commuting group signatures, as
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in standard group signatures, can be opened to reveal the signer’s identity and so do not
provide join anonymity. As the converter is corrupted, this requirement only offers weak
privacy guarantees anyway, and so we believe satisfying this requirement is less important
than the positives of a simple modular construction.
CLS+ schemes must satisfy the following properties, where anonymity, blindness and non–
transitivity capture the privacy-related properties and non–frameability and traceability
formalise the desired unforgeability guarantees.
Anonymity: Group signatures which have not been linked through a conversion request
should not leak any information about the signer’s identity.
Non–transitivity: While conversion guarantees linkability within a batch of converted
signatures, the data processor(s) should not be able to link the outputs of different
convert queries.
Conversion Blindness: The converter should not learn anything about the input it
receives nor the transformed outputs it computes.
Non–frameability: An adversary controlling the issuer and some corrupt users should
not be able to impersonate other honest users i.e., create pseudonymous signatures
that would be linked to a pseudonym of an honest user. Now we must also ensure
that the adversary cannot forge converted signatures that link to those of honest
users.
Traceability: An adversary controlling the issuer, converter and some users, should not
be able to create more pseudonymous signatures that remain unlinkable in an (hon-
est) conversion than they control corrupt users.
All notions require a number of changes to reflect the increased power of the data lake,
while ensuring achievability of the properties. We explain these notions in detail in the
following.
Oracles and State. The security notions we formalise in the following make use of a
number of oracles which keep joint state, for example by keeping track of queries and the
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set of corrupted parties. We present the detailed description of all oracles in Figure 6.1
and now provide an overview of them.
ADDU (join of honest user and honest issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and internally runs a join protocol between the honest user and honest issuer. At
the end, the honest user’s secret key gsk[uid] is generated and from then on signing
queries for uid will be allowed. This is identical to the CLS model.
SNDU (join of honest user and corrupt issuer) Creates a new honest user for uid
and runs the join protocol on behalf of uid with the corrupt issuer. If the join session
completes, the oracle will store the user’s secret key gsk[uid]. This is identical to
the CLS model.
SNDI (join of corrupt user and honest issuer) Runs the join protocol on behalf of
the honest issuer with corrupt users. For joins of honest users, the ADDU oracle
must be used. This is identical to the CLS model.
SIGN This oracle returns signatures for honest users that have successfully joined (via
ADDU or SNDU, depending on the game). This is identical to the CLS model,
except the blinding public key is now input to CLS+.Sign, and so must be input to
the oracle. Also, the blinding public key is now stored in SL, and the pseudonym
and signatures no longer need to be stored as these could be re-randomised.
CONVERT Returns a set of converted signatures. The adversary must input the blinding
secret key into the oracle, which is necessary for our privacy-related security notion,
in anonymity to ensure that the adversary is not inputting a re-randomisation of the
challenge signature. In the CLS+ model this now takes blinded inputs. The oracle
detects whether the adversary has attempted to convert the challenge signature by
checking whether inputs identify to the challenged user and unblind to the challenged
message.
UNBLIND Blinds, converts and unblinds signatures, outputting the resulting tier-2 sig-
natures. This is new to the CLS+ model. The oracle is necessary for the blindness
requirement, because unblinding now outputs a tier-2 signature. This output could
potentially leak information that allows other signatures to be unblinded. We blind,
convert and unblind in this oracle because we are still targeting chosen plaintext
level security.
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All oracles have access to the following records maintained as global state:
HUL List of uids of honest users, initially set to ∅. New honest users can be added by
queries to the ADDU oracle (when the issuer is honest) or SNDU oracle (when the
issuer is corrupt).
CUL List of corrupt users that have requested to join the group. Initially set to ∅, new
corrupt users can be added through the SNDI oracle if the issuer is honest. If the
issuer is corrupt, we do not keep track of corrupt users.
SL List of (uid,m, bpk) tuples requested from the SIGN oracle.
UBL List of (µ,m, c, cµ, cσ) tuples which are unblinded and converted pseudonyms/ mes-
sages along with the corresponding blinded signatures, stored by the CONVERT
oracle.
Helper Algorithms. We use an adaptation of the helper algorithms from CLS for
notational simplicity in our security games: Identify and UnLink. They now also take as
input signatures, because they make use of CLS+.Convert. Identify determines whether a
blinded signature belongs to a certain uid. We create a second signature for gsk[uid] and
use the converter’s secret key to test whether both signatures are linked. If so, Identify
returns 1. This algorithm uses our second helper algorithm UnLink internally, which takes
a list of (correctly formed) pseudonym-message-signatures pairs and returns 1 only if they
are all unlinkable.
Identify(gpk, bpk, csk, bsk, uid, c, cµ, cσ)
(µ′, σ′)←$CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid], 0), (cµ′, cσ′, c′)←$CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µ′, σ′, 0))
if UnLink(gpk, csk, bpk, bsk, ((cµ, cσ, c), (cµ′, cσ′, c′))) = 0 return 1 else return 0
UnLink(gpk, csk, bpk, bsk, ((cµ1, cσ1, c1), · · · , (cµk, cσk, ck)))
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
if {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k =⊥ return ⊥
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi, σi,mi)←$CLS+.Unblind(bsk, (cµi, cσi, ci))
if ∃(i, j) with i 6= j s.t. µi = µj return 0 else return 1
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ADDU(uid)
if uid ∈ HUL ∪ CUL return ⊥
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥
decuid ← cont, stuidJoin ← gpk
stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CLS+.Join(stuidJoin,⊥)
while decuid = cont
(stuidIssue,MJoin,dec
uid)←$CLS+.Issue(stuidIssue,MIssue)
(stuidJoin,MIssue,dec
uid)←$CLS+.Join(stuidJoin,MJoin)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return accept
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
if uid /∈ HUL or gsk[uid] =⊥ return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, bpk)}
return (σ, µ)
SNDI(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ HUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ CUL CUL← CUL ∪ {uid},decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if undefined stuidIssue ← (isk, gpk)
(stuidIssue,Mout,dec
uid)←$CLS+.Issue(stuidIssue,Min)
return (Mout,dec
uid)
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}
gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
if stuidJoin undefined st
uid
Join ← gpk
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$CLS+.Join(stuidJoin,Min)
if decuid = accept gsk[uid]← stuidJoin
return (Mout,dec
uid)
CONVERT((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥, compute {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
Parse permutation shuffling signatures in this run of CLS+.Convert as Π
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi, σi,mi)←$CLS+.Unblind(bsk, (cµΠ(i), cσΠ(i), cΠ(i))),UBL← UBL ∪ {(µi,mi, ci, cµi, cσi)}
if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t Identify(uid∗d, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1} and mi = m∗
if ∃j ∈ [k]\{i} s.t. Identify(uid∗d, cj , cµj , cσj) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1} return ⊥
else return ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
UNBLIND((µ1, σ1,m1), . . . , (µk, σk,mk))
if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
∀i ∈ [k] (cµi, cσi, ci)←$CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi, σi,mi); ri)
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k; r′)
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi, σi,mi)←$CLS+.Unblind(bsk, (cµi, cσi, ci))
return ({(µi, σi,mi)}k, {(ri)}k, r′)
Figure 6.1: Oracles used in our CLS+ security model
For simplicity we often omit the keys for the algorithms (as they are clear from the context).
That is, we write Identify(uid, c, cµ, cσ), which indicates whether the pseudonym cµ belongs
to the user with identity uid or not. Likewise, we write UnLink((c1, cµ,cσ1), . . . , (ck, cµk, cσk))
to test whether all pseudonyms are uncorrelated or not.
Correctness. CLS+ signatures should be correct and consistent when being produced
by honest parties. We formulate correctness via three requirements, as in CLS:
• Correctness of sign guarantees that signatures formed using the CLS+.Sign algorithm
with a user secret key generated honestly will verify correctly.
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• Correctness of conversion guarantees that after blinding, converting and then un-
blinding correctly, the output will be correctly linked valid messages/ pseudonyms/
signatures.
• Consistency is a stronger variant of conversion-correctness and requires that the
correlations of pseudonyms established through the conversion procedure must be
consistent across queries. More precisely, if a conversion query reveals that two
pseudonym µ1 and µ2 are linked, and another one that µ2 and µ3 are linked, then
it must also hold that a conversion query for µ1 and µ3 returns linked pseudonyms.
The detailed definitions for correctness are given in Figure 6.2.
Definition 6.2 (Correctness). A CLS+ scheme satisfies correctness if, for all adversaries
A, Pr[Expcorr−sigA,CLS+ (τ) = 1] = 0, Pr[Expcorr−convA,CLS+ (τ) = 1] ≤ negl(τ), and, Pr[ExpconsistA,CLS+(τ) =
1] = 0.
Again, for the correctness of conversion, the negligible chance that the adversary has of
winning corresponds to the negligible chance that multiple user identifiers have the same
secret key. The only aspect of correctness that has changed is that verify is now input
converted signatures in correctness of conversion, and we check that converted signatures
are valid.
Anonymity. This security requirement captures the desired anonymity properties when
both the issuer and data lake are corrupt (but the converter is honest). Just as in CLS, we
want signatures of honest users to be unlinkable and untraceable to a user’s join session
with the corrupt issuer. To model this property, we let the adversary output uids of two
honest users together with a message, and return a challenge (µ∗, σ∗) that is created either
by user uid0 or uid1. For anonymity, the adversary should not be able to determine the
user’s identity with a better chance than by guessing.
The CLS notion assumed the data lake to be honest, which was modelled via a conversion
oracle that took unblinded tuples as input, thus allowing the oracle to first check the
validity of the input before then internally blinding and converting them. Here we allow
the data lake to be malicious and therefore enable them to ask for the conversion of blinded
tuples. In order to prevent trivial wins, we must be able to detect whether the adversary
tries to convert the challenge signature. As signatures will be re-randomisable to allow
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Experiment: Expcorr−sigA,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CLS+.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL← ∅
(uid,m)←$AADDU(gpk), if gsk[uid] =⊥ return 0
(µ, σ)←$CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
if CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ) = 0 return 1 else return 0
Experiment: Expcorr−convA,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param),
(bpk, bsk)←$CLS+.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk),HUL, CUL← ∅
((uid1,m0), ..., (uidk,mk))←$AADDU(gpk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] st gsk[uidi] =⊥ return 0
∀i ∈ [1, k] (µi, σi)←$CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uidi],mi)
∀j ∈ [1, k] (cµj , cσj , cj)←$CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µj , σj ,mj))
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
∀j ∈ [1, k] (µj , σj ,mj)←$CLS+.Unblind((cµj , cσj , cj), bsk)
if ∃j ∈ [1, k] s.t CLS+.Verify(tier-2, gpk, bpk,mj , µj , σj) = 0 return 1
if ∃ permutation Π : [1, k]→ [1, k] s.t.
1.∀i ∈ [1, k] mΠ(i) = mi
2.∀(i, j) ∈ [1, k] with uidi = uidj µΠ(i) = µΠ(j)
3.∀(i, j) ∈ [1, k] with uidi 6= uidj µΠ(i) 6= µΠ(j)
return 0
else return 1
Experiment: ExpconsistA,CLS+(τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param),
(bpk, bsk)←$CLS+.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((c0, cµ0, cσ0), (c1, cµ1, cσ1), (c2, cµ2, cσ2))←$A(gpk, isk, csk, bsk)
if UnLink((c0, cµ0, cσ0), (c1, cµ1, cσ1)) 6= 0 or
UnLink((c1, cµ1, cσ1), (c2, cµ2, cσ2)) 6= 0 return 0
if UnLink((c0, cµ0, cσ0), (c2, cµ2, cσ2)) = 1 return 1
else return 0
Figure 6.2: Security games for correctness of CLS+
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for non–transitivity, we opt for an RCCA-style of definition and check whether any of the
blinded signature-tuples would identify to either of the challenge users and the challenge
message. To do so, we also require the adversary to input the blinding secret key into the
oracle. We stress that this key is merely used to check whether the internally unblinded
inputs can be traced to a challenge user, but there are no checks that enforce that the
inputs are actually well-formed.
Definition 6.3 (CLS+ Anonymity). A CLS+ scheme satisfies anonymity if for all polynomial–
time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−0A,CLS+(τ) = 1]− Pr[Expanon−1A,CLS+(τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expanon−bA,CLS+(τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk), (uid∗0, uid∗1,m∗, bpk∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗0] =⊥ or uid∗1 /∈ HUL or gsk[uid∗1] =⊥ return 0
(µ∗, σ∗)←$CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk∗,gsk[uid∗b ],m∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗) return b∗
Non–transitivity. The second privacy-related property of CLS is the strict non-transitivity
of conversions. This must now hold when not only the issuer, but also the data lake and
processor can be fully corrupt. Non-transitivity ensures that the outputs of separate con-
vert queries cannot be linked together across multiple queries. Otherwise, data processor(s)
could gradually re-recover the linkability among all signatures.
The definition uses a simulation-based approach, requiring the indistinguishability of an
ideal and a real world. In the real world, convert queries are handled normally through
the CONVERT oracle defined in Figure 6.1. Whereas in the ideal world, the converted
pseudonyms are produced by a simulator SIM through the CONVSIM oracle which we
define here. For honest users, the simulator will only learn which of the messages belong
together, but does not obtain any information about the underlying user identity. This
naturally enforces the desired non-transitivity.
In contrast to the original CLS model, we now allow the data lake to trigger conversions
on blinded inputs. Similarly to the anonymity game, the adversary must also input the
blinding (secret) key with each query. Here the key is used to internally unblind the inputs
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and determine the correlation among the signatures. We stress that this is not an artefact
of our concrete instantiation, but rather a necessity to obtain a security definition that
is realizable, as the CONVSIM oracle is still expected to provide consistently transformed
outputs within a query. Further, the ideal CONVSIM oracle first internally runs the real
conversion algorithm and aborts if it fails. This is again necessary to avoid trivial wins
where the adversary might input malformed tuples which the simulator never gets and
thus cannot verify.
Definition 6.4 (CLS+ Non–transitivity). A CLS+ scheme satisfies non-transitivity if for
all polynomial–time adversaries A there exists an efficient simulator SIM such that the
following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expnontrans−0A,CLS+ (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expnontrans−1A,CLS+ (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expnontrans−bA,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(guess, gpk, isk) return b∗
where the oracle CONVX works as follows:
if b = 0 (real world) then CONVX is the standard CONVERT oracle
if b = 1 (ideal world) then CONVX is the simulated CONVSIM oracle
CONVSIM((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK or CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, (cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck)) =⊥ return ⊥
CL← ∅,∀i ∈ [1, k]
if ∃uid ∈ HUL s.t Identify(bpk, bsk, uid, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1
if Luid does not exist, create Luid ← {ci} else set Luid ← Luid ∪ {ci}
else CL← CL ∪ {(ci, cσi, cµi)}
({(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=1,...k′)←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk,CL) for k′ ← |CL|
Let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=k′+1,...k←$ SIM(gpk, bpk, csk, Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ )
Let {(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k be a random permutation of {(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=1,...k
return ({(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k)
204
6.2 Definition and Security Model for CLS+
Conversion Blindness (Corrupt Issuer and Converter). As in CLS, a crucial prop-
erty of our signatures is that they can be converted obliviously, i.e., the converter learns
nothing about what it converts. However now the converter receives and outputs signa-
tures, which must also be converted obliviously.
Conversion blindness should hold if both the issuer and converter are corrupt, but the
data lake is honest. We formalise this property in a classic indistinguishability style:
the adversary outputs two tuples of pseudonym-message-signature tuples and receives a
blinded version of either of them.
In the original Conversion Blindness requirement for CLS no oracles are required because
blinding is a public-key operation. However, in the CLS+ setting, CLS+.Unblind now
outputs a tier-2 signature. We therefore must ensure that this signature does not leak
anything that allows for the unblinding of other converted signatures. We therefore provide
the adversary with access to a CLS+.Unblind oracle that blinds, converts and unblinds
signatures. We stress that this requirement only provides chosen–plaintext level security
as in CLS, because CLS+.Unblind both blinds and unblinds signatures.
Definition 6.5 (CLS+ Conversion Blindness). A CLS+ scheme satisfies conversion blind-
ness if for all polynomial–time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible in τ :
∣∣∣Pr[Expblind−conv−0A,CLS+ (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expblind−conv−1A,CLS+ (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Experiment: Expblind−conv−bA,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
(bpk, bsk)←$CLS+.BKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
(st, (µ0, σ0,m0), (µ1, σ1,m1))←$AUNBLIND(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, csk)
if ∃d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,md, µd, σd) = 0 return 0
(cµ∗, cσ∗, c∗)←$CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µb, σb,mb))
b∗←$AUNBLIND(guess, st, cµ∗, cσ∗, c∗) return b∗
Traceability of tier-2 signatures. This security requirement formalises the unforge-
ability properties when the issuer is honest but the converter, data lake and some users
are corrupt. To lift the CLS traceability notion to the setting where conversion can be
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triggered by malicious parties, we let the adversary output a list of blinded signatures. As
we still assume the converter to be corrupt in an honest-but-curious form, the signatures
are then honestly converted and unblinded by the challenger. The adversary wins if this
conversion leads to more unlinkable signatures than the number of users it has corrupted
plus the number of signatures obtained through signing queries for distinct users. Doing
the unblinding within the game is necessary to check whether the adversary has indeed
produced a valid forgery.
Note that this notion only captures traceability of tier-2 signatures, and CLS+ schemes
must additionally satisfy the traceability of tier-1 signatures as defined in Section 4.2.
Definition 6.6 (CLS+ Traceability). A CLS+ scheme satisfies tier-2 traceability if for
all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[ExptraceA,CLS+(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExptraceA,CLS+(τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((c1, cµ1, cσ1), ..., (ck, cµk, cσk), bpk, bsk)←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, csk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return 0
∀i ∈ [k] (µi, σi,mi)←$CLS+.Unblind(bsk,CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k))
L← 0,∀uid ∈ HUL if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t (uid,mi, bpk) ∈ SL L← L+ 1
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
k > |CUL|+ L and UnLink((cµ1, cσ1, c1), ..., (cµk, cσk, ck)) = 1 and
∀i ∈ [k] CLS+.Verify(tier-2, gpk, bpk,mi, µi, σi) = 1
Traceability of tier-1 Signatures. For completeness we now present the original CLS
traceability requirement for tier-1 signatures in the context of our new setting.
Definition 6.7 (CLS+ tier-1 Traceability). A CLS+ scheme satisfies tier-1 traceabil-
ity if for all polynomial–time adversaries A, the advantage Pr[Exptrace−tier1A,CLS+ (τ) = 1] is
negligible in τ .
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Experiment: Exptrace−tier1A,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((m1, µ1, σ1), ..., (mk, µk, σk), bpk)←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, csk)
∀i ∈ [k] (cµi, cσi, ci)←$CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (µi, σi,mi))
L← 0,∀uid ∈ HUL if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t (uid,mi, bpk) ∈ SL L← L+ 1
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
k > |CUL|+ L and UnLink((cµ1, cσ1, c1), ..., (cµk, cσk, ck)) = 1 and
∀i ∈ [k] CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,mi, µi, σi) = 1
Non–frameability. This notion captures the desired unforgeability properties when the
issuer is corrupt and requires that an adversary should not be able to impersonate an hon-
est user. Impersonation here means that the adversary outputs two converted signatures
that link to an honest user, but that user never signed one of the corresponding messages.
We use the Identify algorithm to check whether the signatures stem from an honest user
and then look up whether at least one of the messages is not contained in the list of signed
messages by that user.
As we defined Identify to work on blinded signatures, we first retrieve (µb,mb, cb, cµb, cσb)
from the list of queries of the convert oracle (for (µb,mb)). If such tuples cannot be found,
the adversary also wins.
In contrast to traceability, it suffices to define non-frameability for tier-2 signatures only:
tier-1 signatures are entirely unlinkable, and thus the notion of framing attacks only
matters for converted signatures. Also, unlike in traceability, the adversary does not get
the converter secret key here but instead outputs converted signatures directly (whereas
traceability gave the adversary the key, but converted the signatures honestly).
Definition 6.8 (CLS+ Non–frameability). A CLS+ scheme satisfies non–frameability if
for all polynomial–time adversaries A the advantage Pr[ExpnonframeA,CLS+ (τ) = 1] is negligible
in τ .
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Experiment: ExpnonframeA,CLS+ (τ)
param←$CLS+.Setup(1λ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((m0, µ0, σ0), (m1, µ1, σ1), bpk, bsk)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(gpk, isk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK or ∃b ∈ {0, 1} s.t CLS+.Verify(tier-2, gpk, bpk,mb, µb, σb) = 0 return 0
∀b ∈ {0, 1} if (µb,mb, cb, cµb, cσb) /∈ UBL return 1
return 1 if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
µ0 = µ1 and ∃uid ∈ HUL s.t Identify(uid, c0, cµ0, cσ0) = 1 and
(uid,m0, bpk) /∈ SL, or (uid,m1, bpk) /∈ SL
6.3 Our CLS+ Construction
We finally present our construction of a convertible group signature scheme. It uses a
commuting group signature, as defined in Chapter 5, as a core building block provided
it satisfies some additional structural assumptions, and also leverages a standard digital
signature scheme SIG, and a signature proof of knowledge SPK.
High–level Idea. The issuer in our CLS+ scheme simply runs the same algorithms as
in the CGS scheme, whereas the converter takes over the role of the opener in CGS and also
creates a key pair for a standard signature scheme. When requesting blinded conversions,
the group signatures are blinded and re-randomised using the algorithms from the CGS
scheme. The converter blindly opens them and raises the blinded user keys to the power
of r, which is chosen afresh in every convert query, but used consistently within the
query. The converter then blindly signs the converted pseudonym and message. During
unblinding, the converted pseudonyms and messages are retrieved. The final converted
signature is the blindly signed tuple from the converter, along with a proof that unblinding
has been done correctly, which can both be publicly verified.
To ensure that the converter only blindly signs messages that were correctly authenticated
via a group signature, we use the property that blinded signatures from the CGS scheme
can also be verified. Given that the converter is assumed to be at most honest-but-
curious, this transmits the authentication guarantees from the original group signatures
to the converted ones.
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Additional Structural Assumptions of CGS. We need some additional assumptions
from the underlying CGS scheme. We will show in Section 6.5 that these assumptions
are satisfied by our concrete instantiation given in Chapter 5. Firstly, we require that
given a bilinear group, usk ∈ Z∗p, upk = gusk2 , and the output of CGS.OpenBlind consists
of elements in G2. We also require that:
e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk))
r = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupk)
r) and
CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk))r = CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkr).
This essentially means that unblinding of user public keys output by CGS.OpenBlind is
homomorphic. This allows the converter to ensure non-transitivity by re-randomising the
pseudonym output, whilst ensuring that pseudonyms are consistently linked per convert
query.
We also require the CGS scheme to satisfy an additional property we define as extractability.
Roughly, this allows upk′ to be extracted from standard and blinded group signatures
opening to upk, such that e(upk′, g2) = e(g1, upk), provided that the signature does not
open to a user public key input to a simulator that simulates signatures.
We now present the extractability requirement for commuting group signatures.
Firstly, there exists simulators S1, S2, S3 such that for all polynomial–time adversaries A
the advantage
∣∣∣Pr[Expsim−0A,CGS(τ) = 1]− Pr[Expsim−1A,CGS(τ) = 1]∣∣∣ is negligible in τ .
Experiment: Expsim-bA,CGS(τ)
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ ), if b = 0 param←$CGS.Setup(1τ )
if b = 1 (param, τs)←$S1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
(isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$CGS.OKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
b∗←$ASNDUX,SIGNX(gpk, isk, osk)
where the oracles SNDUX,SIGNX work as follows:
if b = 0 (real world) then SNDUX,SIGNX are the SNDU,SIGN oracles
if b = 1 (ideal world) then SNDUX,SIGNX are the simulated SNDUSIM,SIGNSIM oracles
return b∗
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SNDUSIM(uid,Min)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
upk[uid]←$G2
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥, if stuidJoin undefined stuidJoin ← (gpk,⊥,upk[uid])
(stuidJoin,MOut,dec
uid)←$S2(param, stuidJoin,Min, τs), return (MOut,decuid)
SIGNSIM(uid,m, bpk)
if uid /∈ HUL or decuid 6= accept return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$S3(param, gpk, bpk,upk[uid],m, τs) return (σ, µ)
Secondly, there exists SE1, E2, such that (param, τs, ·) output by SE1 is distributed iden-
tically to the output of S1, and for all polynomial–time adversaries A the advantage
Pr[ExpextA,CGS(τ) = 1] is negligible in τ .
Experiment: ExpextA,CGS(τ)
(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)←$G(1τ )
(param, τs, τe)←$SE1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
(isk, ipk)←$CGS.IKGen(param), (osk, opk)←$OKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, opk)
(c, cµ, cσ, bpk, bsk)←$AS2(param,·,·,τs),S3(param,·,·,·,τS)(gpk, isk, osk)
if CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, c, cµ, cσ) = 0 or (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return 0
upk ← CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ))
if upk queried to S3 for bpk, opk, ipk return 0
upk′ ← E2(gpk, bpk, isk, osk, bsk, c, cµ, cσ, τe)
if upk′ =⊥ or e(upk′, g2) 6= e(g1, upk) return 1 else return 0
6.3.1 Detailed Description of CLS–CGS
We now give a detailed description of the CLS–CGS construction. Only commuting group
signatures that satisfy the additional structural assumptions can be used to build this
construction.
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Setup and Key Generation. The CLS+.Setup , CLS+.IKGen, CLS+.CKGen and
CLS+.BKGen algorithms are identical to the CGS.Setup, CGS.IKGen, CGS.OKGen and
CGS.BKGen algorithms for CGS respectively, except that the converter’s key also includes
a signing and verification key of a digital signature scheme.
CLS+.Setup(1τ )
paramcgs←$CGS.Setup(1τ )
paramsig←$ SIG.Setup(1τ )
return (paramcgs, paramsig)
CLS+.IKGen(param)
return CGS.IKGen(paramcgs)
CLS+.BKGen(param)
return CGS.BKGen(paramcgs)
CLS+.CKGen(param)
(cpk1, csk1)←$CGS.OKGen(paramcgs), (cpk2, csk2)←$SIG.KeyGen(1τ )
return ((cpk1, cpk2), (csk1, csk2))
Join. The join protocol between a user and the issuer is identical to the join protocol of
our CGS scheme, except the (upk, usk) are generated in CLS+.Join. The detailed protocol
of 〈CLS+.Join(gpk),CLS+.Issue(isk, gpk)〉 is given in Figure 6.3.
U .CLS+.Join(gpk) 
 I.CLS+.Issue(isk, gpk)
(upk, usk)←$CGS.UKGen(paramcgs)
-upk
〈CGS.Join(gpk, usk, upk),CGS.Issue(gpk, isk, upk)〉
Figure 6.3: Join protocol of our CLS–CGS construction
Sign and Verification of tier-1 signatures. Our signatures are identical to those
in the CGS scheme, and therefore signing and verification are the same. In more detail,
CLS+.Sign and CLS+.Verify are defined as follows:
CLS+.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
return CGS.Sign(gpk, bpk,gsk[uid],m)
CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
return CGS.Verify(gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
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Blind Conversions. The signatures can be blinded identically using the power of the
CGS scheme. In CLS+.Convert, blinded signatures are now input and verified, leveraging
the fact that even fully blinded inputs can be checked for their correctness. The signatures,
pseudonyms, and blinded messages are re-randomised with CGS.RRandBlind to ensure non-
transitivity. The pseudonyms are then blindly opened under the csk1 using CGS.OpenBlind,
and converted by raising them to the power of r and transforming them into the target
group to ensure non-transitivity. The converted signature is simply a digital signature on
the blinded converted pseudonym and message, with respect to the converter’s verification
key. In CLS+.Unblind the converted pseudonym and ciphertext are now unblinded with
CGS.UnblindUser and CGS.UnblindM. The converted pseudonym, message and signature
are included in the tier-2 signature, along with a proof that the unblinding has been done
correctly. During tier-2 verification, the converter’s signature on the blinded values and
the proof of unblinding are verified.
CLS+.Blind(gpk, bpk, (m,µ, σ))
return CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk, (m,µ, σ))
CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
r←$Z∗p, for i = 1, . . . k :
(c′i, cµ
′
i, cσ
′
i)←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci, cµi, cσi)
cµ′′i ← CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, c′i, cµ′i, cσ′i)
cµ′′′i ← e(g1, cµ′′i )r, σ′i←$SIG.Sign(csk2, (c′i, cµ′′′i , bpk))
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k : (cµi, ci, cσi)← (cµ′′′Π(i), c′Π(i), σ′Π(i))
return ((cµ1, c1, cσ1)), ..., (cµk, ck, cσk)))
CLS+.Unblind(bsk, (cµ, cσ, c))
µ← CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cµ),m← CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c)
piub←$ SPK{bsk : µ = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cµ) ∧m = CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c) ∧ (bsk, bpk) ∈ BK}
σ ← (cµ, cσ, c, piub) return (µ,m, σ)
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CLS+.Verify(tier-2, gpk, bpk,m, µ, σ)
parse σ = (cµ, cσ, c, piub),Verify piub holds for cµ, µ, c,m, bpk
if SIG.Ver((cµ, c, bpk), cpk2, cσ) = 1 return 1 else return 0
6.4 Security of CLS–CGS
We now show that our CLS–CGS construction satisfies all security properties defined in
Section 6.2. More precisely, we show that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 6.1. The CLS–CGS construction presented in Section 6.3.1 is a secure CLS+ as
defined in Section 6.2 if
• the CGS scheme is secure as defined in 5.3.2, and also satisfies extractability and the
additional structural assumptions,
• the SIG is strongly EUF-cma secure,
• the SPK is zero–knowledge and sound,
• the DDH assumption holds in G2.
We now present proofs, showing that our CLS–CGS construction satisfies the correctness,
anonymity, non–transitivity, conversion blindness, non–frameability and traceability re-
quirements given in Section 6.2.
6.4.1 Correctness
Correctness of sign is clearly satisfied, due to the correctness of the commuting group
signatures building block.
For all i ∈ k, the blinded signatures cµi, cσi, ci are honestly generated and blinded com-
muting group signatures. In CLS+.Convert they are then re-randomised. Due to the
re-randomisation property, they are indistinguishable from freshly generated and blinded
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signatures. Let cupki be the output of CGS.OpenBlind under the re-randomised blinded sig-
natures, which will consist of elements inG2. The value e(g1, cupki)r will be the pseudonym
output by CLS+.Convert, and CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupki)
r) will be the pseudonym
output by CLS+.Unblind. The commuting group signature satisfies:
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupki)
r) = e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupki))
r.
Therefore due to the correctness of the commuting group signature scheme, letting upki
be the user public key of the ith user, µi = e(g1, upki))
r. Again, due to the correctness
of the commuting group signatures, mi = mi. Due to the correctness of the SPK and the
digital signature used, the signature σ output will be valid. Therefore the construction
satisfies correctness of conversion.
Assume
UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ0,m0, σ0), (µ1,m1, σ1))) = 0
and UnLink(gpk, csk, ((µ1,m1, σ1), (µ2,m2, σ2))) = 0.
This ensures they are all valid blinded commuting group signatures, as otherwise UnLink
would output ⊥. For i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, let
upki = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk, ci, cµi, cσi)).
Due to the same argument as correctness of conversion and the re-randomisation property,
letting r1, r2 be the randomness chosen during Convert, e(g1, upk0)
r1 = e(g1, upk1)
r1 and
e(g1, upk1)
r2 = e(g1, upk2)
r2 . Therefore, e(g1, upk0) = e(g1, upk1) = e(g1, upk2). However,
if
UnLink(gpk, csk, ((cµ0, c0, cσ0), (cµ2, c2, cσ2))) = 1,
then e(g1, upk0)
r3 6= e(g1, upk2)r3 , where r3 was chosen during Convert. This is a contra-
diction. Therefore the construction satisfies consistency.
6.4.2 Anonymity
Lemma 6.1. The CLS–CGS construction satisfies anonymity if the DDH assumption
holds in G2, and the CGS scheme satisfies anonymity, extractability, and the additional
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CONVERT((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if ∃i∗ ∈ [k], d ∈ {0, 1} s.t Identify(uid∗d, ci∗ , cµi∗ , cσi∗) = 1
and CGS.UnblindM(bsk, ci∗) = m
∗ and bpk = bpk∗
if ∃i ∈ [k]\{i∗} s.t. Identify(uid∗d, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1} return ⊥
({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k−1)←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci) : i ∈ [k]\{i∗}})
if ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k−1) =⊥ return ⊥, ck←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci∗)
upk∗←$G2, cµk ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk∗)), cσk←$SIG.Sign(csk2, (ck, cµk, bpk))
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k :
(cµi, ci, cσi)← (cµΠ(i), cΠ(i), cσΠ(i))
else compute {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
return ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
Figure 6.4: Convert oracle used during first j queries of Game (0, j) in the CLS+ anonymity
proof
structural assumptions.
Proof. We assume that an adversary A exists, that makes q queries to the SNDU oracle
for distinct user identifiers, and qconv queries to the CONVERT oracle, that wins in the
anonymity game with probability + 1/2.
We define Game (0,0) to be the anonymity experiment, with b chosen randomly at the
beginning, using the CLS–CGS construction. Let P0,0 be the event that an adversary A
correctly guesses b after Game (0,0).
Game (0, j) is identical to Game (0,0) except during the first j queries to the CONVERT
oracle, when c, cµ, cσ is queried to the CONVERT oracle such that c unblinds to m, for
d ∈ {0, 1} Identify(uid∗d, c, cµ, cσ) = 1 and m = m∗. We provide the new convert oracle
used for such j queries in Game (0, j) in Figure 6.4. Let P0,j be the event that the
adversary A correctly guesses b after Game (0, j).
We show that Game (0,j) and Game (0, j+1) are indistinguishable assuming the DDH
assumption in G2. We provide a distinguishing algorithm Dj in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, and
then explain why Dj simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically to Game (0, j)
if a DDH tuple is input, and Dj simulates inputs to A that are distributed identically to
Game (0, j + 1) if a DDH tuple is not input.
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CONVERT((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
s← s+ 1 if s ≤ j perform CONVERT given in Figure 12
if s > j + 1 perform CONVERT given in anonymity experiment
If ∃i ∈ [k] s.t CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, ci, cµi, cσi) =⊥ return ⊥
if ∃i∗ ∈ [k], d ∈ {0, 1} s.t CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, ci∗ , cµi∗ , cσi∗))
= upk[uid∗d] and CGS.UnblindM(bsk, ci∗) = m
∗ and bpk = bpk∗
if uid∗d 6= uid′ abort Dj
if ∃i ∈ [k]\{i∗}, d ∈ {0, 1} s.t. CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, ci, cµi, cσi))
= upk[uid∗d] return ⊥
for i = [k]\{i∗} :
if ∃uid ∈ HUL\{uid′} s.t Identify(uid, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1, upk′i ← gusk[uid]1
else upk′i ← E2(gpk, isk, osk, bsk, ci, cµi, cσi, τe), if upk′i =⊥ return ⊥
ci←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci), cµi ← e(upk′i,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D3))
cσi←$SIG.Sign(csk2, (ci, cµi, bpk))
µi∗ ← D4, cµi∗ ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, µi∗))
ci∗ ←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci∗), cσi∗ ←$SIG.Sign(csk2, (ci∗ , cµi∗ , bpk))
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k :
(cµi, ci, cσi)← (cµΠ(i), cΠ(i), cσΠ(i))
else compute {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
return ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
Figure 6.5: Dj a distinguishing algorithm for the DDH problem in the CLS+ anonymity
proof
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SNDU(uid, n)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid}, l← l + 1,gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if l = k uid′ ← uid,upk[uid]← D2, stuidJoin ← (gpk,⊥,upk[uid]) return (upk[uid],decuid)
if uid = uid′
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$S2(paramCGS, stuidJoin,Min, τs), return (Mout,decuid)
Continue from line 5 of oracle in anonymity experiment
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
if uid 6= uid′ perform SIGN oracle from anonymity experiment
if uid = uid′
if decuid 6= accept return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$S3(paramCGS, gpk, bpk,upk[uid],m, τs),SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, bpk)}
return (σ, µ)
Dj(D1, D2, D3, D4)
s, l← 0, k←$ [1, q], b←$ {0, 1}, g1←$G1, g2 ← D1
(paramCGS, τs, τe)←$SE1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramsig←$SIG.Setup(1τ )
param← (paramCGS, paramsig), (isk, ipk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param), (csk, cpk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param)
gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
(uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, bpk∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0 /∈ HUL or if decuid
∗
0 6= accept or uid∗1 /∈ HUL or if decuid
∗
1 6= accept if b = 0 return 1 else return 0
(µ∗, σ∗)←$ SIGN(uid′,m∗, bpk∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗)
if b∗ = b return 1
Figure 6.6: Dj a distinguishing algorithm for the DDH problem in the CLS+ anonymity
proof
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The values gpk, csk, isk are distributed identically to the anonymity game, as everything
but g2, paramCGS are chosen in the same way. The simulator SE1 outputs a paramCGS that
is identically distributed to the output of CRSSetup.
Simulating the SNDU oracle. The SNDU oracle only differs from the oracle in the
anonymity experiment when uid′ is input. In this case, upk is distributed identically,
and S2 simulates the CGS.Join protocol. Therefore the outputs of SNDU are distributed
identically to the anonymity experiment, due to the extractability of the commuting group
signatures.
Simulating the SIGN oracle. The SIGN oracle is identical to the oracle in the anonymity
experiment when uid 6= uid′ is queried. When uid′ is queried, S3 can then be used to
simulate signatures that are identically distributed, due to the extractability of commut-
ing group signatures. Therefore the outputs of SIGN are distributed identically to the
anonymity experiment.
Simulating the CONVERT oracle. Other than the jth query, the CONVERT oracle
is identical to both Games (0, j) and (0, j + 1).
For the jth query, if the input to Dj is a DDH tuple, then outputs from the CONVERT
oracle are identically distributed to in the anonymity game. This is because if c, cµ, cσ is
not queried to the CONVERT oracle such that c unblinds to m, Identify(uid∗d, c, cµ, cσ) = 1
for d ∈ {0, 1} and m = m∗ and bpk = bpk∗, the oracle behaves identically to the anonymity
game. If an invalid blinded signature is input, the oracle will abort, as in the original
anonymity game.
If this is queried, we show the simulation is correctly distributed. Firstly ci and cσi are
generated identically to CLS+.Convert.
As we do not have access to gsk[uid′], we cannot perform Identify on input uid′, therefore
instead we perform CGS.OpenBlind and CGS.UnblindUser. Only one signature identifies to
uid∗d, otherwise the oracle will abort as in the anonymity game. We assume uid
∗
d = uid
′,
which happens with probability 1/q, therefore extraction of the upk′i is always successful
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because the signatures do not open to the user public key of uid′.
Letting r′ = logD1(D3) and upk
′
i = g
uski
1 , upki = g
uski
2 , hence
cµi = e(upk
′
i,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D3)) = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D3)
uski)
= e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, g
r′uski
2 )) = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upki))
r′ ,
which is correctly distributed. Also, letting upk = upk[uid′],
cµi∗ = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, µi∗)) = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D4))
= e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk
r′)) = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk))
r′ .
As CGS.BlindUser on input upk is indistinguishable from the output of CGS.RRandBlind
followed by CGS.OpenBlind on a blinded signature that would open to upk after unblinding,
the converted pseudonyms are distributed correctly. The cµi are then shuffled with a
random permutation. Therefore, the outputs of the CONVERT oracle are distributed
identically to the CONVERT oracle in the anonymity game, and so identically to Game
(0, j).
Simulating (µ∗, σ∗). The signature (µ∗, σ∗) input to A in the guessing stage is dis-
tributed identically to the anonymity game, due to outputs of the SIGN oracle being
distributed identically to the anonymity game.
Reduction to the DDH problem. If the input to Dj is not a DDH tuple, then
the output of the CONVERT oracle is identically distributed to Figure 6.4. This is
because if c, cµ, cσ is not queried to the CONVERT oracle such that c unblinds to m,
Identify(uid∗d, c, cµ, cσ) = 1 and m = m
∗ for d ∈ {0, 1} and bpk = bpk∗, then the oracle
behaves identically to both games. If this is the case, as D4 is now chosen randomly
and independently, c∗i , cµ
∗
i , cσ
∗
i are now chosen identically to Figure 6.4. Therefore, if the
input to Dj is not a DDH tuple, then the outputs to A are identically distributed to
Game (0, j + 1).
The distinguisher Dj only aborts early if c, cµ, cσ is queried to the CONVERT oracle,
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such that c unblinds to m, Identify(uid∗d, c, cµ, cσ) = 1 and m = m
∗, for d ∈ {0, 1} and
uid′ 6= uid∗d. This occurs with probability at most q − 1/q. Therefore the probability
that Dj outputs 1 given a DDH tuple was input is Pr[P0,j ]/q. The probability that Dj
outputs 1 given a DDH tuple was not input is Pr[P0,j+1]/q. The advantage of Dj is then
|Pr[P0,j ]− Pr[P0,j+1]|/q, therefore |Pr[P0,j ]− Pr[P0,j+1]| = qDDH.
We define Game 1 to be Game (0, qconv), where qconv is the number of queries to the
CONVERT oracle. Let P1 be the event that an adversary A correctly guesses b after
Game 1. As |Pr[P0,j ]− Pr[P0,j+1]| = qDDH, then |Pr[P0,0]− Pr[P1]| ≤ qconvqDDH.
Next, we show that |Pr[P1]−1/2| ≤ CGSanon. We build an adversary A′ that successfully
guesses b in the anonymity game for commuting group signatures, given A that guesses
successfully in Game 1 with Pr[P1]. We provide A′ in Figure 6.7, and then explain why
the simulation input to A is identically distributed to Game 1, and that A′ successfully
breaks the anonymity of commuting group signatures.
The keys (gpk, isk) are computed identically to the anonymity game. As the SNDUCGS
oracle for the commuting group signatures join protocol is identical to the SNDU oracle
for the CLS+ join protocol, the SNDU oracle is distributed identically. As users’ secret
keys and signatures are distributed identically, the SIGN oracle is distributed correctly,
and input in the guessing phase is distributed correctly.
Simulating the CONVERT oracle. The CONVERT oracle can no longer use Identify
without the secret keys of the honest users. However, if there exists i∗ ∈ [k] such that
Identify(uid∗d, ci∗ , cµi∗ , cσi∗) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1} and CGS.UnblindM(bsk, ci∗) = m∗ and bpk =
bsk∗, then BOPEN(ci∗ , cµi∗ , cσi∗ , bpk, bsk) would output ⊥ in the CGS anonymity game.
If there exists i ∈ [k] such that Identify(uid∗d, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1 for d ∈ {0, 1} , then BOPEN
would either open to the user public key of uid∗d or would output ⊥. Therefore these con-
ditions can be checked instead. Finally, the only difference to in Game 1 is that BOPEN is
used in CLS+.Convert instead of CGS.OpenBlind; as BOPEN will not output ⊥, this oracle
is distributed identically to Figure 6.4.
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SNDU(uid,Min)
return SNDUCGS(uid,Min)
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
return SIGNCGS(uid,m, bpk)
CONVERT((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t CGS.BlindVerify(gpk, bpk, ci, cµi, cσi) = 0 or (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if ∃i∗ ∈ [k] s.t BOPEN(ci∗ , cµi∗ , cσi∗ , bpk, bsk) =⊥
if ∃i ∈ [k]\{i∗} s.t. BOPEN(ci, cµi, cσi, bpk, bsk) =⊥ or upk[uid∗d] for d ∈ {0, 1}
return ⊥
Using the BOPEN oracle instead of CGS.OpenBlind compute
({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k−1)←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci) : i ∈ [k]\{i∗}})
if ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k−1) =⊥ return ⊥
ck←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci∗), upk∗←$G2, cµk ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk∗))
cσk←$ SIG.Sign(csk2, (ck, cµk, bpk))
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k :
(cµi, ci, cσi)← (cµΠ(i), cΠ(i), cσΠ(i))
else Using the BOPEN oracle instead of CGS.OpenBlind compute
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}k←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, {(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
return ({(cµi, cσi, ci)}k)
A′SNDUCGS,SIGNCGS,OPEN,BOPEN(choose, gpkCGS, iskCGS)
parse gpkCGS = (paramCGS, opkCGS, ipkCGS)
paramsig←$SIG.Setup(1τ ), (cpk2, csk2)←$ SIG.KeyGen(1τ ), param← (paramCGS, paramsig)
(ipk, isk)← (ipkCGS, iskCGS), cpk ← (opkCGS, cpk2), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
(uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, bpk∗, st)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(choose, gpk, isk)
if uid∗0 /∈ HUL or if decuid
∗
0 6= accept or uid∗1 /∈ HUL or if decuid
∗
1 6= accept return 0
return (uid∗0, uid
∗
1,m
∗, bpk∗, stCGS)
A′SNDU,SIGN,OPEN,BOPEN(guess, stCGS, µ∗, σ∗)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(guess, st, µ∗, σ∗)
return b∗
Figure 6.7: A′ which breaks the anonymity of commuting group signatures, given A which
breaks the anonymity of CLS–CGS
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Reduction to the Anonymity of Commuting Group Signatures. As the inputs to
A are distributed identically to Game 1, they will guess correctly with probability P1 and
so A′ will guess correctly in the CGS anonymity game with probability Pr[P1]. Therefore,
|Pr[P1] − 1/2| ≤ CGSanon. Therefore, |Pr[P0,0 − 1/2| ≤ CGSanon + qconvqDDH. As this is
negligible, our construction satisfies anonymity.
6.4.3 Non–transitivity
Lemma 6.2. The CLS–CGS construction satisfies non-transitivity if the DDH assump-
tion holds in G2, and the CGS scheme satisfies extractability and the additional structural
assumptions.
Proof. For proving non-transitivity, we have to show that there exists an efficient simulator
SIM that makes the real and simulated game indistinguishable. We start by describing
the simulator and then explain why the real and simulated conversion oracles CONVERT
and CONVSIM are indistinguishable.
SIM(gpk, bpk, csk, Luid1 , . . . Luidk′ )
l← 0,∀j ∈ [1, k′]
µ′←$G2;∀c ∈ Luidj
l← l + 1, cµl ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, µ′)), cl←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c)
cσl←$ SIG.Sign(csk2, (cµl, cl, bpk))
return ((cµ1, c1, cσ1), . . . (cµl, cl, cσl))
We assume that an adversary A exists that makes q queries to the SNDU oracle for distinct
user identifiers, and qconv queries to the CONVX oracle, that guesses b correctly in the non-
transitivity game with SIM as described and wins with probability + 1/2.
We will stepwise make the real-world (b=0) and the simulated world (b=1) equivalent,
using a sequence of Games Hj for j = 0, . . . , q. The idea is that in Game Hj we will not
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use simulated conversions for all users uid1, . . . , uidj in order of when they were queried
to SNDU. More precisely, we define Game Hj to be as given in Figure 6.8 with all other
oracles identical to the non–transitivity experiment. Let Pj be the event that A guesses
b correctly in Game Hj , with the simulator as described. Game Hj keeps track of the
queries to SNDU, adding the first j queries of uid to a set UL. Then during queries to
CONVSIM, if a signature of a user in UL is queried, these are treated in the same way as
pseudonyms for corrupted users, i.e., they are normally converted using the CLS+.Convert
algorithm. If a signature of an honest user that is not in UL is queried, we add this user
to NUL. These conversions are simulated as usual.
Game H0 is identical to the non-transitivity game because UL is empty. Therefore,
Pr[P0] = + 1/2. In Game Hq, UL contains all honest users, and so the CONVSIM oracle
is now identical to the CONVERT oracle, and inputs to the adversary are now independent
of b , therefore Pr[Pq] = 1/2.
We now show that if an adversary can distinguish Games Hj and Hj+1, we can turn
this into a distinguisher Dj that can break the DDH assumption in G2. We describe
the reduction and the additional simulation that is needed in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. The
CONVERT oracle remains unchanged. To avoid confusion, we write uid′ to refer to the
j + 1-th user that has joined the group (and for which Dj embedded the DDH challenge).
We now argue that when a DDH tuple (D′1, D′2, D′3, D′4) is input to Dj , the inputs to A
are distributed identically to Game Hj+1; when a DDH tuple is not input, the inputs to
A are distributed identically to Game Hj . That is for D′1 = h,D′2 = ha, D′3 = hb, D′4 = hc,
the oracles provided by Dj will be exactly as in Hj+1 when c = ab, and as in Hj otherwise.
We first note that due to the DDH random self-reduction given in [127], if a DDH tuple is
input to Dj , then for all i ∈ [qconv], D1, D2, D3,i, D4,i is a DDH tuple. If a DDH tuple is not
input to Dj , then D1, D2, D3,1, D4,1, · · · , D3,qconv , D4,qconv is randomly and independently
distributed.
The values gpk, csk, isk are distributed identically to the non-transitivity game, as every-
thing but g2, paramCGS are chosen in the same way. SE1 and Setup outputs identically
distributed paramCGS.
223
6.4 Security of CLS–CGS
Game Hj
t← 0, b←$ {0, 1}, param←$CLS+.Setup(1τ ), (ipk, isk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param)
(cpk, csk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
return ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(guess, gpk, isk)
SNDU(uid,Min)
if uid /∈ HUL, t← t+ 1, if t ≤ j UL← UL ∪ {uid}
Continue from line 2 of standard SNDU oracle
CONVSIM((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, (cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck)) =⊥ return ⊥
Set CL← ∅
∀i ∈ [1, k]
if ∃uid ∈ HUL s.t Identify(uid, ci, cµi, cσi) = 1
if Luid does not exist, create Luid ← {ci},CLuid ← {(ci, cσi, cµi)}
else set Luid ← Luid ∪ {ci},CLuid ← CLuid ∪ {(ci, cσi, cµi)}
else CL← CL ∪ {(ci, cσi, cµi)}
({(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=1,...k′)←$CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk,CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid))
for k′ ← |CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid|
Let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
Let NUL← {uid1, . . . uidk′′}\UL
{(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=k′+1,...k←$SIM(gpk, bpk, csk,
⋃
uid∈NUL
Luid)
Let {(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k be a random permutation of {(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=1,...k
return ({(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k)
Figure 6.8: Description of Game Hj and the changes to the SNDU and CONVSIM oracles
in the CLS+ non–transitivity proof
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Dj(D′1, D′2, D′3, D′4)
Expand D′1, D
′
2, D
′
3, D
′
4 into D1, D2, {D3,i, D4,i : i ∈ [qconv]} using DDH random self-reduction [127]
s, t← 0, g1←$G1, g2 ← D1, (paramCGS, τs, τe)←$SE1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
paramsig←$ SIG.Setup(1τ ), param← (paramCGS, paramsig), (isk, ipk)←$CLS+.IKGen(param)
(csk, cpk)←$CLS+.CKGen(param), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
b∗←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVX(gpk, csk, isk)
if b∗ = b return 1 else return 0
SNDU(uid, n)
if uid ∈ CUL return ⊥
if uid /∈ HUL, t← t+ 1, if t ≤ j UL← UL ∪ {uid}
HUL← HUL ∪ {uid},gsk[uid]←⊥,Min ←⊥,decuid ← cont
if t = j + 1 uid′ ← uid,upk[uid]← D2, stuidJoin ← (gpk,⊥,upk[uid]) return (D2,decuid)
if uid = uid′
if decuid 6= cont return ⊥
(stuidJoin,Mout,dec
uid)←$S2(paramCGS, stuidJoin,Min, τs), return (Mout,decuid)
Continue from line 5 of standard SNDU oracle
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
if uid 6= uid′ perform SIGN oracle from non–transitivity experiment
if uid = uid′
if decuid 6= accept return ⊥
(µ, σ)←$S3(paramCGS, gpk, bpk,upk[uid],m, τs),SL← SL ∪ {(uid,m, bpk)}
return (σ, µ)
Figure 6.9: Dj our distinguishing algorithm for the DDH problem in the CLS+ non–
transitivity proof
Simulating the SNDU oracle. The SNDU oracle only differs from the oracle in the
non–transitivity experiment during the (j + 1)-th query by embedding D2 of the DDH
challenger into the user’s public key upk. Clearly, upk is distributed correctly, and CGS.Join
can be simulated with S2 on input upk using τs. Note that usk, upk
′ are not defined for
this user, but this is not output to A, or used in the next stage of the protocol.
Simulating the SIGN oracle. The SIGN oracle is identical to the oracle in the non–
transitivity experiment when uid 6= uid′ is queried. When uid′ is queried, we simply use
S3 on input upk[uid] to simulate signatures.
Simulating the CONVSIM oracle. What remains to be shown is that the CONVSIM
oracle either behaves identically to the CONVSIM oracle in Game Hj or as in Hj+1,
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CONVSIM((cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
s← s+ 1, if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if CLS+.Convert(gpk, bpk, csk, (cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck)) =⊥ return ⊥
Set CL← ∅
∀i ∈ [1, k]
if ∃uid ∈ HUL s.t CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) = upk[uid]
if Luid does not exist Luid ← {ci},CLuid ← {(ci, gusk[uid]1 )}
else Luid ← Luid ∪ {ci},CLuid ← CLuid ∪ {(ci, gusk[uid]1 )}
else upk′i ← E2(gpk, bpk, isk, osk, bsk, ci, cµi, cσi, τe)
CL← CL ∪ {(ci, upk′i)}
n← 0; ∀(c, upk′) ∈ CL ∪
⋃
uid∈UL
CLuid
n← n+ 1, cµn ← e(upk′,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D3,s)), cn←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c)
cσn←$Sig(csk, (cµn, cn, bpk))
if Luid′ exists ∀c ∈ Luid′
n← n+ 1, cµn ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D4,s)), cn←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, c)
cσn←$Sig(csk, (cµn, cn, bpk))
let Luid1 , . . . Luidk′′ be the non-empty message clusters
Let NUL← {uid1, . . . uidk′′}\UL
{(cµi, ci, cσi)}i=n+1,...k←$ SIM(gpk, bpk, csk
⋃
uid∈NUL,uid 6=uid′
Luid)
Let {(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k be a random permutation of {(cµi, cσi, ci)}i=1,...k
return ({(cµ′i, cσ′i, c′i)}i=1,...k)
Figure 6.10: The CONVSIM oracle used by distinguisher Dj in the CLS+ non–transitivity
proof
depending on whether its input was a DDH tuple or not. The value upk′ is only extracted
if ci, cµi, cσi does not identify to any honest user, and therefore this will be successful as it
will not identify to upk[uid′]. In the case of uid′ usk[uid′] is not defined, however because
uid′ /∈ UL then CLuid′ will never be used. The values c, cσ are computed in the same way
as in CLS+.Convert. We know that D3,s = g
r˜
2 for some r˜ , and upk
′ = gusk1 for some usk,
and thus it must hold that:
cµ = e(upk′,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,D3,s)) = e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, gr˜2))
usk
= e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk))
r˜.
As CGS.BlindUser on input upk is indistinguishable from the output of CGS.RRandBlind
followed by CGS.OpenBlind on a blinded signature that would open to upk after unblinding,
these pseudonyms are distributed identically to the non–transitivity experiment.
If (D′1, D′2, D′3, D′4) is a DDH tuple, then D4,s = Dr˜2. Therefore as upkuid′ = D2, and
as CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkr˜uid′) = CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkuid′)
r˜, the inputs to A are also
distributed identically to Game Hj+1. Whereas if (D′1, D′2, D′3, D′4) is not a DDH tuple,
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then D4,s, is distributed identically to µ
′, which was chosen randomly and independently.
Therefore the inputs to A are distributed identically to Game Hj .
Reduction to the DDH problem. Therefore the probability that Dj outputs 1 if it
was given a valid DDH tuple as input is Pr[Pj+1], and Pr[Pj ] is the probability that Dj
outputs 1 when the input was not a DDH tuple. The advantage of Dj is then |Pr[Pj ] −
Pr[Pj+1]|, therefore |Pr[Pj ]− Pr[Pj+1]| = DDH.
Overall, for our sequence of games H0 to Hq it holds that |Pr[P0]− Pr[Pq]| ≤ qDDH and
thus  ≤ qDDH is negligible. This concludes our proof that the CLS–CGS construction
satisfies non–transitivity.
6.4.4 Conversion Blindness
Lemma 6.3. The CLS–CGS construction satisfies conversion blindness if the CGS
scheme satisfies the blindness requirement and the additional structural assumptions and
the SPK is zero–knowledge.
Proof. We build an adversary A′ that successfully guesses b in the blindness game for com-
muting group signatures, given A that successfully guesses b in the conversion blindness
game. We provide A′ in Figure 6.11, and then explain why the simulation input to A is
identically distributed to the conversion blindness experiment, and that A′ successfully
breaks the blindness of commuting group signatures.
The values (gpk, bpk, isk, csk) are computed identically to the conversion blindness game.
As signatures and the blinding algorithm are identical for both the CLS–CGS construction
and commuting group signatures, cµ∗, cσ∗, c∗ is identically distributed to the conversion
blindness game, with the same b chosen as that A′ must guess.
Simulating the UNBLIND oracle. Firstly µi = e(g1,CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, oskCGS,mi,
µi, σi))
r. This is distributed correctly because:
227
6.4 Security of CLS–CGS
UNBLIND(µ1, σ1,m1), . . . , (µk, σk,mk))
if ∃i ∈ [k] s.t CLS+.Verify(tier-1, gpk, bpk,mi, µi, σi) = 0 return ⊥
r←$Z∗p,∀i ∈ [1, k]
(cµi, cσi, ci)←$CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk,mi, µi, σi; r′i)
(ci, ·, ·)←$CGS.RRandBlind(gpk, bpk, ci, cµi, cσi; r′′i )
µi ← e(g1,CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, oskCGS,mi, µi, σi))r
cµi ← e(g1,CGS.BlindUser(bpk,CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, oskCGS,mi, µi, σi); r′i + r′′i ))r
cσ←$SIG.Sign(csk2, (ci, cµi, bpk))
Simulate pii with µi, cµi,mi, ci
σi ← (cµi, cσi, ci, pii)
choose random permutation Π, for i = 1, . . . , k : (µi, σi,mi)← (µΠ(i), σΠ(i),mΠ(i))
return ({(µi, σi,mi)}k, {r′i}k, {r′′i }k, r,Π)
A′(choose, gpkCGS, bpkCGS, iskCGS, oskCGS)
parse gpkCGS = (paramCGS, opkCGS, ipkCGS)
paramsig←$SIG.Setup(1τ ), (cpk2, csk2)←$ SIG.KeyGen(1τ )
param← (paramCGS, paramsig), (ipk, isk)← (ipkCGS, iskCGS), bpk ← bpkCGS
(cpk, csk)← ((opkCGS, cpk2), (oskCGS, csk2)), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
(st, (µ0, σ0,m0), (µ1, σ1,m1))←$AUNBLIND(choose, gpk, bpk, isk, csk)
return (stCGS, (µ0, σ0,m0), (µ1, σ1,m1))
A′(guess, stCGS, c∗, cµ∗, cσ∗)
b∗←$AUNBLIND(guess, st, cµ∗, cσ∗, c∗), return b∗
Figure 6.11: A′ which breaks the blindness of commuting group signatures using A which
breaks the conversion blindness of CLS–CGS
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CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, oskCGS,CGS.Blind(gpk, bpk, ,mi, µi, σi))) =
CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, oskCGS,mi, µi, σi));
and because e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk))
r = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupk)
r).
The value ci is computed identically to the original oracle. cµi is distributed correctly be-
cause CGS.BlindUser(bpk, (CGS.Open(gpk, bpk, osk,m, µ, σ))) ≈ CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk,
osk, c, cµ, cσ). The randomness input to CGS.BlindUser corresponds to the randomness
used to blind the pseudonym in Blind, and then to re-randomise the pseudonym in
CGS.RRandBlind. The signature cσ is computed identically to CLS+.Convert. Finally, pii
can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge property of the SPK. Therefore, all outputs
of UNBLIND are distributed identically to the experiment.
Reduction to the Blindness of Commuting Group Signature. If A correctly
guesses b then A′ correctly guesses b, and therefore blindness of commuting group signa-
tures implies conversion blindness.
6.4.5 Non–frameability
Lemma 6.4. The CLS–CGS construction satisfies non-frameability if the CGS scheme
satisfies the non–frameability requirement and the additional structural assumptions, SIG
is strongly EUF-cma secure and the SPK is sound.
Proof. We build an adversary A′ that successfully wins the non-frameability game for com-
muting group signatures, given A that wins the non–frameability game for the CLS–CGS
construction. We provide A′ in Figure 6.12 and then explain why the simulation input
to A given in Figure 6.12 is identically distributed to the non–frameability experiment
for the CLS–CGS construction, and that A′ successfully breaks the non–frameability of
commuting group signatures.
The values (gpk, isk) are computed identically to the non–frameability game. As the
SNDUCGS oracle for the commuting group signatures join protocol is identical to the SNDU
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SNDU(uid,Min)
return SNDUCGS(uid,Min)
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
return SIGNCGS(uid,m, bpk)
CONVERT(cµ1, cσ1, c1), . . . , (cµk, cσk, ck), bpk, bsk)
Identical to non–frameability experiment
A′SNDUCGS,SIGNCGS(gpkCGS, iskCGS, oskCGS)
parse gpkCGS = (paramCGS, opkCGS, ipkCGS)
paramsig←$SIG.Setup(1τ ), (cpk2, csk2)←$ SIG.KeyGen(1τ ), param← (paramCGS, paramsig)
(ipk, isk)← (ipkCGS, iskCGS), (cpk, csk)← ((opkCGS, cpk2), (oskCGS, csk2)), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
(m0, µ0, σ0,m1, µ1, σ1, bpk, bsk)←$ASNDU,SIGN,CONVERT(gpk, isk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return 0
∀b ∈ {0, 1} if @(µb,mb, cb, cµb, cσb) ∈ UBL return ⊥
if @uid∗ ∈ HUL s.t CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, oskCGS, c0, cµ0, cσ0)) = upk[uid∗]
return ⊥
if ∃b ∈ {0, 1} s,t (uid∗,mb, bpk) /∈ SL return (uid∗, cb, cµb, cσb, bpk, bsk) else return ⊥
Figure 6.12: A′ which breaks the non–frameability of commuting group signatures using
A which breaks the non–frameability of CLS–CGS
oracle for the CLS+ construction join protocol, the SNDU oracle is distributed identically.
As users’ secret keys and signatures are distributed identically to commuting group sig-
natures, the SIGN oracle is distributed correctly. The CONVERT oracle is identical to the
non–frameability game.
Reduction to the Non–frameability of Commuting Group Signatures. We as-
sumeA is successful. Firstly, we consider the case thatA′ aborts due to (µb,mb, cb, cµb, cσb)
not being found in UBL. In this case, clearly A′ could break the strong EUF-cma secu-
rity of the digital signatures or the soundness of the SPK. Let σb = (cµb, cσb, cb, piub,b).
The values cµb, cσb, cb were output by a convert query under bpk otherwise A′ could
break the strong EUF-cma security of the digital signatures. Due to the soundness of
the SPK, CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cµb) = µb and CGS.UnblindM(bsk, cb) = mb. Therefore,
(µb,mb, cb, cµb, cσb) is not stored in UBL with at most negligible probability.
A′ does not abort in the next step. This is because A is successful, and so ∃uid∗ ∈ HUL
such that Identify(bpk, bsk, uid∗, c0, cµ0, cσ0) = 1. Again as A is successful, A′ does not
abort in the final step.
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We now argue that A′ successfully breaks the non–frameability of commuting group signa-
tures. In order to do so, cb, cµb, cσb output must be valid, which is clearly true otherwise
the CONVERT oracle would have failed, and the signatures would not be stored in UBL.
For b ∈ {0, 1} such that (uid∗,mb, bpk) /∈ SL, due to the re-randomisation property
(uid∗,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, cb) = (uid∗,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, cb)),
thus (uid∗,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, cb), bpk) /∈ SL.
Finally we need to show that
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, cb, cµb, cσb)) = upk[uid
∗].
We already have that:
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c0, cµ0, cσ0)) = upk[uid
∗].
Also,
µ0 = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, c0, cµ0, cσ0))
r1),
µ1 = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c1, cµ1, cσ1))
r2),
where r1, r2 are the conversion randomness chosen in the CONVERT oracle. The probabil-
ity that two converted pseudonyms will be output that unblind to the same pseudonym in
different convert queries is negligible, as the adversary has no control over the conversion
randomness. Therefore,
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c0, cµ0, cσ0))
r1)
= CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c1, cµ1, cσ1))
r1).
Therefore due to the requirements at the beginning of Section 6.3.1:
e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c0, cµ0, cσ0))
r1
= e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c1, cµ1, cσ1))
r1 .
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Therefore
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, osk, c1, cµ1, cσ1)) = upk[uid
∗].
Therefore A′ successfully breaks the non–frameability of commuting group signatures with
probability (1 − negl). Therefore, assuming the non–frameability of commuting group
signatures, the CLS–CGS construction satisfies non–frameability.
6.4.6 Traceability
Lemma 6.5. The CLS–CGS construction satisfies (tier-1 and tier-2) traceability if the
CGS scheme satisfies the non–frameability and traceability requirements and the additional
structural assumptions.
Proof. We build an adversary A′ that successfully wins the traceability game for commut-
ing group signatures, given A that wins the tier-2 traceability game for the CLS–CGS
construction. We provide A′ in Figure 6.13, and then explain why the simulation input to
A is identically distributed to the tier-2 traceability experiment for the CLS–CGS con-
struction, and that A′ successfully breaks the traceability of commuting group signatures.
The values (gpk, csk) are distributed identically to the tier-2 traceability game. The
SNDICGS oracle for the commuting group signatures join protocol is identical to the SNDI
oracle for the CLS+ join protocol, except that in the latter the user sends their user public
key as their first message, whereas in the former the user’s public key is part of the issuer’s
input. Therefore, the first message input to the SNDI oracle per user will be a user public
key. This can be input to SNDICGS with an empty message. Therefore, the SNDI oracle is
distributed correctly. As users’ secret keys and signatures are distributed identically, the
SIGN oracle is distributed correctly. The ADDUCGS and ADDU oracles are identical.
Reduction to the Traceability of Commuting Group Signatures. As A is suc-
cessful, all the blinded outputs are valid, therefore clearly provided A′ can find i ∈
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ADDU(uid)
return ADDUCGS(uid)
SIGN(uid,m, bpk)
SIGNCGS(uid,m, bpk)
SNDI(uid,Min)
Parse Min = upk
return SNDICGS(uid,⊥, upk)
A′ADDUCGS,SNDICGS,SIGNCGS(gpkCGS, oskCGS)
Parse gpkCGS = (paramCGS, opkCGS, ipkCGS), paramsig←$SIG.Setup(1τ )
(cpk2, csk2)←$SIG.KeyGen(1τ ), param← (paramCGS, paramsig), ipk ← ipkCGS
(cpk, csk)← ((opkCGS, cpk2), (oskCGS, csk2)), gpk ← (param, ipk, cpk)
((c1, cµ1, cσ1), ..., (ck, cµk, cσk), bpk, bsk)←$AADDU,SNDI,SIGN(gpk, csk)
if (bpk, bsk) /∈ BK return ⊥
if ∃i ∈ [1, k] s.t ∀uid ∈ CUL ∪ HUL
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) 6= upk[uid]
return (ci, cµi, cσi, bpk, bsk)
else return ⊥
Figure 6.13: A′ which breaks the traceability of commuting group signatures using A
which breaks the tier-2 traceability of CLS–CGS
[1, k] such that ∀uid ∈ CUL ∪ HUL:
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) 6= upk[uid]
then they will break the traceability of commuting group signatures.
Let L′ = |{i ∈ [k] : CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) =
upk[uid] and uid ∈ HUL}|.
Let C ′ = |{i ∈ [k] : CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) =
upk[uid] and uid ∈ CUL}|.
If A′ aborts then k ≤ C ′ + L′. However if A is successful, then k > CUL + L, where
L = |{uid ∈ HUL : ∃i s.t (uid,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, ci), bpk) ∈ SL}|.
Therefore, either C ′ > CUL or L′ > L.
If C ′ > CUL, two signatures both open to the same corrupted user. Therefore for some
(i, j) ∈ [k]2 , CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) =
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CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, cj , cµj , cσj)). However as the two sig-
natures are unlinked we have:
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi))
r) 6=
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, cj , cµj , cσj)
r),
which is a contradiction.
If L′ > L, let L′′ = |{uid ∈ HUL : ∃i ∈ [k] s.t CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk,
bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) = upk[uid]}|, as no two signatures will open to the same honest user,
due to the same argument, L′ = L′′, and so L′′ > L. Therefore there exists an honest user
uid∗ and i ∈ [k] such that CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, bpk, csk1, ci, cµi, cσi)) =
upk[uid∗], but (uid∗,CGS.UnblindM(bsk, ci), bpk) /∈ SL. In this case, A could break the
non–frameability of commuting group signatures.
Therefore A′ aborts with negligible probability, and so assuming the traceability and non–
frameability of commuting group signatures, our CLS–CGS construction satisfies tier-2
traceability.
We now show that our CLS–CGS construction satisfies tier-1 traceability. Clearly if an
adversary could break tier-1 traceability they could also break tier-2 traceability by
simply blinding the group signatures. This is due to the fact that blinded and standard
signatures are commuting group signatures. Commuting group signatures satisfy the com-
mutative behaviour requirement. If a valid signature is blinded, this will result in a valid
blinded signature. As our construction satisfies tier-2 traceability, this is a contradiction,
and so our construction must also satisfy tier-1 traceability.
6.5 Concrete Instantiation of CLS–CGS construction
We now show that the building blocks of our CLS–CGS construction can be instantiated,
based on the Asymmetric Double Hidden SDH [65] and SXDH assumption. For this, we
need that the commuting group signatures construction given in Section 5.4 and instan-
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tiated in Section 5.6, satisfies the additional structural assumptions and extractability in
Section 6.3, and that the proof of unblinding can also be instantiated.
Firstly, due to the automorphic signature scheme [65] used, usk ∈ Z∗p, and upk = gusk2 .
Outputs of CGS.OpenBlind are also elements of G2.
Our construction for commuting group signatures satisfies
e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk))
r = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupk)
r) because letting
cupk = (cupk1, cupk2):
e(g1,CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cupk))
r = e(g1, (cupk2cupk
−bsk
1 ))
r =
e(g1, cupk
r
2)e(g1, cupk
r
1)
−bsk = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, e(g1, cupk)r).
Our construction satisfies CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk))r = CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upkr) because:
CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk; r′))r = (gˆrr
′
, upkrbpkrr
′
2 ) = CGS.BlindUser(bpk, upk
r; rr′)),
and as r′ is chosen uniformly and independently, then rr′ is distributed identically.
6.5.1 Extractability
We now show that that our commuting group signature construction satisfies extractabil-
ity, assuming the cm-NIZK satisfies controlled malleable simulation soundness. We present
simulators S1, S2, S3:
S1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs)←$S1,cm-NIZK(1τ )
return (((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs), τs)
S2(param, st
uid
Join,Min, τs)
Identical to Join except pijoin is simulated
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S3(param, gpk, bpk,upk[uid],m, τs)
α←$Z∗p, µ← (gˆα, 1,upk[uid]opkα), β ← 0, γ ← 0, c← (1,m)
σ←$S2,cm-NIZK(σcrs, τs, (opk, bpk, ipk, µ, c)) return (µ, σ)
Due to the zero–knowledge of the SPK and the cm-NIZK, the following advantage is neg-
ligible in τ : ∣∣∣Pr[Expsim−0A,Π (τ) = 1]− Pr[Expsim−1A,Π (τ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We now provide SE1, E2. As outputs of SE1,cm-NIZK are distributed identically to outputs
of S1,cm-NIZK, outputs of SE1 are identically distributed to outputs of S1.
SE1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)
paramauto1←$ASetup1(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2)), paramauto2←$ASetup2(p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2))
g←$G1, gˆ←$G2, (σcrs, τs, τs)←$SE1,cm-NIZK(1τ )
return (((p,G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2), paramauto1, paramauto2, g, gˆ, σcrs), τs, τe)
E2(gpk, bpk, isk, osk, bsk, c, cµ, cσ, τe)
(upk′, ·, ·, ·, ·....)← E2,cm-NIZK(σcrs, τe, (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c), cσ) return upk′
The extractor E2,cm-NIZK will either successfully extract upk
′, or instead will extract a
transformation T and statement (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ′, c′) such that (opk, bpk, ipk, cµ, c) =
Tinst(opk, bpk, ipk, cµ
′, c′). If it outputs the latter, (cµ′, c′) was input to S2,cm-NIZK, and
(cµ′, c′) is a re-randomisation of (cµ, c), therefore uid∗ was input to S3, such that
CGS.UnblindUser(bsk,CGS.OpenBlind(gpk, osk, c, cµ, cσ)) = upk[uid∗]; in which case the
extractor will not need to extract upk′.
6.5.2 Instantiating the Proof of Unblinding
We show how to instantiate the proof of unblinding piub:
piub = SPK{bsk : µ = CGS.UnblindUser(bsk, cµ) ∧m = CGS.UnblindM(bsk, c)∧
(bsk, bpk) ∈ BPK}
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= SPK{bsk1, bsk2 : µ = cµ2cµ−bsk21 ∧m = c2c−bsk11 ∧ bpk1 = gbsk1 ∧ bpk2 = gˆbsk2}
For transforming interactive into non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, we rely on the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic that ensures security in the random oracle model.
6.5.3 Efficiency
We focus on the computational overhead, as this is the key barrier to overcome to allow
for the practical implementation of this work. The tier-1 and tier-2 signatures are the
size of standard and blinded commuting group signatures respectively. Therefore, both
have size 328G1 + 314G2. Our CLS+ construction is significantly less efficient than that
of our CLS construction in Chapter 4, but demonstrates that the stronger CLS+ security
model can be achieved and the assumption of trusted data lakes can be avoided.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter we propose convertibly linkable group signatures, an extension of group
signatures with selective linkability given in Chapter 4. We allow for authentication to be
preserved during convert queries, and remove the assumption that inputs to the converter
are well formed. We have extended the CLS model to provide a formal security model for
this primitive. We have given a provably secure construction in this model, making use of
commuting group signatures from Chapter 5, and a standard signature scheme. We then
show that our instantiation of commuting group signatures can be used to build a concrete
instantiation. We finally analyse the efficiency in comparison to our CLS instantiation.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we have introduced several variants of group signatures that have applications
in both reputation systems and the collection and processing of data.
In Chapter 3 we introduced a new cryptographic model for reputation systems. Reputation
values are based on a user’s entire behaviour, whilst a user’s activities cannot be linked
together. We have shown how a construction satisfying this model can be built based
on direct anonymous attestation and a variant of a group signature scheme that allows
reputation to be bound to the signature. We prove that this construction is secure based
on the DDH, q-SDH and LRSW assumptions, as well as the security of the signature
proofs of knowledge used. We then show that the signature proofs of knowledge can be
instantiated in the random oracle model, and that this instantiation comes at a reasonable
additional efficiency cost in comparison to existing work.
In Chapter 4 we introduced group signatures with selective linkability, a new variant
of group signatures with applications in privacy–preserving technologies. Signatures can
be linked in a more flexible, controlled way than via an opener, as in standard group
signatures. Signatures are unlinkable by default but can be obliviously converted into
a linked representation by the converter. The linkage in non-transitive, i.e., only holds
within a particular convert query, which ensures that a list of linked signatures cannot
be built up over time. We formally define the security of this primitive, and provide a
construction that provably satisfies this model. This construction makes use of BBS+
signatures, ElGamal encryption and signature proofs of knowledge. We then provide
238
proofs of security for this construction given the DDH and q-SDH assumptions, as well as
the security of the signature proof of knowledge. We then show that the signature proofs
of knowledge can be instantiated in the random oracle model, and that this instantiation
is reasonably efficient.
In Chapter 5 we introduce commuting group signatures, a variant of group signatures
that are later used as a building block in Chapter 6. We extend the existing commuting
signatures primitive to group signatures, introducing group signatures that can be blinded,
whilst remaining publicly verifiable. They can also still be opened, outputting a blinded
user identity. We first provide a formal model, defining the syntax and security properties
required for this new primitive. We then provide a construction based on controlled
malleable proof protocols, automorphic signatures and signature proofs of knowledge.
Controlled malleable proofs allow the proof to be transformed when signatures are blinded,
whilst still ensuring unforgeability of the signatures because the malleability is controlled.
We then prove this construction secure, given the security of the building blocks and
the DDH assumption. We show that our building blocks can be instantiated given the
ADHSDH and SXDH assumptions in the random oracle model. We must particularly
ensure that the controlled malleable proof protocols can be instantiated for the relation
used in signing and the transformation used in blinding. We finally provide the sizes of
signatures in terms of group elements.
In Chapter 6 we extend and strengthen the primitive defined in Chapter 4. We consider a
setting where the data lake, who queries unlinkable user data to the converter, and data
processor, who receives linked data from the converter for processing, are separate entities.
Previously, we assumed that these were the same entity or trusted each other fully. We
no longer assume that the data lake provides the converter with well formed inputs. We
also must preserve the authentication of data throughout the conversion, so that the data
processor is assured that data originates from a valid group member. We first extend
the previous security model, to take into account this new setting. We then provide a
construction that makes use of commuting group signatures, defined in Chapter 5, as
a building block, and a standard digital signature scheme. We prove that our scheme
is secure given the DDH assumption, as well as the security of the building blocks. We
finally show that these building blocks can be instantiated, given the ADHSDH and SXDH
assumptions in the random oracle model, and provide efficiency figures. The efficiency is
significantly worse than in Chapter 4, however we show that our new strengthened security
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model is achievable.
There are several potential directions for further work within this thesis. Firstly, in Chap-
ter 3 we provide a static model where users all join at the beginning of the scheme.
Extending this model to the dynamic setting, where users can join throughout, would be
an improvement. Both building blocks in our construction are in the dynamic model, and
so it should be possible to adapt the construction.
Furthermore, in Chapter 3, we provide a concrete construction using the two building
blocks, and prove this is secure. It would also be interesting to formally define the security
of the group signatures bound to reputation. A modular construction could then be built,
so that any secure DAA scheme and group signature scheme bound to reputation could
be used to build a secure reputation system.
In both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, compared with the anonymity requirements of con-
ventional dynamic group signatures, our anonymity notions are somewhat weaker as we
do not allow the adversary to corrupt the two challenge users after it received the chal-
lenge signature. This means that our privacy related requirements do not yield forward
anonymity. Given the conversion functionality that is inherent in our setting, achieving
this stronger notion seems challenging. In fact, for the related problem of group signatures
with user-controlled linkability with signature-based revocation, forward anonymity has
not been achieved by any of the existing schemes. It would be interesting to determine
whether this stronger security is achievable in this setting. We could also consider ex-
tending both security models to allow for the revocation of users, as in the fully dynamic
model for group signatures.
The online extractable signature proofs of knowledge used in Chapter 4 are costly in terms
of efficiency. Therefore, if the construction could be built without such proofs, it would
allow the work to be more easily implemented. Signatures for the scheme in Chapter 6
are significantly larger than for the scheme in Chapter 4. If a more efficient construction
could be built, it would allow the strengthened primitive to be used in practise.
The security of all our constructions is based on hardness problems related to the discrete
logarithm problem. This means they are all vulnerable to attacks by an adversary with
quantum capabilities. A potential future direction could be to build these primitives from
240
post–quantum secure cryptography.
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Appendix A
Additional Security Proofs for our
RS-GS construction
A.1 Traceability
Assuming the random oracle model, the SPK is zero–knowledge and simulation sound
extractable, and the q-SDH assumption, our RS-GS construction satisfies traceability.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists, such that Pr[ExptraceA′,RS-GS(τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) =
1] = , for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R| polynomial in τ , n = |U| polynomial in τ , there
are l different values of (r, t) queried to the H oracle, or ALLREP oracle, and  is non–
negligible in τ , then we can can build an adversary A, that solves the q-SDH problem,
where q = n, in polynomial–time. We describe A in Figures A.1 and A.2. We then
describe why the simulation given in Figures A.1 and A.2 and the traceability experiment
are indistinguishable to A, and how A′ works.
We first show that all inputs that A provides to A′ are distributed identically to the
traceability experiment.
Simulating (gpk, osk, ID). W = T γ2 = Gγ2 . G1 is chosen randomly due to µ being
chosen randomly and independently. As ν1 is chosen randomly and independently, H is
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USK(uid)
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗ A aborts else return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω)
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗
if tˆ(ω,WGxuid∗2 ) 6= tˆ(H(r, t), G2) return ⊥
ρ1, ρ2←$Zp, T1 ← Kρ1 , T2 ← Zuid∗ωHρ1 , T3 ← Kρ2 , T4 ← Zuid∗ωGρ2
G˜1 ← H(r, t) ·G1, Simulate pi with T1, T2, T3, T4, G˜1
return Ω← (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
else return PostItem(gpk, I,usk[uid], r, t, ω)
SENDFB(uid, fb, (I, r, t,Ω))
Φ←$SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
ALLREP(uid, t, r)
if (uid, t, r, out) ∈ AR, return (out, r, ID)
out′ ← H(r, t), let ((r, t), out′, χ) ∈ HL, out′′ ←
n−1∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χκuid,j
AR← AR ∪ (uid, t, r, out′′), ID ← ID ∪ (uid, r, t, Zuidout′′), return (out′′, r, ID)
H(in)
if ∃(in, out) ∈ HL return out
else χ←$Z∗p, out←
n∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χλj , add (in, out, χ) to HL, return out
Figure A.1: Simulated answers to oracle queries for our traceability proof
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A(T1, T γ1 , T γ
2
1 , ..., T
γq
1 , T2, T
γ
2 )
Create Empty Lists HL,AR, b←$ {0, 1}, uid′←$U
if b = 0,V ← U , n′ ← n
if b = 1, uid∗←$U\{uid′},V ← U\{uid∗}, n′ ← n− 1, xuid∗ ←$Z∗p, Zuid∗ ←$G1
∀uid ∈ V\{uid′}, xuid, yuid←$Z∗p
µ←$Z∗p, let f(X) =
∏
uid∈V\{uid′}
(X + xuid) =
n′−1∑
i=1
ζiX
i;G1 ←
n′−1∏
i=0
(T γ
i
1 )
µζi
,Γ←
n′−1∏
i=0
(T γ
(i+1)
1 )
µζi
G2 ← T2,W ← T γ2 , x, ν1, ν2←$Z∗p, H ← ((ΓGx1)ν1G−11 )1/ν2
ξ1←$Z∗p,K ← H1/ξ1 , ξ2←$Z∗p, G← Kξ2 , gpk1 ← (G1,K,H,G,G2,W )
∀uid ∈ V\{uid′} let fuid(X) =
∏
uˆid∈V\{uid′,uid}
(X + xuˆid) =
n′−2∑
j=0
ηuid,jX
j ;Buid ←
n′−2∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
µηuid,j
Zuid ← Buid(B((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2uid Gν1/ν21 )yuid ,usk1[uid]← (Zuid, xuid, yuid)
yuid′ ← ν2, xuid′ ← x, Zuid′ ← Gν11 ,usk1[uid′]← (Zuid′ , xuid′ , yuid′)
Let g(X) =
∏
uid∈U
(X + xuid) =
n∑
j=0
λjX
j
∀uid ∈ U , set guid(X) = g(X)/(X + xuid) =
n−1∑
j=0
κuid,jX
j
Finish computing (usk2[uid], gpk2, ID) as in Setup
(I, r, t,Ω, fb,Φ, r,L,F)←$A′USK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP,H(gpk, osk, ID)
Let Ω = (T1, T2, T3, T4, pi)
if @out such that ((r, t), out, χ) ∈ HL return ⊥
Extract x?, ρ?1, z
? from pi, y? ← z? − x?ρ?1, Q? ← T2T−ξ11
if x? = xuid with uid ∈ U ω←$ALLREP(uid, t, r), Q˜? ← Q?ω−1 = (G1, Hy?)1/(x
?+γ)
if uid /∈ C if x? 6= xuid∗return ⊥
return (Q˜?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x) , x?)
if uid ∈ C if x? 6= xuid′return ⊥
return (Q˜?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?) , x?)
else return (Q?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 G
−χ/µ
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x) , x?)
Figure A.2: A which solves the q-SDH problem, using A′ which breaks traceability for the
RS-GS construction
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independent of G1. (ξ1, ξ2,K,G, ID) are chosen as in Setup. Therefore (gpk, osk, ID) are
distributed identically to the traceability experiment.
We will use the fact that Γ = Gγ1 and Buid = G
1/(γ+xuid)
1 later. This is because G1 =∏n′−1
i=0 (T
γi
1 )
µζi = T
µf(γ)
1 , and so Γ =
∏n′−1
i=0 (T
γ(i+1)
1 )
µζi
=
∏n′−1
i=0 T
γi
1
µζiγ
= Gγ1 , and Buid =∏n′−2
j=0 (T
γj
1 )
µηuid,j
= T
µfuid(γ)
1 = G
1/(γ+xuid)
1 .
Simulating the USK oracle. The USK oracle is distributed identically to the trace-
ability experiment because, provided the oracle does not abort, if uid 6= uid′,
Zuid = Buid(B
((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2
uid G
ν1/ν2
1 )
yuid = Buid(B
((x−xuid)ν1−1)/ν2
uid B
ν1(γ+xuid)/ν2
uid )
yuid
= BuidB
yuid(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
uid = (G1G
yuid(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+xuid) = (G1H
yuid)1/(γ+xuid),
and Zuid′ = G
ν1
1 = (G1G
ν1(γ+x)−1
1 )
1/(γ+x) = (G1H
yuid′ )1/(γ+xuid′ ).
Simulating the POST oracle. If b = 1, and uid = uid∗ is input to the POST oracle,
because Zuid∗ was chosen randomly and independently, it is distributed identically to
the traceability experiment. The SPK can then be simulated due to the zero–knowledge
property. The signature output is then distributed identically to in PostItem. If b = 0 or
uid 6= uid∗, our oracle works in exactly the same way as in the traceability experiment.
Simulating all other oracles. The SENDFB oracle is identical to the traceability
experiment. The ALLREP oracle is distributed identically to the traceability experiment,
because
∏n−1
j=0 (T
γj
1 )
χκuid,j = T
χg(γ)/(γ+xuid)
1 = H(r, t)1/(γ+xuid). The hash oracle is dis-
tributed identically to the traceability experiment in the random oracle model, because χ
is chosen randomly and independently every hash query.
Reduction to q-SDH. If A′ is successful and outputs (I, r, t,Ω) then there exists out
such that ((r, t), out, χ) ∈ HL, and so A does not abort for this reason. This is because for
A′ to have output a valid signature on (r, t), they must have queried this to the hash oracle.
As Ω was not output by the POST oracle, we can extract (Q?, x?, y?) such that Q? =
(G1, H
y?out)
1/(x?+γ)
, because Ω is a valid signature.
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Assume A′ is successful. If x? = xuid for uid ∈ U\C, then we assume we chose b = 1 with
probability 1/2, and uid = uid∗ with probability 1/n. A will not have aborted during
USK, because uid∗ was not corrupted. If ν2 − y? − ν1y?(x? − x) = 0, then ν1 = ν2−y?y?(x?−x) .
If y? = 0 then ν2 = 0, which is not possible. Therefore the adversary can obtain ν1 and
so break the discrete logarithm problem, which is implied by the q-SDH problem.
Due to the fact that Q˜? = (G1H
y?)1/(x
?+γ), then
(Q˜?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x) = (G1H
y?)
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x)
1
= (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x)
1
= G
y?ν1(γ+x)−y?+ν2−y?ν1(γ+x?)
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?−ν1y?(x?−x))
1 = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20]. Therefore, in this case,
assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/2n.
If x? = xuid for some uid ∈ C, then as (G1Hyuidout)1/(xuid+γ) is saved in ID, y? 6= yuid.
Q˜? = (G1H
y?)1/(x
?+γ). Assuming b = 0 was chosen with probability 1/2, the USK oracle
does not abort. Therefore, assuming x? = xuid′ with probability 1/n, then A will not
abort. As ν2 = yuid′ 6= y?, then ν2 − y? 6= 0.
Due to the fact that Q˜? = (G1H
y?)1/(x
?+γ), then
(Q˜?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 )
ν2
ν2−y? = (G1H
y?)
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?
1
= (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
ν2
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)G
−ν1y?
ν2−y?
1 = G
y?ν1(γ+x)−y?+ν2−y?ν1(γ+x?)
(γ+x?)(ν2−y?)
1 = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20] . Therefore, in this case,
assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/2n.
If x? 6= xuid with uid ∈ U , then we assume b = 0 was chosen with probability 1/2.
Therefore, the USK oracle does not abort, and so A will not abort.
If ν2 − y? − (ν1y? + χν2/µ)(x? − x) = 0, then χ = µ(ν2−y
?−ν1y?(x?−x))
ν2(x?−x) . Therefore the
259
A.2 Soundness of Reputation
adversary can obtain χ and so break the discrete logarithm problem, which is implied by
the q-SDH problem.
Due to the fact that,
out1/(γ+x
?) = (
n∏
j=0
(T γ
j
1 )
χλj )1/(γ+x
?) = T
χg(γ)/(γ+x?)
1 = G
χ(γ+x)
µ(γ+x?)
1
= Γχ/µ(γ+x
?)G
χx/µ(γ+x?)
1 = (Γ
χ/µG
χx?/µ
1 )
1/(γ+x?)G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 = G
χ/µ
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 ,
and Q? = (G1H
y?out)1/(γ+x
?),
and
(G1H
y?)1/(γ+x
?) = (G1G
y?(ν1(γ+x)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+x?)
= G
y?ν1x
?
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
y?ν1γ
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 (G1G
y?(ν1(x−x?)−1)/ν2
1 )
1/(γ+x?) = G
y?ν1/ν2
1 G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 ,
we have that,
(Q?G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 G
−χ/µ
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x)
= (G
y?ν1/ν2
1 G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
−ν1y?/ν2
1 G
χ/µ
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 G
−χ/µ
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x)
= (G
ν2+y
?(ν1(x−x?)−1)
ν2(γ+x
?)
1 G
χ(x−x?)
µ(γ+x?)
1 )
ν2
ν2−y?−(ν1y?+χν2/µ)(x?−x) = G
1/(γ+x?)
1 .
Given this, A can break the q-sdh assumption as shown in [20] .
Therefore, in this case, assuming A′ was successful, A succeeds with probability 1/2.
Therefore A solves the q-SDH problem with probability at least 2n .
A.2 Soundness of Reputation
Assuming the CL signatures are existentially unforgeable under the chosen–message attack,
the SPK is zero–knowledge and simulation sound extractable, and the random oracle
model, our RS-GS construction satisfies soundness of reputation.
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Proof. The CDL scheme makes use of Camenisch–Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures [39]. These
are existentially unforgeable under the chosen–message attack [73] assuming the LRSW
assumption [97], as detailed in Section 2.5.5.
We show that if an adversaryA′ exists, such that Pr[Expsound−repA′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U Aggr) = 1] = ,
for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R| polynomial in τ , n = |U| polynomial in τ , corrupting
l users with the USK oracle, and  is non–negligible in τ , then we can can build an
adversary A that breaks existential unforgeability under the chosen–message attack for
CL signatures. We describe A in Figure A.3. We then describe why the simulation given
in Figure A.3 and the soundness of reputation experiment are indistinguishable to A′ and
how A works. The adversary A has input parameters (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G1, G2), the public
key (X = Gα2 , Y = G
β
2 ), and access to a CLSIGN oracle which takes input f and outputs
(a, aβ, aα+fαβ), for a←$G1.
We first show that all inputs that A provides to A′ are distributed identically to the
soundness of reputation experiment.
Simulating inputs to A′. (gpk, osk) are chosen in exactly the same way as in Setup.
The POST and ALLREP oracles are the same as in the soundness of reputation experiment.
Due to the distribution of outputs of the CLSIGN oracle, users’ secret keys are of the form
(f, (A,Aβ, Aα+fαβ , Afβ)) for randomly chosen A ∈ G1, therefore answers to USK queries
are distributed identically to the soundness of reputation experiment.
If b = 0 or uid 6= uid∗ then the SENDFB oracle is the same as in the soundness of reputation
experiment. We now show that outputs are correctly distributed if b = 1 and uid = uid∗.
Let A2 = A
d
1, because A
∗ = A1A2, then
B∗ = Aβ1A
β
2 = A
∗β, C∗ = Aα1A
α
2A
αβf
1 A
αβadf
1 = A
∗α(A∗)αβ(f+daf)/(1+d),
D∗ = (Aβ1A
daβ
1 )
f = A∗β(f+daf)/(1+d) = B∗(f+daf)/(1+d).
Therefore ((f + daf)/(1 + d), (A∗, B∗, C∗, D∗)) is distributed identically to a user secret
key, because f, d were chosen randomly and independently. Therefore, (A′, B′, C ′, D′)
are distributed identically to the SendFB oracle. Also J = D∗d
′′
= B∗d
′′(f+daf)/(1+d) =
H(I, r, t,Ω)(f+daf)/(1+d), which is distributed as in SendFB. The proof pi can be simulated
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USK(uid):
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗ A aborts
else CU ← CU ∪ {uid}, return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω):
return PostItem(gpk, I, (usk1[uid], ·), r, t, ω)
SENDFB(uid, fb, (I, r, t,Ω)):
if b = 1 and uid = uid∗, Z ← H(I, r, t,Ω), for ((I, r, t,Ω), Z, d′′) ∈ HL, J ← D∗d′′
d′←$Z∗p, A′ ← A∗d
′
, B′ ← B∗d′ , C ′ ← C∗d′ , D′ ← D∗d′
Simulate pi with A′, B′, C ′, D′, J return (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
else return SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
ALLREP(uid, t, r):
return AllocateReputation(gpk, (isk1, ·), uid, (usk1[uid], ·), t, r, ID)
H(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·) ∈ HL return out
else d′′←$Z∗p, HL← HL ∪ (in, B∗d
′′
, d′′) return B∗d
′′
ACLSIGN(X,Y )
Create empty lists HL,CU, b←$ {0, 1},V ← U
gpk2 ← (X,Y ),finish computing gpk, osk, isk1,usk1, r, ID as in Setup
if b = 1, uid∗←$U ,V ← U\{uid∗}, f ←$Z∗p, a←$Z∗p with a 6= 1
(A1, B1, C1)←$CLSIGN(f), (A2, B2, C2)←$CLSIGN(af)
A∗ ← A1A2, B∗ ← B1B2, C∗ ← C1C2, D∗ ← (B1B2a)f
∀uid ∈ V
fuid←$Z∗p, (Auid, Buid, Cuid)←$CLSIGN(fuid), Duid ← Bfuiduid
usk[uid]← (usk1[uid], (fuid, (Auid, Buid, Cuid, Duid)))
((I, r, t,Ω), {fbj ,Φj}l+1j=1)←$A′USK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP,H(gpk, osk)
j←$ [l + 1],Extract f ′j for (fbj ,Φj)
Let Φj = (A
′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
return (f ′j , A
′, B′, C ′)
Figure A.3: A which breaks existential unforgeability under the chosen–message attack for
CL signatures, using A′ which breaks soundness of reputation for our RS-GS construction
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due to the zero–knowledge property of the SPK used. The hash oracle is distributed
identically to the random oracle model, as d′′ is chosen randomly for each query.
Reduction to existential unforgeability of CL signatures. We now show that the
output of A is a valid forgery of a CL signature with non-negligible probability. For this
to be the case, (f ′j , A
′, B′, C ′) output by A should be a valid CL signature, and f ′j should
not have been queried to the CLSIGN oracle. For all potential strategies a successful A′
could take, we show that A is successful with non-negligible probability.
Assuming A′ is successful, there is some j∗ ∈ [l+1] such that f ′j∗ /∈ {fuid : uid ∈ C}, where
the f ′j∗ was extracted from (fbj∗ ,Φj∗). This is because all signatures output are valid and
unlinkable. We assume j∗ = j, which occurs with probability 1/(l + 1).
If A′ corrupts all users so that l = n, we assume A chose b = 0, which occurs with
probability 1/2, and so A does not abort. As f ′j∗ /∈ {fuid : uid ∈ C}, and b = 0, f ′j∗ was
not input to the CLSIGN oracle, and so A wins. Therefore A succeeds with probability
1/2(l + 1).
If A′ corrupts l < n users, we assume A chose b = 1 and uid∗ /∈ C, which occurs with
probability (n − l)/2n. As uid∗ is not queried to the USK oracle, A does not abort. For
A to win, fj∗ must not have been input to the CLSIGN oracle.
If f ′j∗ = fuid with uid ∈ U\C, then we assume uid = uid∗, which occurs with probability
1/(n − l). As a 6= 1, f ′j∗ = f(1+da)1+d 6= f or af , therefore f ′j∗ was not input to CLSIGN.
Therefore, A succeeds with probability 1/2n(l + 1).
If f ′j∗ /∈ {fuid : uid ∈ U}, then the only case that f ′j∗ was input to CLSIGN is if f ′j∗ = f
or af . Let f∗ = f(1+da)1+d . Fixing f, a, then g(θ) =
f(1+θa)
1+θ is a bijective function, meaning
that f∗ = f(1+da)1+d is uniform and random and therefore independent of f, a. All inputs to
A′ were distributed independently of f, a, therefore f ′j∗ = f or af with probability 1/p.
Therefore, A succeeds with probability (p−2)(n−l)2pn(l+1) .
Therefore, A succeeds with non-negligible probability.
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A.3 Anonymity of Feedback
Assuming the DDH assumption in G1, the SPK is zero–knowledge and the random oracle
model, our RS-GS construction satisfies anonymity of feedback.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists, such that Pr[Expanon−fb−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
= 1] −Pr[Expanon−fb−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1] = , for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R| and
n = |U| polynomial in τ , q different items (I, r, t,Ω) are queried to the H and SENDFB
oracles in the choose stage, and  is non–negligible in τ , then we can can build an adversary
A that breaks the DDH assumption. We describe A in Figure A.4. We then describe
why the simulation given in Figure A.4 and the anonymity of feedback experiment are
indistinguishable to A, when a DDH tuple is input, and then how A′ works.
Simulating the inputs to A′. Assuming A is input a DDH tuple, inputs to A′ are
distributed identically to the anonymity of feedback experiment. If A does not abort, the
USK, POST, and ALLREP oracles are exactly the same as in the anonymity of feedback
experiment.
The SENDFB oracle is also the same as in the experiment, provided uid∗ is not input.
If uid∗ is input, the output is distributed identically to the output of the oracle in the
anonymity of feedback experiment. This is because letting Q2 = Q
f1
1 , as A
′ = Qd/β1 ,
then B′ = Qd1 = A′β, C ′ = A′αQdα2 = A′αA′βαf1 , D′ = Qd2 = B′f1 .If A does not abort in
SENDFB, then j′ 6= q∗ or b′ = 1, and so H(I, r, t,Ω) = Qd′1 , and J = Qd
′
2 = H(I, r, t,Ω)f1 .
Due to the zero–knowledge property of the SPK used, pi can be simulated. Therefore the
output of SENDFB is distributed identically to the anonymity of feedback experiment.
The hash oracle is distributed identically to the random oracle model, as d is chosen
randomly. The (gpk, isk, osk) input in the choosing phase are chosen exactly as in Setup.
The input in the guessing phase (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi) is distributed identically to outputs
of SendFB, because if Q4 = Q
f2
3 and A
′ = Qd/β3 , B
′ = Qd3 = A′β, C ′ = A′αQdα4 =
A′αA′βαf2 , D′ = Qd4 = B′f2 . If A does not abort, H(I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) = Qd
′
3 , and so J = Q
d′
4 =
H(I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗)f2 . Again, due to the zero–knowledge property of the SPK used, pi can
be simulated. This signature is consistent with the SENDFB oracle, because A does not
abort, so uidb = uid
∗, and (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) is a DDH tuple, therefore f1 = f2.
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USK(uid):
if uid = uid∗, if b = 0 A return 1 else A return 0
else return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω):
return PostItem(gpk, I, (usk1[uid], ·), r, t, ω)
SENDFB(uid, fb, (I, r, t,Ω)):
if uid = uid∗ if (I, r, t,Ω) = (I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) if b = 0 A return 1 else A return 0
d←$Z∗p, A′ ← Qd/β1 , B′ ← Qd1, C ′ ← A′αQdα2 , D′ ← Qd2, S ← H(I, r, t,Ω)
for ((I, r, t,Ω), S, d′, j′) ∈ HL if j′ = q∗ and b′ = 0, if b = 0 A return 1 else A return 0
else J ← Qd′2 ,Simulate pi with A′, B′, C ′, D′, J
return (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
else return SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
ALLREP(uid, t, r):
return AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid, (usk1[uid], ·), t, r, ID)
H(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·, ·) ∈ HL return out
j = j + 1, if j = q ∗ and b′ = 0, d←$Z∗p, HL← (in, Q3d, d, j) ∪HL, return Q3d
else d←$Z∗p, HL← (in, Q1d, d, j) ∪HL return Q1d
A(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4)
1 : b, b′←$ {0, 1}, uid∗←$U , q∗←$ [q], j ← 0, create empty list HL
2 : Compute (gpk, isk, osk,usk) as in Setup, except usk2[uid
∗]
3 : (st, uid0, uid1, fb, (I
∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗))←$A′USK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP,H(choose, gpk, isk, osk)
4 : if uid∗ 6= uidb, return 0
5 : if b′ = 0, if ((I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗), ·, ·, q∗) /∈ HL return 0, else let ((I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗), S, d′, q∗) ∈ HL
6 : if b′ = 1, if ∃((I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗), ·, ·, ·) ∈ HL return 0
7 : d′←$Z∗p, S ← Qd
′
3 , j ← j + 1, q∗ ← j,HL← ((I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗), S, d′, q∗) ∪HL
8 : d←$Z∗p, A′ ← Qd/β3 , B′ ← Qd3, C ′ ← A′αQdα4 , D′ ← Qd4
9 : J ← Qd′4 ,Simulate pi with A′, B′, C ′, D′, J
10 : b∗←$A′USK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP,H(guess, st, (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi))
11 : if uid0 or uid1 queried to the USK oracle b
∗ ← 0
12 : if (uid0, ·, (I, r, t,Ω)) or (uid1, ·, (I, r, t,Ω)) queried to the SENDFB oracle b∗ ← 0
13 : if b∗ = b return 1, else return 0
Figure A.4: A which distinguishes between DDH tuples in G1, using A′ which breaks
anonymity of feedback for our RS-GS construction
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Reduction to the DDH problem. If A was input a DDH tuple (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4),
then we assume uid∗ was chosen so that uid∗ = uidb, which occurs with probability 1/n,
therefore A does not abort during line 4.
If A′ outputs (I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) in the choosing phase that they have queried to the hash
oracle or the SENDFB oracle, we assume b′ = 0 and that this was the q∗th such query,
which occurs with probability 1/2q. Then, provided A does not abort, all inputs to A′ are
distributed identically to the anonymity of feedback experiment.
The probability that A outputs 1 is then
1/2(Pr[Expanon−fb−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 0] + Pr[Expanon−fb−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1])
= 1/2(1−Pr[Expanon−fb−0A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1] + Pr[Expanon−fb−1A′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr) = 1])
= 1/2+ 1/2.
Therefore, A outputs 1 with probability (+ 1)/4qn.
If A′ outputs (I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) in the choosing phase that they have not queried to H or
SENDFB, we assume b′ = 1 is chosen which occurs with probability 1/2, and so A never
outputs early outputting 0. Then, by the same argument, A outputs 1 with probability
(+ 1)/4n.
If (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) is not a DDH tuple, then A still aborts returning 0 in lines 4, 5, 6 with
the same probability. A′ is now given a signature in the guess stage that is independent
of both fuid0 and fuid1 , therefore the probability A′ guesses correctly is 1/2. If A′ queries
USK with uid0, uid1 or SENDFB with uid0, uid1 and (I
∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗), then A outputs 1
with probability 1/2. Therefore, if A′ outputs (I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) in the choosing phase that
they have already queried to the hash oracle or the SENDFB oracle, then the probability A
outputs 1 is (1/2)(1/2qn) = 1/4qn. If A′ outputs (I∗, r∗, t∗,Ω∗) in the choosing phase that
they have not queried to H or SENDFB, then the probability A outputs 1 is (1/2)(1/2n) =
1/4n.
Therefore A has at least a /4qn advantage in distinguishing between DDH tuples.
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USK(uid):
if uid = uid∗ A aborts
else return usk[uid]
POST(I, uid, r, t, ω):
return PostItem(gpk, I, (usk1[uid], ·), r, t, ω)
SENDFB(uid, fb, (I, r, t,Ω)):
if uid = uid∗, d←$Z∗p, A′ ← Qd/β1 , B′ ← Qd1, C ′ ← A′αQdα2 , D′ ← Qd2
S ← H(I, r, t,Ω), ((I, r, t,Ω), S, d′) ∈ HL
J ← Qd′2 ,Simulate pi with A′, B′, C ′, D′, J
return (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi)
else return SendFB(gpk,usk[uid], (I, r, t,Ω), fb)
ALLREP(uid, t, r):
return AllocateReputation(gpk, isk, uid, (usk1[uid], ·), t, r, ID)
H(in):
if ∃(in, out, ·) ∈ HL return out
else d′←$Z∗p, HL← HL ∪ (in, Qd
′
1 , d
′) return Qd
′
1
A(Q1, Q2)
Create empty list HL, uid∗←$U
Compute (gpk, isk, osk,usk) as in Setup, except usk2[uid
∗]
((I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ)←$A′USK,POST,SENDFB,ALLREP,H(gpk, isk, osk)
Extract f∗ from Φ return f∗
Figure A.5: A which breaks the DL problem in G1, usingA′ which breaks non–frameability
for our RS-GS construction
A.4 Non–frameability
Assuming the DL assumption in G1, the SPK is zero–knowledge and simulation sound ex-
tractable and the random oracle model, our RS-GS construction satisfies non–frameability.
Proof. We show that if an adversary A′ exists, such that Pr[Expnon−frameA′,RS-GS (τ,R, rˆ,U ,Aggr)
= 1] = , for some τ,R, rˆ, U ,Aggr with |R| polynomial in τ , n = |U| polynomial in τ ,
and  is non–negligible in τ , then we can can build an adversary A that breaks the DL
problem. We describe A in Figure A.5. We then describe why the simulation given in
Figure A.5 and the non–frameability experiment are indistinguishable to A, and how A′
works.
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We first show that all inputs A provides to A′ are distributed identically to the non–
frameability experiment.
Simulating inputs to A′. (gpk, isk, osk) are chosen in exactly the same way as in
Setup. Provided A does not abort, the USK, POST and ALLREP oracles are the same
as in the non–frameability experiment. If uid 6= uid∗ is input, the SENDFB oracle is
identical to the non–frameability experiment. If uid = uid∗ is input, letting Q2 = Q
f
1 , and
as A′ = Qd/β1 , then B
′ = Qd1 = A′β, C ′ = A′αQdα2 = A′αA′βαf , D′ = Qd2 = B′f . Because
H(I, r, t,Ω) = Qd′1 , J = Qd
′
2 = H(I, r, t,Ω)f . pi can be simulated due to the zero–knowledge
property of the SPK used. Therefore the output of SENDFB is distributed identically to
the anonymity of feedback experiment. The hash oracle is distributed identically to the
random oracle model, because d′ is chosen randomly.
Reduction to the DL problem. Assuming A′ is successful, there is some uid /∈ C such
that (I, r, t,Ω), fb′,Φ′) was output by the SENDFB oracle under input uid, ((I, r, t,Ω), fb,
Φ) was not output by SENDFB under input uid, and LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,
Φ′) = 1. The signature Φ output by A′ was not output by SENDFB with input user
uid′ 6= uid, because otherwise LinkFB(gpk, (I, r, t,Ω), fb,Φ, fb′,Φ′) 6= 1. Therefore, it
is possible to extract f∗. We assume uid = uid∗, which occurs with probability 1/n.
Then A will not abort. Again, let Q2 = Qf1 , and also let ((I, r, t,Ω), S, ·) ∈ HL, and
Φ = (A∗, B∗, C∗, D∗, J∗, pi∗), Φ′ = (A′, B′, C ′, D′, J, pi). As the signatures are linked,
J = Sf = Sf
∗
= J∗, therefore f = f∗ mod p. This means A successfully finds the
discrete logarithm with probability /n.
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